The Promotion of Employee Ownership and Participation by Lowitzsch, Jens & HASHI, Iraj
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Promotion of  
Employee Ownership  
and Participation 
 
 
Study prepared by the Inter-University Centre 
 for European Commission’s DG MARKT  
(Contract MARKT/2013/0191F2/ST/OP) 
 
Final report October 2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
European University Viadrina and 
Inter-University CentreInter-Univ ity Centre 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The information and views set out in this Study are those of the author(s) and do not 
necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Commission. The Commission does not 
guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this Study. Neither the Commission nor 
any person acting on the Commission’s behalf may be held responsible for the use, 
which may be made of the information contained therein. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DOI: 10.2780/1538 
ISBN: 978-92-79-33037-7 
 
 
© European Union, 2014. 
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. 
This document is available on the Internet at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/internal_market/studies/  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Promotion of Employee Ownership  
and Participation 
 
 
Study prepared by the Inter-University Centre 
 for European Commission’s DG MARKT  
(Contract MARKT/2013/0191F2/ST/OP) 
 
Final report October 2014 
 
Abstract 
This Study provides an overview of the development of employee financial participa-
tion, in particular employee share ownership, across the EU-28. Against 
the background of the policy development of the past 30 years, it highlights the 
growth of financial participation of employees over last decade using the most recent 
2013 European Company Survey data which also show employee financial participa-
tion's potential positive impact on employment and productivity. The study analyses 
a range of policy options in depth and makes recommendations to the Commission in 
the form of a five-point plan. Most importantly, it proposes the establishment of a 
Virtual Centre for employee financial participation including an effective tax rate cal-
culator in the short term, the development of a code of conduct in the mid-term, and 
an optional “Common European Regime on Employee Financial Participation” in the 
long term. Overcoming the barriers especially to cross-border plans, is particularly 
important in view of the potential described in this study for EU companies to imple-
ment such schemes and benefit from their impact. 
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Executive summary 
Background and aim of this Study 
The European Commission’s interest in employee financial participation (EFP) has 
grown substantially since publication of the first PEPPER Report in 1991 and the Coun-
cil Recommendation on EFP of 27 July 1992. Opinions drafted by the European Eco-
nomic and Social Committee, most recently in 2010, as well as Reports and Studies by 
the European Parliament and a 2014 Resolution on EFP emphasised the growing 
importance of EFP, particularly with respect to small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs).  
Against this background, the Commission included the promotion of employee share 
ownership (ESO) in its Action Plan to reform European company law and corpo-
rate governance and embarked on the 2013/14 Pilot Project. Based on the most 
recent data on the scope and impact of various EFP schemes in EU companies and the 
legal and regulatory changes in individual Member States, the aim of this Study is to 
identify the main obstacles to cross-border EFP schemes and to develop detailed 
policy recommendations for the promotion and encouragement of employee owner-
ship at EU level.  
Types of EFP plans, their benefits and increasing incidence  
Financial participation of employees can take a variety of forms: 
! individual employee share ownership (employee shares or stock options); 
! Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs, i.e., collective employee share 
ownership, with shares acquired through an intermediary entity, financed by a 
share of profits allocated to employees in addition to their remuneration);  
! profit sharing (PS, i.e., in cash or shares, paid immediately or deferred). 
Thirty years of research have confirmed that companies partly or entirely owned by 
their employees are more profitable, create more jobs and pay more taxes than their 
competitors without employee ownership. At the macroeconomic level, EFP leads to 
higher productivity and, therefore, higher competitiveness and growth as well as stra-
tegic stabilisation of ownership. At the company level, it can contribute to solving 
problems such as absenteeism, labour turnover and the retention of key employees, 
as well as business succession and funding, especially in SMEs and micro-enterprises. 
At the regional level, EFP encourages enterprises to stay rooted in their home com-
munities, enhancing the purchasing power of employee households while discouraging 
outsourcing and hostile takeovers. Of course, it is also important to take into account 
the potential negative aspects associated with ESO, such as the risk borne by employ-
ees. 
The most recent rounds of different large scale cross-country surveys (2010 Euro-
pean Working Conditions Survey, 2010 CRANET, 2013 European Company Survey 
(ECS)) show that in the last 15 years—despite the period of economic and financial 
crisis companies increased their offer while employees continue to expand their partic-
ipation in ESO plans in Europe. According to the ECS data, between 2009 and 2013 
the proportion of firms offering ESO schemes rose from 4.7 per cent to 5.2 per 
cent (an increase of 10 per cent) and that offering PS schemes from 14.3 per cent 
to 30.2 per cent (the incidence more than doubled). 
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Challenges for the promotion of ESO  
The ECS data suggests that firms with ESO or PS schemes are more likely to experi-
ence significant increase in both productivity and employment. However, despite the 
acknowledged positive effects and the widespread use of EFP schemes throughout the 
EU, they have been extended to a significant proportion of the working population in 
only a handful of Member States. Today, about 68 per cent of firms in the EU do 
not provide any form of financial participation to their employees. At the same 
time, the latest analysis of the ECS data estimates that at least 300,000 small firms 
across the entire EU-28 could be potential candidates for the introduction of 
EFP. If these prospective firms actually decided to offer an ESO or PS scheme, there 
would be a significant improvement in both productivity and employment—and there-
by competitiveness—of these firms. 
ESO is much less frequently used in Europe than, e.g., in the U.S. If this still largely 
unexploited potential is to be harnessed, the further development of financial par-
ticipation, ESO in particular, should be part of an overall strategy for stimulating sus-
tainable and inclusive growth of the EU economy. However, barriers especially for 
cross-border EFP plans arise from: a) differences in regulatory density, application 
and legislative requirements of national legal frameworks or b) differences in the fiscal 
treatment of existing schemes. Although the scope and types of these obstacles are 
diverse, the actual effect on the spread of cross-border EFP schemes is the same; 
firms will need to collect a large quantity of information, which will involve high costs 
and considerable expert knowledge—two obstacles that many companies, especially 
SMEs, may not be able to overcome. 
Policy options and recommended measures to promote EFP 
If the policy objectives of promoting EFP at the EU level are to be successful, 
measures beyond the assessment of the current situation and the identification of best 
practice are necessary. Considering the current interest in EFP, triggered by the 2014 
EP Resolution as well as the Pilot Project, immediate action is advisable in order to 
maintain momentum. Information sharing and awareness raising measures are 
crucial in the short to medium term; creating a level playing field for EFP through a 
European legal framework is important in the long term.  
A package of different short, medium and long-term initiatives, combined in a Five-
Point Action Plan to promote EFP coordinated and promoted by the Commission, is 
suggested. As a first step the launch of a “Virtual Centre for EFP”, presented in this 
Study, could be an effective means of making the necessary and relevant information 
provided by this Study available to those needing such information (especially SMEs). 
The promotion of best practice examples for EFP could be best accomplished by means 
of a voluntary Code of Conduct for EFP, to be regularly amended by, e.g., a Com-
mission Expert Group. Parallel measures to raise awareness, e.g., a European EFP 
Day, could accompany and frame the above measures. 
With regard to the much needed transparency on taxation and social security 
contributions for the various national EFP schemes, the online effective tax rate 
calculator, presented in this Study, would make it possible to quantify the effective 
tax burden for EFP schemes across the EU-28 and thus provide a representative com-
parison of the effect of tax systems as well as of specific tax incentives. However, this 
tool would need to be tested with stakeholders and practitioners to collect feedback. 
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The establishment of a binding legal framework on EFP through hard law instruments, 
e.g., by means of a Framework Directive on EFP, would lead to the harmonisation 
of national legislation. This would clearly have the largest impact on removing obsta-
cles to EFP, particularly to cross-border schemes. However, to avoid conflict with ex-
isting national EFP models, a more pragmatic policy option would be to develop and 
implement an optional Common European Regime for EFP either through a Regula-
tion or a Directive. Either variant would present the most ambitious policy option in 
the long term. 
As part of the Pilot Project, the conference “Taking Action: Promotion of Employ-
ee Share Ownership” was organised on 30 January 2014 in Brussels. The Confer-
ence was followed by an online survey of participants. The positive feedback from the 
Survey indicates the commitment of the stakeholders to take actions to promote EFP 
in the future. 
Focus: EFP information centres 
An important element of an information and awareness raising campaign, an integral 
part of the Pilot Project, is the establishment of an information platform for EFP. 
Here, European firms could find both general information on national legal frameworks 
and information on fiscal treatment of different EFP schemes in the EU-28 to assist in 
deciding whether or not to introduce a cross-border plan. The costs, impact and ad-
ministration of such an information platform would differ according to its form, e.g., 
whether they would be physical or virtual. 
A virtual information centre would deliver best results vis-à-vis the given criteria. 
The main advantage of the Virtual Centre for EFP, proposed in this Study, in compari-
son with physical centres, would be to provide quality information at low cost 
(EUR 780,000 compared with EUR 3.6m per year for one physical centre and EUR 
6.2m for 28 centres). The virtual centre is more cost effective since it requires only 
one central administrator. This facilitates quick response to local market changes 
via push updates to the web application and shorter communication lines in general. 
However, the larger and more personal scope of the physical centres could justify their 
higher costs. Their establishment, however, could be made conditional on self-
sustainable financing.  
Programmed as a web-based plug-in, the prototype of the “Virtual Centre for EFP” 
could be easily integrated into an unlimited number of existing websites. Since well-
established information channels used by the target groups would have a multiplier-
effect, the coverage is potentially wide and the cost low. Regular updates of the in-
formation would be managed centrally through the back end. The cost of launch-
ing the Virtual Centre and the CETREPS Calculator for a pilot period of 18 months is 
estimated at EUR 75,000. Once tested, the operating cost for the Calculator (EUR 
100,000 per year) and the annual operating cost of the Virtual Centre (EUR 250,000 
per year) are estimated to be roughly EUR 1m for a pilot phase of three years. 
Legislative proposal for a Common European Regime on EFP 
An optional Common European Regime on EFP would introduce a “market approach” 
to harmonisation, triggering competition between the existing national rules and the 
newly introduced second EU-wide regime, similar to the approach in the proposal for a 
Common European Sales Law.  Employers and employees in all EU Member States 
could choose to operate EFP plans under one single European regulatory 
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framework. At the same time it would do without the conventional EU harmonisation 
procedure. Excluding taxation issues, this proposal would be the least invasive legisla-
tive measure and thus could be expected to achieve the necessary consensus within 
the ordinary legislative procedure according to Art. 114 TFEU.  
Since national best practice influencing the common European regime would be ex-
pected to prevail in this market-based approach, over time this development could 
eventually lead to mutual approximation of national regulation. Furthermore, in 
many countries rules on EFP are only rudimentary. The common European Regime 
would be above all an optional solution to complement national law where rules 
do not or not sufficiently exist. While in some Member States the common Europe-
an regime would introduce coherent rules for the first time, in the majority of coun-
tries, it would overlap only with the area of existing national regulation dealing with a 
specific EFP scheme. Only in a minority of Member States would it actually duplicate 
national law. 
Firms could also utilise the Common European Regime on EFP in domestic settings. 
This advantage is of primary importance for SMEs, which could easily extend a 
plan based on the optional common European regime across borders, as they 
grow and expand. 
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I. Introduction and background 
1. Structure of the Study 
This Study is divided into nine chapters followed by conclusions and four annexes; its 
structure is as follows:  
! This introduction recapitulates the background, policy developments and cur-
rent policy initiatives on employee financial participation (EFP) with a focus on 
employee share ownership (ESO) at the EU level.  
! Chapter II outlines the links between the 2012 Commission Action Plan and the 
Pilot Project on the Promotion of Employee Ownership and Participation, which 
includes the current Study and the related January 2014 Conference, as well as 
the recent policy debates suggesting the current challenges for employee fi-
nancial participation.  
! Chapter III discusses the most recent empirical findings on EFP from the 2009 
and 2013 European Company Surveys with a particular focus on the effects on 
employment and productivity as well as the potential for the introduction of EFP 
schemes.  
! Chapter IV provides an overview of potential policy measures and options to 
promote employee share ownership and possible ways to implement them.  
! Chapter V contains a comparative assessment of the policy options and formu-
lates recommended measures to promote EFP, i.e., a Five Point Plan to pro-
mote EFP.  
! Chapter VI briefly summarises the main outreach event of the Pilot Project, 
i.e., the January 2014 Conference “Taking Action: Promotion of Employee 
Share Ownership” with its results, and reports on the results of a survey car-
ried out among the participants of the conference. 
! Chapter VII analyses the feasibility of the establishment of Information Cen-
tre(s) for EFP.  
! A description of The Virtual Centre for EFP and the CETREPS effective tax rate 
calculator for EFP schemes developed for this project follows in Chapter VIII. 
! Finally, Chapter IX provides an assessment of the proposed optional Common 
European Regime on Employee Financial Participation.  
The separate annexes contain (i) an overview of the results of the assessment of the 
present situation regarding EFP in the 28 EU Member States (EU-28), (ii) a review of 
literature on EFP, (iii) examples of best practice models for employee share ownership 
from the EU-28 and (iv) the background econometric work on the impact of EFP 
schemes on company performance and the potential number of companies, which may 
offer EFP schemes—the non-technical results of which are presented in Chapter III. 
This Study is based on the most recent data on the scope and impact of various EFP 
schemes in EU companies. It draws on this information and the most recent legal and 
regulatory changes in individual Member States to develop detailed policy recommen-
dations for concrete actions to implement the Commission’s policies on the promotion 
of employee ownership. In some aspects the conclusions of this Study are similar to a 
number of previous policy documents (particularly those by the 2003 High Level Ex-
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pert Group), which, however, were not followed. But unlike previous studies the rec-
ommendations of this Study come at a particular point in time, where both the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Commission have shown an explicit interest in taking con-
crete action. Therefore, it includes an in-depth assessment of a number of potential 
initiatives, which could be the basis for future decision-making within the Commission. 
2. Context, aims and scope of the Pilot Project  
The European Commission’s interest in employee financial participation has grown 
substantially since publication of the first PEPPER (Promotion of Employee Participa-
tion in Profits and Enterprise Results) Report (details of the policy development are 
described in section 3d below). With the Recommendation on EFP of 27 July 1992, the 
Council encouraged its active promotion by all Member States. To move the issue for-
ward, in 2002 the Commission published a Communication on a framework for the 
promotion of employee financial participation. Opinions drafted by the European Eco-
nomic and Social Committee (the most recent in 2010) as well as Reports and Studies 
by the European Parliament and a 2014 Resolution further emphasised the growing 
importance of EFP, particularly with respect to small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs). This was the background for the Commission putting promotion of employee 
shareholding on its Action Plan to reform European company law and corporate gov-
ernance1 and embarking on the 2013/2014 Pilot Project, which includes this Study. 
In the introduction to the Action Plan, the Commission notes the shareholders' appar-
ent disinterest in holding management accountable for their decisions and actions and 
links this to the fact that many shareholders hold their shares for only a short time. 
Since employee shareholding is a type of long-term investment, it could serve as a 
counterweight to short-term speculation and help to stabilise the capital markets. The 
Commission stresses, that the interest of employees in the sustainability of their em-
ployer firm should be a factor in the design of any well-functioning governance frame-
work. The Action Plan cites research conducted in preparation of the 2011 Green Paper 
on corporate governance, indicating that ESO schemes can play an important part in 
increasing the proportion of long-term shareholders. In respect to transparency, re-
sponsibility and competitiveness, the three areas identified by the Action Plan as stag-
es for possible future action, ESO is considered as an important means of encouraging 
shareholders to engage more actively in corporate governance. If the majority of 
shareholders remain passive, not seeking to interact with management and failing to 
exercise their voting rights, any form of corporate governance will be less effective. 
The Commission has committed itself to several measures intended to encourage 
long-term shareholding. However, inasmuch as many different issues are involved 
(such as taxation, social security contributions and labour law) the Commission has 
highlighted the importance of analysing ESO in more detail, particularly its internal 
market dimension, stating that: 
“the Commission will identify and investigate potential obstacles to trans-
national employee share ownership schemes, and will subsequently take ap-
propriate action to encourage employee share ownership throughout Europe” 
(EC Communication Action Plan 2012 p. 11).  
                                           
1  See Action Plan: European company law and corporate governance - a modern legal framework for more 
engaged shareholders and sustainable companies, COM(2012)0740; section 3.5. Employee share owner-
ship.  
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In response to this Commission goal, the Pilot Project, and this Study in particular, will 
undertake to:  
(1) Assess EFP across the EU-28, explaining the reasons for widely divergent ap-
proaches between Member States and identifying problems with cross-border im-
plementation of EFP schemes; and 
(2) Analyse regulatory and non-regulatory actions that might be proposed or under-
taken by the Commission to promote EFP and in particular ESO.  
Within these parameters, the principal concerns of this Study are the elimination of 
cross-border obstacles, the setting up of Information Centre(s) for ESO and the chal-
lenges confronting small and medium sized companies.  
3. Types of employee financial participation plans in the EU  
Financial participation of employees is a form of remuneration, in addition to regular 
pay systems, that enables employees to participate in profits and enterprise results 
(Uvali! 1991; Robinson et al. 1995). It can take a variety of forms: 
! individual employee share ownership (employee shares or stock options but 
excluding executive stock options); 
! Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs, i.e., collective employee share own-
ership, with shares acquired through an intermediary entity, financed by a 
share of profits allocated to employees in addition to their remuneration);  
! profit sharing (in cash or shares, paid immediately or deferred), including gain 
sharing. 
Individual employee share ownership (ESO) provides for employee participation 
in enterprise results in indirect ways, through receiving dividends, through apprecia-
tion of share values, or both. Shares may be distributed for free or may be sold at 
market price or under preferential conditions.2 The latter may include sale at a dis-
count rate (Discounted Stock Purchase Plan), sale at a lower price through forms of 
delayed payment (usually within a capital increase), or by giving priority in public of-
ferings to all or a group of employees. 
There are also employee stock options, which—unlike executive stock options granted 
to reward individual performance—are broad-based and offered to all or a majority of 
employees. The company grants employees an option, which entitles them to acquire 
shares in the company at a later date, but at a price fixed at the time the option is 
granted. The potential gain from rising share prices is the primary reward conferred by 
options. 
In Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs) the acquisition of shares is facilitat-
ed through a separate intermediary entity usually set up by the company and financed 
by a profit share paid in addition to wages and—of course—dividends of the shares 
acquired. Essentially the structure is as follows: 
                                           
2  To defer the valuation problem in unlisted SMEs, capital participation may initially take the form of an 
employee loan to the company, creating corporate debt (external capital) subsequently converted into 
company shares. Valuation of the shares designated for acquisition through the loan can be postponed 
until the moment of the actual conversion into shares (debt-to-equity) without impeding the implemen-
tation of the scheme. 
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! The company establishes an employee share ownership fund for the benefit of 
its employees and shares are held and managed in the trust by a separate enti-
ty (in continental Europe by a limited company, foundation or association; in 
the UK, Ireland and North America usually a trust). 
! The fund is financed by a combination of company contributions and loans. The 
former are free shares or cash, usually as part of a profit-sharing agreement 
with the employees. The trust may borrow money directly from a bank or from 
the company, which may utilise a loan from a bank or other lender.  
! Shares are either acquired directly from existing shareholders or through a new 
share issue. They are held collectively in trust, and are only allocated to indi-
vidual employees accounts, or distributed, after a specific holding period.  
! The loan may be repaid by direct cash contributions from the company to the 
fund, by monies received from sale of shares to the share-based profit-sharing 
scheme, or by dividends on the shares held in the fund. 
Profit sharing (PS)—strictly defined—means the sharing of profits between employ-
ers and employees by giving the latter—in addition to a fixed wage—a variable income 
directly linked to profits or some other measure of enterprise results. In contrast to 
individual incentives, this concept involves a collective scheme, which generally in-
cludes all employees. In practice, profit sharing can take various forms. The formula 
may include profits, productivity and return on investments. It can provide employees 
with immediate or deferred benefits, it can be paid in cash, enterprise shares or other 
securities, or it can be allocated to special funds invested for the benefit of employees. 
A related form of participation is the concept of gain sharing, which is designed to pro-
vide variable pay, and usually to encourage employee involvement, by rewarding em-
ployees for improvements in individual and organizational performance. Gains, meas-
ured by a predetermined formula, are shared with employees, usually through cash 
bonuses. These constitute an addition to the basic salary and usually are intended to 
reward individual or small unit performance.3   
Although employee share ownership and profit sharing are often used in combination, 
a distinction has to be made between the two, particularly because of fundamental dif-
ferences in taxation and with regards to participation in decision-making. Both forms 
are often embedded in asset accumulation or employee savings plans which offer a 
vehicle to allocate and invest sums received in other schemes. While profit sharing, 
employee share schemes and stock options are relatively widespread in the European 
Union, ESOPs are predominantly found in countries with an Anglo-American tradition, 
e.g., the United Kingdom and Ireland (Shanahan and Hennessy 1998). However, 
ESOP-like schemes exist in other countries, e.g., in France, where enterprise mutual 
investment funds (FCPE) pool monies from profit-sharing schemes and voluntary em-
ployee and employer matching contributions are made to buy shares in the employer 
company, take part in capital increases, or receive free shares.4 With regard to em-
ployee share ownership it should be kept in mind that in practice—whether shares are 
                                           
3  The formulas for measuring employee performance vary considerably; piece rates and productivity bo-
nuses are most common, but other performance indicators may be employed, such as profit, productivi-
ty, costs, sales, etc. (Vaughan-Whitehead 1995 pp. 2). 
4  According to the Association Francaise de la Gestion Financière (AFG) in 2013, out of a total of EUR 98bn 
managed in FCPEs, ca. EUR 37bn were invested in share plans of the employer company. 
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held individually or under some form of trust—does not automatically entitle employee 
shareholders to have a say in the operation of the company (Pérotin 2002 p. 8). 
In order to link these many and very diverse EFP models found in the EU Member 
States, a Commission financed project has developed the “Building Block Approach”, 
which includes all the above-mentioned forms of financial participation practised and 
stresses the potential of combining different forms of EFP tailored to the situation and 
needs of individual enterprises (Lowitzsch et al. 2008).5 This Approach reflects the 
postulates of the 2002 Commission Communication, i.e. that all EFP schemes should: 
be regularly applied; be calculated according to a predetermined formula; be treated 
as an addition to wages; provide variable employee benefits linked to enterprise per-
formance; have all employees as beneficiaries; cover all types of enterprises, both pri-
vate and public; be used in all enterprises irrespective of size; be simple; include em-
ployee information and education; be voluntary. The European Parliament has also 
endorsed it.6 
Therefore, and since employee share ownership is often funded by profit sharing 
schemes, this Study reviews the entire range of EFP although the focus of the Pilot 
Project is on employee ownership.   
4. Reasons for and the scale of adoption of EFP schemes in the EU  
In the last decade, EFP has been moved up the EU policy agenda because of its bene-
fits both perceived and demonstrated. At the same time, though slow to take off, both 
the offer of EFP schemes by enterprises and their take-up by employees have picked 
up surprising momentum between 2000 and 2013. These developments are discussed 
in this section. 
a) Overview of the benefits of financial participation of employees 
The theoretical and empirical literature (for details see Annex 2) over the past three 
decades points to the following important benefits of EFP (particularly ESO) to firms:  
! By strengthening employees’ commitment to, and identification with, the firm 
EFP makes the company more productive and hence more competitive.7  
! Firms in which employees have an ownership stake are more profitable, create 
more jobs and are better taxpayers than firms without ESO schemes. In fact, 
businesses with substantial employee ownership perform better than conven-
                                           
5  With forewords of the then Presidents of the European Parliament Hans Gert Pöttering (DE/EN/FR) and 
Jerzy Buzek (PL). 
6   Own-Initiative Report on financial participation of employees in companies’ proceeds; 2013/2127(INI) - 
18 December 2013, recommendation no 19. 
7  For example, a survey of 70 empirical studies on the effects of employee stock ownership, broad-based 
stock options, profit sharing, and employee participation by Blasi, Kruse and Bernstein (2003) found that 
the adoption of any of the scheme had led to an average rise in productivity by 4 per cent, return on eq-
uity (ROE) by 14 per cent, return on assets (ROA) by 12 per cent and profit margins by 11 per cent; an-
other survey of some 70 papers by Kaarsemaker (2006) found that 48 of the 70 reviewed studies had 
shown a positive effect, while only 6 studies had found negative effects. A third survey of the literature 
on employee- owned firms by Freeman (2007) corroborates the earlier survey results that most of the 
surveyed papers showed that the sample firms were more productive and profitable, survive longer, and 
result in better shareholder returns. 
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tional firms over the long term as illustrated by the UK Employee Ownership 
Index, which has grown faster in comparison to the FTSE 100 index.8  
! ESO provides a potential solution to the business succession problem, effecting 
a smooth transition of the ownership and management of family enterprises 
and SMEs, thus keeping them rooted in the community and securing continuity 
and employment.9 This is a serious problem inasmuch as, according to 2011 
figures, each year some 450,000 firms in the EU look for successors, affecting 
up to 2 million employees. Every year, there is a risk of losing approximately 
150,000 companies and 600,000 jobs due to inefficient business transfers.10  
! Financial participation strengthens corporate governance since employees are 
long-term shareholders par excellence. 
! EFP can also assist in recruiting and retaining highly qualified and skilled em-
ployees, especially in SMEs, by providing benefits in addition to wages (IAFP 
2010; Soppe and Houweling 2014).  
! Financial participation is often regarded as a solution to some of the chronic 
problems of industrial society, i.e., employee dissatisfaction, low quality of 
working life and declining productivity. It has been shown that EFP schemes 
are likely to decrease absenteeism and labour turnover and to reduce internal 
conflicts (McDonnell, Macknight and Donelly 2012; Robinson and Zhang 2005; 
Wilson and Peel 1991). 
! Companies with employee ownership also tend to be economically more resili-
ent in tough economic times (The Nuttall Review 2012 pp. 24; Lamper, Bhalla 
and Pushkar 2010; Blair, Kruse and Blasi 2000). 
! Companies with ESO do not relocate as easily and are more strongly embedded 
in their local communities and regions. 
! ESO directly connects to the Europe 2020 strategy, especially to the challenge 
of meeting the long-term financing needs of companies.11  
! By extending capital ownership to employees and their families, ESO can help 
reduce inequality. 
The impact of EFP on company performance, of course, varies from case to case, de-
pending on multiple factors such as the extent of employee share ownership or profit 
sharing, the qualification structure of employees and the type of industry in which the 
firm operates (more on this in Chapter III).  
Despite the cited benefits, the concept of employee financial participation has been 
criticised on a number of grounds such as the “free riding”, creating confusion be-
tween the roles of managers and workers, and the excessive risk borne by employees.  
                                           
8  http://www.employeeownershipindex.co.uk/wiki/index.php5?title=The_Employee_Ownership_Index. 
9  For the role of ESO in facilitating business succession as well as a summary of other advantages, see 
The Nuttall Review (2013); the UK government recently introduced tax incentives for employee owner-
ship trusts in the context of business successions. 
10  See European Commission 2011, Business Dynamics: Start-ups, Business Transfers and Bankruptcy, 
final report for DG Enterprise, p. 95, 96 and 100. 
11  See point 7 of the Communication from the Commission to the EP and the Council on Long-Term Financ-
ing of the European Economy, COM(2014)0168 final. 
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On the whole, these issues have remained largely at a theoretical level and not sup-
ported by large-scale empirical evidence (Kaarsemaker 2006). The literature review in 
Annex 2 discusses the research on the evidence of both benefits and shortcomings of 
EFP schemes. It is of course the case that both profit sharing and share ownership in-
volve a certain amount of risk for employees. Profit is determined not only by employ-
ees’ efforts, but also by management decisions and external factors outside of their 
control. Firms and employees have developed mechanisms to mitigate some of the 
potential problems, which may arise in firms with EFP schemes. 
b) The development of financial participation schemes in the EU-28  
The number of firms offering EFP schemes to their employees, though slow to take off, 
has grown over the years in most EU countries. The most recent rounds of various 
cross-country surveys (conducted in the last five years) show that EFP generally has 
continued to expand in Europe despite of the 2008-09 financial crisis. This is true of 
both profit sharing and employee share ownership, although profit sharing is more 
widespread. 
! The European Working Conditions Surveys (EWCS) conducted in 2005 and 
201012 indicate that the proportion of company employees participating in EFP 
schemes increased between the two Surveys (9.1 per cent to 13.5 per cent for 
profit sharing and 2.3 per cent to 3.3 per cent for employee ownership).  
! This rise is to some extent reflected in the CRANET Surveys (Cranfield Network 
on International Human Resource Management) conducted also in 2005 and 
201013, showing that between 2005 and 2010 the proportion of employees to 
whom broad-based EFP schemes were offered increased from a weighted aver-
age 17.7 to 19.9 per cent for employee ownership, with a slight decline from 
33.6 to 32.5 per cent for profit sharing. 
! The European Company Surveys14 conducted in 2009 and 2013 show that the 
proportion of companies offering ESO and PS schemes to their employees in-
creased between the two surveys too; the proportion of companies offering 
ESO schemes rose from 4.7 per cent to 5.2 per cent (an increase of 10 per 
cent) and the proportion of companies offering PS schemes during the same 
period more than doubled from 14.3 per cent to 30.2 per cent. 
As expected, the ECS 2009 and 2013 data confirm results from previous research that 
the size of a company is closely related to the incidence of EFP, especially that of em-
                                           
12  This is a large survey of some 30,000 individuals in 30 European countries undertaken by the European 
Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) every four or five years.  
The 2010 Survey covered 43,816 randomly selected individuals in 34 countries (including all EU Member 
States and candidate countries as well as some non-EU countries). 
13  This is a survey of companies with more than 200 employees undertaken by a network of universities 
co-ordinated by the Cranfield School of Management (Cranfield University, U.K.) approximately every 
four or five years since 1992. In 2010, the number of companies surveyed was 6,258 and only 20 Mem-
ber States of the EU were included. 
14  This is a regular survey of European companies conducted by the European Foundation. It covers some 
30,000 companies in 30 European countries (all EU Member States and candidate countries). The size 
distribution of the ECS sample is not according to the distribution in the population (large companies are 
over-represented while small companies are under-represented). For this reason, the data has to be 
weighted in order to be representative of the population. The Survey database also contains weights cal-
culated in a scientific manner by the Eurofound. All information relating to ECS data in this Study are 
weighted using published weights. 
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ployee share ownership. It indicates that large firms almost always have higher levels 
of EFP schemes than medium and especially small companies. (A more detailed dis-
cussion of the trend of EFP adoption and its impact can be found in Chapter III). 
In summary, the expansion of the EFP schemes in the most recent period (2009-13), 
which also forms the basis of the empirical evidence of this Study, has been very dif-
ferent for ESO and PS schemes, with the latter expanding significantly faster than the 
former. This seems to reflect the environment after the financial crisis when firms 
used profit sharing as a mechanism to incentivise employees while increasing wage 
flexibility. However, the reasons for the different incidence of ESO and PS in different 
countries are many, including also some general issues such as: (i) the concepts of 
ESO and PS are very different and not many companies have yet been convinced of 
the benefits of ESO; (ii) the implementation of ESO is more complex and involves 
higher administrative costs while the adoption of a profit-sharing scheme is fairly 
straightforward and simple; and (iii) the attitudes of employers and trade unions have 
been less supportive of ESO. There are of course other reasons for this phenomenon, 
which are still unknown to observers and require more investigation which has been 
outside the scope of this Study. 
5. Employee financial participation on the EU policy agenda  
The Commission started to investigate financial participation with the Green Paper on 
Employee Participation in November 197515 and the Memorandum on Employee Partic-
ipation in Asset Formation in August 197916. The topic has been in the Commission's 
focus of attention since 1991 when it commissioned a research project specifically in-
tended to obtain an overview of "state of the art" financial participation of employees 
in the EU. The results were published as the first PEPPER Report (Uvali! 1991). The 
Report was followed by a number of measures designed to promote employee financial 
participation in the Member States. Some of the main steps in this process were: 
! A Council Recommendation followed up this first report in 199217, which em-
phasised the importance the Community attached to the use of financial partic-
ipation schemes and called for the direct involvement of Member States and 
the social partners. In January 1997, the Commission adopted the PEPPER II 
report (Commission of the European Communities 1997), which reviewed the 
effects of the earlier mentioned recommendation 92/443/EEC in the Member 
States. 
! The conclusions of these reports were the basis of a Communication on a 
framework for the promotion of EFP, which the Commission launched in 2002.18 
This communication established a working group of independent experts to an-
alyse legal and legislative obstacles to the transnational diffusion of employee 
financial participation and offered concrete proposals for dealing with them. 
The Commission published the report of this high-level expert group on 'cross-
                                           
15  COM(75)570; see in particular Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 8, 1975, p. 31. 
16  Memorandum on employee participation in asset formation, COM(79)190. 
17 Council Recommendation 92/443/EEC of 27 July 1992 concerning the promotion of employee participa-
tion in profits and enterprise results, including equity participation. 
18 European Commission Communication on a framework for the promotion of employee financial participa-
tion, in July 2002 (COM(2002)364 final). 
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border obstacles to financial participation of employees for companies having a 
transnational dimension' in 2003.19 
! The PEPPER III Report (Lowitzsch 2006) extended the previous two reports to 
cover the new Member States and candidate countries (Croatia, Bulgaria, Ro-
mania and Turkey) of the EU. In 2009, the PEPPER IV Report summarised and 
updated the previous reports (Lowitzsch, Hashi and Woodward 2009). Provid-
ing conclusive evidence that the previous decade had seen a significant expan-
sion of employee financial participation in Europe, it also reported that despite 
this positive trend only a handful of countries have extended financial participa-
tion to a significant proportion of the working population. 
! The promotion of employee share ownership received further boost from the 
Commission by being included in the 2012 Action Plan to reform European 
company law and corporate governance and by making “business transfers” 
one of the priorities of the 2013 Entrepreneurship 2020 Action Plan20 a field, 
where employee share ownership plans could play a crucial role.   
The European Economic and Social Committee has emphasised the potential of ESOPs 
in business transfers in its 2010 Own-Initiative Opinion with reference to previous mo-
tions of the European Parliament. In its Opinion, which linked this issue with the Eu-
rope 2020 Strategy, the EESC noted that "the introduction of EFP can help business in 
Europe, especially SMEs, to improve their competitiveness by increasing employees' 
loyalty and identification with the company, in good times and bad".21  
The European Parliament also has repeatedly taken a positive stand on promoting em-
ployee financial participation. 
! Notably, in its Resolution of 6 May 2009 on the Renewed Social Agenda, the 
European Parliament suggested that "the social partners at national level dis-
cuss new methodologies for wage policies, which could reverse the current de-
clining percentage relation between salaries and profits and include higher fi-
nancial participation of employees in companies' proceeds through the use of 
schemes that mitigate the impact of inflation." It further suggested that "such 
schemes could allow for channelling employees' extra earnings to special capi-
tal funds created by companies". It also called for "a debate regarding ways of 
encouraging companies to engage in those methodologies” and furthermore 
calls for “a debate regarding legal frameworks that regulate the access of em-
ployees to those funds in a gradual way over time".22  
! In 2012 the European Parliament commissioned a study to provide a compre-
hensive appraisal of the development of EFP in the EU. In the same year a Eu-
ropean Parliament hearing on the issue of EFP laid the ground for the Pilot Pro-
ject and, therefore, this Study. 
                                           
19  See Report of the High Level Group of Independent Experts on Cross-Border Obstacles to Financial Par-
ticipation of Employees for Companies Having a Transnational Dimension (European Commission 2003).  
20 Communication from the Commission; Entrepreneurship 2020 Action Plan – reigniting the entrepreneuri-
al spirit in Europe, European Commission (COM(2012)795 final), January 2013.  
21 Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee on Employee financial participation in Europe, 
SOC/371, October 2010. 
22 European Parliament Resolution of 6 May 2009 on the Renewed social agenda, P6_TA (2009)0370. 
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! Finally, the European Parliament underlined the importance of promoting EFP 
at the EU level addressing all of the issues covered here. In its most recent 
Own-Initiative Report on financial participation of employees in companies’ 
proceeds that was adopted on 14 January 201423, it recommends various in-
struments to facilitate the implementation of cross-border EFP schemes. These 
include setting up information centres on EFP, developing an effective transna-
tional tax rate calculator and exploring the possibility of constructing a 29th re-
gime to implement an optional European regulation on EFP. 
The following figure shows the different policy initiatives at the EU level on the subject 
of employee financial participation: 
 
                                           
23  European Parliament Own-Initiative report: Financial participation of employees in companies’ proceeds, 
2013/2127(INI) T7-0013/2014. 
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Figure 1. Policy initiatives on em
ployee financial participation at EU
 level. 
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II. The Action Plan and ESO – links with current policy 
debates and challenges 
1. Links between employee shareholding and corporate governance 
As mentioned above, in December 2012 the Commission included the promotion of 
employee share ownership (ESO) in its Action Plan to reform European company law 
and corporate governance. This signalled a new appreciation of EFP, and particularly 
ESO, as a policy area, while in the 1990s it had been predominantly regarded as relat-
ed to social policy.  
While the focus in the Action Plan with regard to ESO is on “engaging shareholders”, 
the positive effects of ESO (see Chapter I, 4. a) are of course relevant to all three are-
as targeted by the Action Plan, i.e., transparency, responsibility and competitiveness. 
ESO broadens the role of employees and elevates their status. In so doing, ESO con-
tributes to: 
! Higher transparency of remuneration: Employee shareholders having a “say on 
pay” contribute to making executive compensation transparent, a step toward 
more sustainable remuneration policies. As knowledgeable insiders they can 
exercise more effective “oversight” than other shareholders. 
! A switch from short-term to long-term incentives: Companies with a significant 
employee shareholder base gain a bloc of exacting but loyal shareholders com-
posed of their own employees who understand the firm more intimately than 
outsiders ever could. Employee shareholders can support management in re-
sisting the short-term actions of the financial markets; they may also impose 
some constraint on opportunistic management and short-term policies. 
! Making EU firms more competitive through productivity gains arising from in-
creased employee loyalty and identification with the company: Employee share 
ownership can increase employee participation and reward the assumption of 
new responsibilities at both the shop floor and shareholder levels. 
Good corporate governance, of course, improves company performance and thus ben-
efits all shareholders and stakeholders. But, since the link between ESO and better 
corporate governance is complex, it may be helpful to review the main related argu-
ments and findings. Issues such as information sharing, long-term shareholding and 
participation in decision-making are interlinked; by regarding employees not just as 
another factor of production, but as shareholders and stakeholders, employees are 
encouraged to actively contribute to good corporate governance. 
a) ESO contributing to information sharing 
Anyone with an important stake in a company, such as his/her own job or savings, 
naturally wants full transparency on company accounts and company decisions; em-
ployee owners would push for transparency of accounts. Participation based on share 
ownership complements participation based on information and consultation. To en-
courage positive attitudes and behaviour, management also needs to adopt such prac-
tices as information sharing, clarifying and strengthening the link between individual 
and organisational performance, and employee participation in decision-making into 
their incentive plan. These measures complement EFP (Pendleton and Robinson 2010). 
Well-informed employees can also make significant contributions to the effectiveness 
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of company boards, especially to their important function of monitoring and oversee-
ing management. 
The company should also supply employees with detailed, independent and timely in-
formation on firm performance and its determinants so that employees can better un-
derstand the financial risks and benefits associated with joining a scheme (Pérotin and 
Robinson 2002). Information sharing can attract employees who otherwise might not 
involve themselves in company affairs. Moreover, employee shareholders have an in-
centive to provide the management with useful information on shop floor level. Finan-
cial participation, in particular ESO, would enhance information sharing because of the 
closer alignment between individual employees and corporate interests; this is also 
likely to improve company decisions. 
For non-employee shareholders, it is advantageous to know that they have the com-
pany's employees as fellow shareholders pursuing the same objectives. ESO also ap-
pears to benefit the firm by increasing disclosure to all of its stakeholders. (Bova, Dou 
and Hope 2013) Employee shareholders are better positioned to monitor and exercise 
oversight on management than any other entity. They also have an incentive to moni-
tor their fellow employees. This can potentially improve corporate governance within 
the company. The presence of employee shareholders should assure other long-term 
investors, such as institutional shareholders, that the company’s long-term interests 
will prevail. 
b) ESO contributing to participation in decision-making 
Employee participation in the decision-making process and employee financial partici-
pation are regarded as complementary, with the potential to reinforce the beneficial 
effects of each on productivity and the quality of management. Financial participation 
gives employees an additional incentive for involvement, while participation in deci-
sion-making gives them a means of doing so. Financial participation thus rewards re-
sults—i.e., profits—while participation in decision-making offers employees ways and 
means to actually make the firm more profitable—not by working necessarily harder 
but smarter, and by eliminating the organizational and other bottlenecks and ineffi-
ciencies that impede production and increase costs.   
Participation in decision-making is a concept so heavily weighted with ideological con-
notations that it is necessary to state that the term as used here refers to various lev-
els of involvement—having a say on work organization is quite different from partici-
pating in board decisions. The extent of participation in decision-making will be influ-
enced by the home country's history of labour relations24, by how much company 
stock employees own, and many other factors. Concerning financial participation, 
however, three areas of participation have proved to be crucial: information sharing, 
involvement at the shop floor level, and executing voting rights as a shareholder. 
! Because company performance depends on many factors, both internal and ex-
ternal, employees may be reluctant to exert more effort unless they are in-
formed about major decisions, e.g., investment or strategic decisions having an 
impact on profit and share prices. The positive impact of financial participation 
                                           
24 E.g., the consensual continental contrasts with the Anglo-American confrontational model; likewise the 
strong position of the state in France contrasts with the powerful role of the German collective bargain-
ing parties, such as trade unions and employer associations (Pendleton and Poutsma 2004). 
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may depend on providing employees with the information necessary to under-
stand the ways in which firm profitability can be increased. This in turn will in-
fluence employees’ investment decisions, i.e., the decision of whether to ac-
quire shares in their own company. 
! As to active involvement at the shop floor level, it is important that employees’ 
ideas and concerns are taken seriously and that employee suggestions for im-
proving work procedures and operations are put into effect. This is particularly 
important if employees own shares in the company and begin to think like co-
owners. Otherwise the inability to positively influence the company's financial 
results could lead to demoralizing frustration, undermining the positive motiva-
tional effects that financial participation would provide. 
! Regarding participation via shareholder voting rights, employee shareholders 
represent the type of investor, concerned with the long-term performance of 
the firm, not the short-term fluctuations, which may occur from year to year. 
Thus, ESO may involve participation in decision-making through voting rights, 
which—depending on their structure—may be executed individually or collec-
tively via an intermediary entity. Employee shareholders as the natural stew-
ards of their firms will support management’s sustainability-oriented policies. 
In discussing participation via shareholder rights, it is important to emphasise 
that the EU trend towards using an intermediary vehicle, e.g., a trust, as the 
custodian of employee shares, allows pooling of voting rights.25   
c) ESO contributing to remuneration policy reforms 
Executive compensation structures are often cited as one cause of the recent financial 
and economic crisis. The pre-crisis executive compensation structures are criticised for 
putting too much emphasis on short-term variable compensation, thus leading to my-
opic management decisions (Teichmann 2009). Furthermore, by rewarding risk and 
short-term results with out-size bonuses while not penalizing high-risk management 
practices with compensation cuts, they created moral hazard.26 Examples from differ-
ent countries show that when employees control a significant proportion of shares, 
they make effective use of their say on pay.27  
As financial participation is promoted, it fosters a change in the orientation of the re-
muneration system from short-term to long-term. Even if initially limited in extent, 
employee shareholding can be an important support of transparency, eventually be-
                                           
25  These indirect share ownership schemes utilise an intermediary entity to manage the shares held in trust 
for employees. In Britain and Ireland this intermediary vehicle is often an ESOP. At the enterprise level, 
it may also take the form of a combined savings plan and mutual investment fund (e.g., in French 
FCPEs). Pooling voting rights and voting for a trustee to execute them can “professionalise” the man-
agement of employee voting rights. Eventually employee-voting shares may become large enough to se-
cure representation on the company board. See also the 2010 European Economic and Social Committee 
Own-Initiative Opinion SOC 371 on EFP, CESE 1375/2010, OJ C 51, 17.02.2011, p. 1–7.  
26  Empirical evidence from management boards in Sweden (Oxelheim, Wihlborg and Zhang 2010) as well 
as supervisory boards in Germany (Koch and Stadtmann 2012) support these findings. 
27  In the U.S.-based firm Wal-Mart, a group of employee shareholders placed a proxy regarding compensa-
tion (Rodgers 2012). The employees demanded an annual analysis with which the board should ensure 
that Wal-Mart’s compensation schemes discourage managers from making capital investments, which 
might lower the company’s returns. The British ESOP Centre calls these series of actions the “sharehold-
er spring” and further notes that employee shareholders might be the protagonists of “the most capital-
ist of the revolutions” (ESOP Centre 2012). 
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coming, as the employees’ equity and voting rights increase, an influence on compen-
sation systems. If employee shareholders constitute a small minority, as is usually the 
case, then they will serve as a party of interest. Companies embracing EFP, are more 
likely to be transparent and share information with employees, including information 
on executive compensation. Although the extent of shareholding generally will be too 
small to influence compensation packages through voting, employee shareholders can 
put the issue on the agenda of the general assembly. Once employees gain a signifi-
cant minority of shares, they will be able to influence the compensation package as 
institutional shareholders.  
Empirical evidence suggests that employee shareholders being risk averse and having 
their job tied to the fate of their employer face significant incentives to reduce risk and 
are able to influence decisions relating to firm risk (Bova et al. 2012). Employee 
shareholder voting rights along with higher transparency of remuneration schemes will 
give employees closer scrutiny of executive compensation decisions. This should have 
a more positive impact on the orientation of executive compensation toward the long-
term than the vote of an average shareholder:  
! The average shareholder, in general, has a diversified portfolio of shares. He 
does not invest in one single firm only, but in several firms. With his diversified 
portfolio, he is not concerned about the performance of an individual firm, but 
is rather interested in a satisfactory relationship between risk and return (Mar-
kowitz 1952). In addition, for this type of shareholder, the transaction cost of 
share trading is low and when the stocks he holds are not performing as de-
sired, he can sell them and invest somewhere else.  
! For an employee shareholder the situation is different: His is a non-diversified 
position with his job as well as his previous savings linked to the survival of the 
firm. Depending on the provisions of a specific EFP scheme, employees might 
well invest more heavily in company shares since they are often discounted 
and thus more attractive than shares of other firms. If shares are a compensa-
tion component, there could be restrictions on the time of sale. Furthermore, 
the employee shareholder would have higher transaction costs and thus, is less 
able than the average shareholder to sell his shares. These considerations give 
employee shareholders a vital interest in executive compensation that is ori-
ented toward the long term because this fosters a balanced attitude on risk.   
It is sometimes argued that employee shareholders do not have the expertise to exe-
cute their voting rights so as to achieve the beneficial influence described. However, 
this possibility should be to some extent mitigated by the probable presence of a com-
pensation expert on the remuneration committee, which will be present at the annual 
general meeting where remuneration is decided.  
2. Current challenges of EFP 
In deciding to actively encourage EFP throughout the European Union and to identify 
and investigate potential obstacles to transnational EFP schemes, the Commission has 
taken an important step. However, serious challenges remain. 
By raising productivity, stimulating economic growth and stabilising employment, EFP 
can help to expand the single market, thus contributing to the goals of the Europe 
2020 strategy. But in order to achieve these goals, EFP itself requires a single market. 
As European firms operate across national borders, so also must their ESO schemes. 
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Bottlenecks to cross-border application of EFP schemes and for transferability of na-
tional schemes must be identified and eliminated. For example, whereas employees of 
large multinational enterprises can at least partly benefit from transferable schemes, 
employees of SMEs with operations in other EU Member States, as a rule, have no ac-
cess to such schemes because of the complexity and costs of transfer. 
Recent research depicts very diverse scenarios throughout the European Union; while 
some Member States have introduced legislation and tax incentives to promote the 
development of employee financial participation, this practice is much less popular in 
others (for an overview of the status quo in the EU-28 see the table in Annex 1). The 
costs, administrative burdens and other complexities have also hampered the intro-
duction of financial participation schemes across the EU, particularly in small or medi-
um sized transnational enterprises (IAFP 2011 pp. 20). In 2003 the Commission set 
up a High Level Expert Group to deliver an in-depth analysis of obstacles to EFP for 
transnational companies. The group's report identifies differences between the legal 
and tax frameworks in different countries as the major obstacles to cross-border EFP 
schemes.28 Research undertaken for this Study confirms this analysis.  
Difficulties may arise from: a) differences in application and regulatory density of na-
tional legislative frameworks and their legislative requirements on the implementation 
of EFP schemes, or b) differences in the fiscal treatment of different schemes. 
a) Differences between national legal frameworks on EFP 
Considering regulatory density, we observe that some countries—among them 
France, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Slovenia—provide detailed rules on 
and considerable support for EFP schemes, while a large number of Member States, 
including Germany, the Netherlands and Poland, stipulate only a few rules for the im-
plementation of EFP schemes. Some countries, such as Luxemburg, Portugal and 
Sweden, have been passive with no specific regulations on EFP (for details see the 
overview table on Table 1). However, the overall trend is positive: In the past, the 
general attitude of governments and social partners had shown a dearth of concrete 
policy measures supporting EFP schemes, with limited interest on the part of trade un-
ions and employers’ organisations in about half of the countries. The last decade has 
seen a general, positive shift in attitude across the EU, with the number of passive 
countries decreasing from half to about a third of the total.  
It is important to stress that the update of the country data since the PEPPER IV Re-
port, which is undertaken in this Study, seems to indicate a West-East divide with re-
spect to share ownership which however is narrowing. Initial differences (Lowitzsch 
2006) were probably due to the different genesis of EFP in the EU-15 and the EU-12:  
! In the EU–15, a generally favourable attitude in a given country has usually led 
to some supportive legislation for EFP schemes, which in turn has spread their 
practice. This suggests a clear link between national attitudes, legislation and 
diffusion. In general the development of EFP was a progressive evolution of pay 
system and work organisation process.  
                                           
28 Report of the High Level Group of independent experts, on cross-border obstacles to financial participa-
tion of employees for companies having a transnational dimension, Commission of the European Com-
munities, December 2003. 
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! A quite different situation prevailed in the countries, which have jointed the Eu-
ropean Union since 2004. Few laws specifically address employee financial par-
ticipation, and these refer almost exclusively to employee share ownership; 
legislation on profit sharing is rare. Although employees were frequently of-
fered privileged conditions for buying shares of their employer companies, the 
purpose was not to motivate employees to become more efficient and produc-
tive. Occasionally the issue of social justice (the fact that workers had suffered 
under the socialist regime and therefore should be compensated) was raised. 
But, on the whole, this method was simply an expedient mechanism for privat-
ising state-owned enterprises for which there were no buyers at the time. It 
was essentially a decision made by default. 
Furthermore, in the former socialist countries, ESO has been largely ignored and even 
viewed with suspicion by governments and employers. In these countries, ideas such 
as “co-operatives” or “worker ownership” were associated with the former regime 
(something that they were trying to move away from) and there was no interest to 
encourage such ideas. Even though in the course of the privatisation programmes in 
almost all of these countries, employees acquired (or were given) significant shares of 
companies, employee ownership declined rapidly in the early years of transition with 
employees selling their shares on the market (Uvali! and Vaughan-Whitehead 1997). 
It has taken some twenty years for these countries to realise that genuine employee 
ownership can be a feature of developed market economies and something that can 
contribute to the growth of productivity and competitiveness. 
In combination with differences in legislative requirements concerning EFP 
schemes, the heterogeneity of national rules becomes an obstacle, especially to the 
implementation of cross border plans. Examples of requirements, which hinder cross-
border plans are rules pertaining to the involvement of employees in the introduction 
of such schemes, the coverage of EFP plans, the eligibility criteria, the retention peri-
od, or the rules on investment and administration of funds. The legal framework—
being a premise for implementation schemes—is the most fundamental of the 
measures in place to promote EFP. The presence or absence of specific regulations is 
directly related to conducive and non-conducive legal arrangements. Thus, establish-
ing EFP schemes through legislation is of first importance. Schemes approved through 
legislation give companies a distinct legal basis and provide them with a clear frame-
work for decisions and actions.  
b) Issues related to taxation and social security contributions  
Tax incentives are important tools for enhancing and broadening financial participa-
tion. When properly designed, they promote the spread of EFP effectively29 but they 
                                           
29 Countries with a long tradition of tax incentives for EFP (e.g., UK, France) confirm this point, but so do 
countries where tax incentives are quite recent, e.g., Austria. In France, legislation on voluntary em-
ployee financial participation without tax incentives of 1959 and even legislation on compulsory employ-
ee financial participation without tax incentives of 1967 did not lead to a significant number of plans in 
operation. Only in 1986 when the first tax incentives were introduced did the number of plans increase 
rapidly; this upward tendency has been supported by the introduction of new tax incentives (see Würz 
2003 p. 39). In the UK, although profit sharing has existed since the 19th century and share ownership 
since the early 1950s, the number of plans remained small until the first tax incentives were introduced 
in 1978. Since then, the system of tax incentives and economic efficiency of incentives and plans are 
regularly reviewed by the government, and the number of plans is steadily increasing, especially Reve-
nue Approved plans (see Würz 2003 p. 130; www.ifsproshare.org). 
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do not appear to be a prerequisite to the development of financial participation30. 
Moreover, at the national level, taxation can either inhibit or support the spread of 
EFP. At the EU level, cross-border migration of employees partaking in financial partic-
ipation plans, as well as the transfer of such plans by companies to subsidiaries in dif-
ferent Member States, faces problems created by conflicting tax regimes.31 Generally, 
attention is centred on tax incentives, which are often considered the State’s main in-
strument for promoting employee financial participation. But there are a number of 
problems in assessing the fiscal treatment of EFP schemes, especially for employees. 
The first issue is a lack of comparability (Lowitzsch 2008 Annex II.C): 
! Tax incentives are relative; they need to be analysed in the context of the gen-
eral taxation system in the given country.  
! National tax systems are not easily comparable; it is even more difficult to 
compare taxation laws governing national financial participation schemes. 
! Moreover, compulsory social security contributions must be taken into account 
since they add substantially to the overall burden of state levies, especially on 
labour. 
! Also, in many countries, social security contributions influence the tax base of 
the principal income taxes.  
Differences in national taxation systems also affect the tax treatment of different EFP 
schemes across the Member States. In turn, the diverse tax treatment of EFP across 
the EU represents another very important barrier to the implementation and spread of 
these schemes.32 These differences are mainly linked to: 
! the incidence and timing of taxation;  
! the uncertainty and/or complexity of fiscal treatment;  
! differences in tax treatment and social security contributions for employers 
and/or employees;  
! questions of double taxation or double exemption. 
For employees who are not resident in the country in which they work (i.e., they live 
there less than 183 days) or who change their tax residence, this leads to uncertainty 
and/or complexity of fiscal treatment, possibly resulting in double taxation or double 
exemption. Within a single company, resident and non-resident employees may be 
treated differently, which may lead to discrimination. Despite their broad freedom to 
design their tax systems according to domestic policy objectives, EU Member States 
are not allowed to discriminate on the basis of nationality or to apply unjustified re-
                                           
30 Financial participation schemes without tax incentives (e.g., profit-sharing plans in Austria and Germa-
ny) sometimes have a higher incidence than those with tax incentives (e.g., share ownership plans in 
Austria and Germany). In Austria, only 8 per cent of enterprises and 6 per cent of the workforce partici-
pated in employee share ownership plans in 2005, tax incentives for which were introduced in 2001, 
whereas 25 per cent of enterprises operated profit-sharing plans without tax incentives (see Kronberger, 
Leitsmüller and Rauner (2007) pp. 11, 17, 162). In Germany, 2.4 per cent of enterprises had an em-
ployee share ownership plan in 2001, supported by (marginal) tax incentives, whereas at the same time 
8.7 per cent of enterprises operated profit-sharing plans without tax incentives (see Würz 2003 p. 59). 
31  Report of the High Level Group of Independent Experts on cross-border obstacles to financial participa-
tion of employees for companies having a transnational dimension, December 2003, p. 43 et seq. on ob-
stacles to exportation. 
32  Report of the High Level Group of Independent Experts on cross-border obstacles to financial participa-
tion of employees for companies having a transnational dimension, December 2003, p. 6, 24, 26. 51. 
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strictions on the exercise of the fundamental EU Treaty freedoms.33 Furthermore, 
withholding tax on portfolio dividends is a potential problem for employees holding 
shares in companies located in another EU Member State. There is already a practical 
difficulty in claiming entitlements to relief from foreign withholding taxes. A further 
obstacle is the several layers of taxation being applied (company level, withholding tax 
in the source country, and tax in the country of residence) for which no double taxa-
tion relief may be available despite the existence of double taxation treaties between 
Member States. 
 
 
                                           
33  The Court of Justice of the EU has ruled that double taxation resulting from the parallel exercise of tax-
ing rights by Member States, is not per se contrary to EU law. However, the Commission considers it an 
obstacle in the Single Market. 
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Table 1. Classification of EU Member States based on regulatory density and support 
measures for EFP 
EU Member 
States 
Legal frame-
work 
Fiscal incen-
tives 
Political support, 
social dialogue 
Rating 
EFP schemes PS ESO PS ESO PS ESO PS ESO 
Belgium 2 2 2 2 1 1 5 5 
Bulgaria 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
Croatia  0 2 0 1 0 1 0 4 
Czech Rep. 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 2 
Denmark 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Germany 0 2 0 1 0 2 0 5 
Estonia 0 1 0 -1 -1 0 -1 0 
Ireland 2 2 3 3 3 3 8 8 
Greece 1 1 0 1 2 2 3 4 
Spain 1 2 0 3 0 1 1 6 
France 3 2 4 3 3 2 10 7 
Italy 1 2 1 2 2 2 4 6 
Cyprus 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Latvia 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 3 
Lithuania 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Luxembourg 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Hungary 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 4 
Malta 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 3 
Netherlands 1 2 0 0 2 2 3 4 
Austria 0 2 0 3 2 2 2 7 
Poland 1 2 0 2 0 0 1 4 
Portugal 1 1 1 0 0 0 2 1 
Romania 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 3 
Slovenia 3 3 3 3 3 3 9 9 
Slovakia 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 2 
Finland 3 1 3 1 3 0 9 2 
Sweden 2 1 1 0 0 0 3 1 
UK 0 3 0 4 0 3 0 10 
Source: Own research based on the PEPPER IV country profiles updated as part of the Pilot Project.  
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The analysis in Table 1 is based on objective criteria applicable to all EU Member States and—
at least generally—measurable. The three indicators are: (i) legal framework, (ii) fiscal and 
other incentives, and (iii) political acceptance and social dialogue. However, this task is 
complex as most potential values of the indicators are not quantitative. 
The legal framework  
The legal framework as an indicator is not easily quantifiable, but the presence or absence of 
regulations can be used as a basis for distinguishing conducive and non-conducive legal ar-
rangements. Regulations may be contained in different laws, but it is deemed effective, if it is 
systematic, i.e., the provisions of different laws are co-ordinated. 
-1 The Member State has no systematic regulation of EFP and its general legal regulations 
inhibit the development of EFP. 
 0 The Member State has no systematic regulation of EFP and its general legal regulations 
neither promote nor inhibit the development of EFP 
+1 The Member State has an isolated regulation of one aspect of EFP (usually company law). 
+2 The Member State has a systematic regulation of more than one aspects of EFP. 
+3 The Member State has a systematic regulation of more than one aspects of EFP (usually 
tax and company law) and one or more additional aspects (connection to securities law, 
labour law, social legislation, etc.). 
Fiscal incentives  
The indicator, which is generally quantitative, is connected with fiscal incentives. Usually, the 
term “fiscal incentives” refers to not just tax incentives but also measures such as subsidies for 
training or consulting on EFP, authorisation to use public unemployment benefits to set up a 
worker-owned company (and thus become a shareholder) or reduction of registration fees. The 
following grades were given to the EU Member States for fiscal incentives: 
-1 The Member State has no special tax incentives on EFP and its general system of taxation 
inhibits the development of EFP. 
 0 The Member State has no special tax incentives on EFP and its general system of taxation 
neither promotes nor inhibits the development of EFP 
+1 The Member State has (some) tax incentives on EFP, but their impact is not clear. This 
indicator alone might seem inadequate for rating since tax incentives could be ineffective 
and, therefore, have no impact on the practical implementation of EFP schemes. However, 
it does show the interest of the lawmaker in the issue and their willingness to adopt 
amendments, which could increase the effectiveness of tax incentives. 
+2 The Member State has some tax incentives on EFP and the difference between the effec-
tive tax rate on a salary increase and that on an increase in income of the same value ac-
cruing through financial participation (e.g., employee shares or profit sharing) is signifi-
cant due to these specific tax incentives (in some cases the advantage would accrue only 
if transferred shares are held by the employee for a period of time). The effective tax rates 
are calculated for all Member States in a separate table. A difference of over five per cent 
shall be deemed as substantial. 
+3 The Member State has tax incentives on EFP applicable to most enterprises and the criteria 
for these tax incentives are clearly defined and not restrictive. 
+4  The Member State has effective tax incentives (as under ++ and +++) and, additionally, 
other instruments of fiscal support for EFP schemes. 
Political acceptance and social dialogue 
The attitude of social partners, political parties and governments is a classic soft indicator. For 
the success rating, negative, neutral and positive attitudes were taken into account. 
-1 The government and/or social partners are opposed to EFP in the Member State. 
  0 Neither government nor social partners are interested in EFP in the Member State.  
+1 Only one social partner supports EFP in the Member State.  
+2 Social partners support EFP, thus is a part of social dialogue in the Member State.  
+3  EFP is a part of social dialogue and is substantially supported by the Government. 
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Although the scope of the above-mentioned different types of obstacles is rather di-
verse, the actual effect on the spread of cross-border EFP schemes is the same; 
transnational companies with subsidiaries in different Member States planning an EFP 
plan for the entire group, or intending to extend their local plan across the EU, will 
need to collect a large amount of information about the different national legal regula-
tions on EFP, as well as about the differences in national tax and social security sys-
tems. Such an undertaking will involve high costs and considerable expert 
knowledge—two obstacles that many if not most companies, especially SMEs, may not 
be able to overcome. For a more detailed discussion of the implications of differences 
between national legal frameworks on EFP for European firms see Chapter IX 2 b). 
The findings summarised here are supported by the results of a set of surveys con-
ducted in 2008 among companies in several EU Member States of Eastern Europe and 
the Baltics in the context of the PEPPER IV Report.34 Companies asked to identify the 
greatest obstacles to the implementation of EFP schemes other than opposition of ex-
isting shareholders mentioned both a difficult legal framework and complex accounting 
regulations. Although companies of varying size noted these issues, they appeared to 
be most onerous for SMEs. 
                                           
34  This was a survey of firms with more than 200 employees in six countries, i.e., Lithuania, Malta, Poland, 
Portugal, Romania and Croatia. The planned number of firms in each of these countries was 100 in larg-
er and 50 in smaller counties, randomly selected. In practice, the total number of observations in these 
countries was 533—in Malta, in particular, the number of firms interviewed was 17 (and for this reason, 
the information on Malta should be treated with caution). Furthermore, given that the number of large 
firms in some of these countries (Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, in particular) was small, firms with less than 
200 employees were also included in the sample. For details see the PEPPER IV Report (Lowitzsch, Hashi 
and Woodward 2009).  
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III. Empirical evidence on EFP according to the 2nd 
(2009) and 3rd (2013) European Company Survey 
Information on the scale of EFP in European companies is difficult to obtain, as there is 
no register of companies with EFP schemes in any country. The main sources of infor-
mation on EFP are small scale surveys undertaken by academic researchers in one or 
a few countries for the specific purpose of investigating the incidence and impact of 
EFP, or occasional surveys conducted by larger organisations for reasons not related to 
EFP but which include questions on financial participation.35 The European Company 
Survey conducted by European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working 
Conditions (Eurofound) is the largest firm level survey conducted in all European coun-
tries (including some non-EU countries). It covers the total population (universe) of EU 
companies (with ten or more employees) of approximately 1.65 million.36 The ECS 
2009 sample contained 25,140 companies of which 19,320 were private sector firms; 
the 2013 survey contained 27,300 companies with 22,974 of them being private.37 
1. Scale of EFP in EU companies 
a) Employee share ownership (ESO) 
Despite the period of economic and financial crisis in EU countries, companies continue 
to offer share ownership schemes to their employees. As Figure 2 shows, for the sam-
ple as a whole, the average proportion of private companies offering ESO schemes has 
increased from 4.7 per cent to 5.2 per cent (a growth of about ten per cent) since the 
2nd European Company Survey (ECS).38 
However, there is significant variation in adoption of ESO schemes across the EU. 
Firms in Austria, Estonia, Finland, France, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Spain and 
the UK have experienced an expansion of ESO schemes while those in Belgium, Bul-
garia, Denmark and Romania have witnessed significant declines. 
 
                                           
35  Two other surveys, the European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS) conducted by the Eurofound and 
the CRANET Survey of Human Resource Managers conducted by a network of universities coordinated by 
Cranfield University, U.K., are examples. For more information see footnotes 12, 13.  
!"   Eurostat figure for 2011. This is the latest data on the actual total number of companies in EU countries. 
Given that the actual number of companies in 2013 is likely to be higher than 2011, the actual number 
of companies offering EFP schemes are likely to be slightly higher than those estimated in this chapter. 
!#!$ The ECS covers only firms with 10 and more employees. All information extracted from the ECS data 
(e.g., averages) are weighted (as explained in footnote 14). The figures and data mentioned here refer 
to EU-28 (for 2013) and to EU 27 plus Croatia (for 2009). 
!%!$ In the 2009 ECS sample, 1,388 of 20,828 private firms (weighted average, 4.7 per cent) reported ESO 
implementation. Of these more than half implemented the scheme broadly, i.e., to all employees. Unfor-
tunately the 2013 round of the ECS survey did not distinguish between broad and narrow based 
schemes; therefore Chapter III reports on EFP schemes in general. 
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Figure 2: Proportion of private companies offering employee share ownership schemes 
in EU-28 in 2009 and 2013 (%) 
Source: ECS 2009 and 2013. 
It is possible to identify a number of characteristics of firms offering ESO, such as size 
and sector of activity, which influence the adoption of these schemes.39 As Figure 3 
shows, the adoption of ESO schemes in the EU is positively correlated with firm size, 
both in 2009 and 2013. 
Similarly, in terms of sector of operation, there is considerable variation in the adop-
tion of ESO schemes across sectors. However, as Figure 4 shows, companies in the 
Financial Intermediation sector and Real Estate and Business Services sector are much 
more likely to offer their employees an ESO scheme than those in other sectors.   
Figure 3. Proportion of private companies offering employee share ownership schemes 
by size class in EU-28 in 2009 and 2013 (%) 
Source: ECS 2009 and 2013. 
 
                                           
39  For a quantitative study of the impact of firm characteristics on the likelihood of a company adopting 
financial participation schemes using the 2nd ECS, see Hashi and Hashani (2013). 
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Figure 4. Proportion of private companies offering employee share ownership schemes 
by sector of activity in EU-28 in 2009 and 2013 (%)  
Source: ECS 2009 and 2013. Note: Sector classification were different, i.e., NACE Rev. 1.1 in 2009 and NACE 
Rev. 2 in 2013. Sectors were matched using broad one-to-one correspondence between sub-sectors. There 
were no private firms offering ESO in the 'Health and social work' and 'Education' sectors in the 2013 survey. 
Although the adoption of ESO schemes has increased overall, it has marginally de-
clined in few sectors, including the two leading sectors with highest incidence. 
Apart from country, size and sector of operation, the presence of an employee repre-
sentation system in a company can also affect the adoption of an ESO scheme. As Ta-
ble 2 shows, the presence of an employee representation arrangement in a company 
increases the likelihood of the presence of a share ownership scheme. This is also the 
case for companies in all size classes. Still, there is considerable heterogeneity be-
tween countries. The proportion of companies with employee representation and offer-
ing ESO schemes in the period under consideration, in all size-classes, ranged from 
zero to 18 per cent. In 2013 the bottom three countries were Malta, Romania and Ita-
ly while the top three countries were Luxembourg, UK and Lithuania. 
Table 2. Proportion of private companies offering employee share ownership schemes 
by employee representation and size class in EU-28 in 2009 and 2013 (%) 
Source: ECS 2009 and 2013. 
 2009 2013 
Size-
class 
All      
companies 
Without     
employee   
representation 
With         
employee   
representation 
All     
companies 
Without    
employee  
representation 
With         
employee   
representation 
10-19 3.8% 3.6% 4.7% 3.7% 3.10% 6.50% 
20-49 4.6% 4.3% 5.1% 5.2% 4.70% 6.40% 
50-249 7.3% 5.2% 8.6% 8.9% 6.90% 10.50% 
250-499 12.0% 10.8% 12.3% 12.5% 8.90% 13.40% 
500+ 16.2% 10.0% 17.0% 18.0% 16.70% 18.40% 
Total 4.7% 3.9% 6.3% 5.2% 4.10% 7.90% 
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b) Profit sharing (PS) 
Profit-sharing schemes became even more popular than ESO schemes between the 2nd 
and 3rd ECS, with the average proportion of private firms offering PS schemes to their 
employees more than doubling, rising from 14.3 to 30.2 per cent. As Figure 5 shows, 
their popularity increased in all EU members. 
Figure 5. Proportion of private companies offering profit-sharing schemes in EU-28 in 
2009 and 2013 (%)  
 
Source: ECS 2009 and 2013. 
The adoption of PS schemes increased in all EU countries despite the fact that there 
was no general improvement in the legal/policy environment across the EU. One pos-
sible explanation is that during the financial and economic crisis, in an environment of 
increased profit volatility risk, employers used PS schemes as a mechanism for incen-
tivising employees while increasing wage flexibility. By adopting more flexible com-
pensation schemes such as PS, a part of this risk is transferred to employees. It is un-
clear whether this practice involves substitution of wages. This observation is backed 
both by anecdotal evidence from some experts40, as well as findings from the Europe-
an Restructuring Monitor (Hurley et al. 2009) and a study investigating – among other 
issues – the relationship between financial participation and the evolution of wages.41 
However, when looking at countries individually, there is no strong explanation for 
variations between countries. Austria and Slovenia saw the largest expansion of PS 
schemes (more than quadrupling), France and the Netherlands, the smallest expan-
sion. A noticeable trend was the significant increase in the adoption of PS schemes in 
East European Countries, where the average proportion more than trebled during the 
period under consideration.    
                                           
40  For example, the large majority of 20 human resource managers of large German enterprises confirmed 
this practice at the workshop “Neuer Schwung für die Belegschaftsaktie” (new impulses for employee 
shares) on 14 May 2014 in Frankfurt organised by the Deutsches Aktieninstitut. 
41  See Employment Studies Centre (CEE) (2014), which suggests that financial participation goes along 
with wage moderation that is compensated by bonus payments. However, the study uses older data that 
cover the period prior to the crisis (1999-2007). 
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In terms of the characteristics of companies which have adopted PS schemes, it is 
possible to identify a number of features, such as size and sector of activity, that in-
fluence the adoption of these schemes. Figure 5 presents the proportion of companies 
of different size classes offering PS schemes to their employees. 
As Figure 6 shows, the adoption of PS schemes in the EU is positively correlated with 
company size in both 2nd and 3rd Surveys. The proportion of firms offering PS schemes 
has increased in all size classes with the largest size class showing a slightly larger 
proportionate increase than other size classes. 
Figure 6. Proportion of private companies offering profit-sharing schemes by size class 
(number of employees) in EU-28 in 2009 and 2013  
                              Source: ECS 2009 and 2013. 
Figure 7 illustrates the adoption of PS schemes in different sectors of activity. These 
schemes are most commonly employed in the Financial Intermediation sector, fol-
lowed by the Real Estate and Business Activities sectors (as is also the case for ESO 
schemes). Profit-sharing schemes have become more widespread in all sectors in 
2013 in comparison with 2009, though the proportionate increase across sectors var-
ies greatly. Again, the aggregated data cannot depict the disparities between coun-
tries. 
Apart from country, size and sector of activity, the presence of an employee represen-
tation system in a company can also influence its decision to employ a PS scheme. 
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Figure 7. Proportion of private companies offering profit-sharing schemes by sector in 
EU-28 in 2009 and 2013 (%)  
Source: ECS 2009; 2013. Note: Sector classifications were different, i.e., NACE Rev. 1.1 in 2009 and NACE 
Rev. 2 in 2013). Sectors were matched using broad one-to-one correspondence between sub-sectors. There 
were no private firms offering PS in the 'Health and social work' and 'Education' sectors in the 2013 survey. 
As Table 3 shows, companies that have an employee representation system are more 
likely to offer their employees profit sharing in some form, a relationship that has pre-
vailed in both surveys. This relationship is also found in firms of different size class, 
with the largest much more likely to offer their employees a PS scheme. The averages 
shown in Figures 6 and 7 as well as in Table 3 do not, of course, show between-
country heterogeneity. The proportion of companies with employee representation and 
offering PS schemes in the period under consideration, in all size-classes, ranged from 
5 to 45 per cent. In 2013 the bottom three countries were Cyprus, Greece and Hunga-
ry while the top three countries were Finland, Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
Table 3. Proportion of private companies offering profit-sharing schemes by employee 
representation and size class in EU-28 in 2009 and 2013 (%) 
Source: ECS 2009 and 2013. 
 2009 2013 
Size-class All     companies 
Without    
employee   
representation 
With         
employee  
representation 
All     
companies 
Without     
employee  
representation 
With         
employee   
representation 
10-19 11.9% 10.7% 16.4% 23.9% 22.7% 29.4% 
20-49 14.1% 11.9% 17.8% 30.9% 29.3% 34.3% 
50-249 22.3% 14.7% 27.2% 45.4% 38.8% 50.5% 
250-499 27.5% 11.8% 31.4% 53.3% 42.9% 56.2% 
500+ 28.0% 13.6% 30.1% 59.3% 44.0% 62.0% 
Total 14.3% 11.4% 20.4% 30.2% 26.8% 38.2% 
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2. The impact of EFP on productivity and employment levels 
Econometric analysis of the 2nd and 3rd European Company Survey data makes it pos-
sible to estimate the impact of EFP schemes and other firm characteristics (including 
location) on firm performance measured in terms of either productivity improvement 
or employment increase in the previous three years.42 The results are in line with the 
bulk of previous empirical findings (referred to in Section I. 4 a), which indicate that 
employee financial participation is likely to improve the performance of firms regard-
less of how they are measured. However, unlike previous studies, which were based 
on relatively small samples and on one or a few countries, the European Company 
Survey is based on a large sample (over 30,000 firms from both rounds of surveys) 
and all 28 EU countries. This wider coverage makes the results highly significant and 
ensures external validity of inferences.   
Companies have other characteristics (e.g., their size, the proportion of highly quali-
fied or educated staff, sector of activity, the presence of other forms of participation 
such as a system of employee representation, location, etc.), which may also influence 
the likelihood of their offering an EFP scheme. Thus the impact of an EFP scheme is 
affected by not only the presence or absence of EFP schemes but also by other com-
pany characteristics as well. The impact of these factors on the performance of com-
panies was estimated by relevant econometric models presented in Annex 4. For the 
purpose of illustration, a number of possible scenarios (different EFP schemes and dif-
ferent firm characteristics) have been constructed to enable us to show numerically 
the impact on company performance in companies with different types of characteris-
tics. There are, of course, many possible combinations of firm variables and it is pos-
sible to calculate the impact of each combination on the performance of companies 
with those characteristics but, here, only a small number of these possible combina-
tions are included. Table 4 demonstrates how ESO schemes affect the performance 
(productivity improvement and employment increase) of a number of possible combi-
nations of characteristics. 
The performance measures identified in the European Company Survey are twofold: 
‘improvement in productivity’ and ‘increase in employment’ in the past three years. 
The questionnaire does not ask for the magnitude of the rise in either productivity or 
employment, only if they have increased, decreased or remained unchanged.43 Table 4 
compares the likelihood of improved performance as a result of employee share own-
ership schemes in companies with different characteristics. 
                                           
42  For details of the econometric model underlying the analysis in this section, see Annex 4.1. 
43  The relevant questions in the 2009 and 2013 surveys were: (1) for productivity improvement, question 
MM502 (in 2009) and P7 (in 2013): “Over the past 3 years, has the labour productivity of this estab-
lishment increased, decreased or stayed about the same?” (2) for employment, question MM103 (in 
2009) and Q7 (in 2013): “Over the past 3 years, has the total number of employees in this establish-
ment increased, decreased or stayed about the same?” 
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Table 4. The impact of ESO schemes on productivity improvement and employment 
increase 
 No. Scenario 
Probability 
of improving productivity 
Probability 
of increasing employment 
A B C D F G 
Without 
an ESO 
scheme 
With an 
ESO 
scheme 
Propor-
tionate in-
crease 
from A to B 
Without 
an ESO 
scheme 
With an 
ESO 
scheme 
Propor-
tionate 
increase 
from D to F 
1 
A large firm in 
manufacturing in 
Western Europe in 
2013, without a 
system of employee 
representation 
1.25% 3.51% 181% 0.79% 2.57% 225% 
2 Same as 1 but a small company 0.27% 1.02% 278% 0.14% 0.63% 350% 
3 
Same as 1 but in 
Financial Interme-
diation sector 
2.34% 5.84% 150% 1.93% 5.06% 162% 
4 Same as 1 but in 
Nordic countries 
3.29% 7.09% 116% 1.41% 4.34% 208% 
5 Same as 1 but in 
CEE countries 
1.08% 2.85% 164% 0.33% 1.32% 300% 
6 
Same as 1 but with 
employee represen-
tation present 
1.75% 4.72% 170% 1.01% 3.22% 219% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ECS 2009 and 2013.  
For each performance indicator, the table first shows the probability of improvement in 
performance in a particular type of company in the absence of an ESO scheme, and 
then the probability of performance improvement in the same type of company with 
an ESO scheme. In all scenarios (or types of companies), when a company introduces 
an ESO scheme, the likelihood of its experiencing improved performance increases 
too, with the increase ranging from 116 to 278 per cent for productivity and 162 to 
350 per cent for employment. Although the survey does not quantify the scale of im-
provement, nevertheless there is a highly significant rise in the likelihood of improve-
ment. This impact is generally stronger in the financial intermediation and other ser-
vices sectors in Nordic countries, and in companies, which already have employee rep-
resentation in some form. It is generally weaker in Southern Europe and Iberian re-
gions. 
The picture is very similar with respect to profit-sharing schemes. Table 5 shows that 
PS schemes positively impact the likelihood of companies experiencing improved 
productivity and increases employment. Here, too, the proportionate increase in the 
probability of performance improvement as a result of adoption of a PS scheme varies 
from 255 per cent to 426 per cent for productivity and from 70 per cent to 114 per 
cent for employment. The probability of an increase in employment is smaller than 
was the case with an ESO scheme (Table 4). 
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Table 5. The impact of PS schemes on productivity improvement and employment in-
crease 
 No. Scenario 
Probability 
of improving productivity 
Probability 
of increasing employment 
A B C D F G 
Without 
a PS 
scheme 
With a 
PS 
scheme 
Propor-
tionate 
increase 
from A to B 
Without 
a PS 
scheme 
With a 
PS 
scheme 
Propor-
tionate in-
crease 
from D to F 
1 
A large firm in 
manufacturing in 
Western Europe in 
2013, without a 
system of employee 
representation 
4.68% 15.39% 329% 6.08% 11.50% 89% 
2 
Same as 1 but a 
small company 1.52% 6.48% 426% 2.09% 4.48% 114% 
3 
Same as 1 but in 
Financial Intermedi-
ation sector 
5.97% 18.12% 304% 9.48% 16.12% 70% 
4 Same as 1 but in Nordic countries 9.51% 24.23% 255% 7.95% 14.88% 87% 
5 
Same as 1 but in 
CEE countries 6.12% 18.03% 295% 4.44% 9.23% 108% 
6 
Same as 1 but with 
employee represen-
tation present 
6.89% 20.95% 304% 8.28% 15.37% 86% 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ECS 2009 and 2013. 
3. Potential number of companies offering EFP schemes (PS or ESO)  
The above sections focus on the companies in the ECS sample, which actually offer 
EFP schemes to their employees and the impact of these schemes on their perfor-
mance. But there are many other companies in the sample, which, for a variety of 
reasons, do not currently offer any such scheme to their employees despite their simi-
larity in terms of observed characteristics with those that do. These companies have 
the potential to provide their employees with EFP opportunities if right conditions are 
present. It is possible to estimate the number of these candidate companies by using 
statistical techniques such as propensity score matching (PSM). This technique us-
es the observed characteristics of companies, which offer a scheme (e.g., size, sector 
of operation, region, etc.) to find companies with matching characteristics, which do 
not offer any scheme. In this way, the technique identifies those companies, which 
could potentially offer a scheme to their employees based on their similarity with 
those companies that currently do. The procedure uses observed characteristics to lo-
cate a matching group of companies and assumes that there are no differences in un-
observed characteristics between them.44 
                                           
44  For a technical discussion of the econometric model underlying the analysis in this section, see Annex 
4.2. 
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Furthermore, given that the ECS sample is a statistically representative sample of EU 
companies, once the number of companies in the sample which could potentially offer 
EFP schemes to their employees is estimated, it would also be possible to estimate the 
number of firms in the population of EU companies that could potentially adopt an EFP 
scheme. 
a) Employee share ownership 
The number of companies in the European Company Surveys 2009 and 2013, which 
may potentially offer ESO schemes to their employees can be estimated by applying 
the propensity score matching technique to the sample, using the companies currently 
offering ESO schemes as the comparator group.45 Using this technique, we find the 
number of companies matched against the group offering ESO schemes to be 15,185 
(out of a total of 41,751, i.e., 36.37 per cent of all private companies in the pooled 
sample). These companies are statistically likely to offer an ESO scheme to their em-
ployees as their propensity score – conditional probability of offering a scheme – is 
matched with those that currently offer an ESO scheme. Applying the 36.37 per cent 
figure to the total population of private companies in the EU (1.65 million companies), 
one arrives at a total of 600,111 companies that are likely to offer ESO schemes based 
on the matched observed characteristics. Figure 8 compares the actual and potential 
proportions of companies offering an ESO scheme.  
Using the same method, it is possible to estimate the number of small companies that 
can potentially offer ESO schemes to their employees. For the small size companies 
(10 to 49 employees) in the pooled sample, the number of matched companies is 
5,460 (i.e., 24.41 per cent of 22,368 small firms in the pooled dataset). Applying the 
24.41 per cent figure to the total population of small companies in the EU (around 
1.38 million), one arrives at a total of 336,856 small companies that are likely to offer 
ESO schemes based on the matched observed characteristics. 
Figure 8: The actual and potential distribution of firms offering ESO schemes in 2013 
 
 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on ECS 2009 and 2013. 
                                           
45  For this exercise, the data from 2009 and 2013 were pooled together.   
5.2 
36.4 
58.4 
Companies that offer an ESO scheme 
Companies that can potentially offer an ESO scheme 
Companies that do not offer an ESO scheme 
5.2 
94.8 
Companies that offer an ESO scheme 
Companies that do not offer an ESO scheme 
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b) Profit sharing 
The number of companies in the European Company Surveys 2009 and 2013, which 
may potentially offer PS schemes to their employees, can be estimated by applying 
the PSM technique to the sample, using companies currently offering PS schemes as 
the comparator group. Using this technique, we find the number of companies 
matched against the group offering PS to be 23,636 (out of the total of 41,751, i.e., 
56.61 per cent of all private companies in the pooled sample). These companies are 
statistically likely to offer a PS scheme to their employees as their propensity 
score-conditional probability of offering a scheme-is matched with those that currently 
offer a PS scheme.  Applying the 56.61 per cent figure to the total population of pri-
vate companies in the EU (around 1.65 million companies), one arrives at a figure of 
934,095 for companies that are likely to offer PS schemes based on the matched ob-
served characteristics Figure 9 compares the actual and potential proportions of com-
panies offering a PS scheme. 
Figure 9. The actual and potential distribution of firms offering PS schemes in 2013 
 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on ECS 2009 and 2013. 
Using the same method, it is possible to estimate the number of small companies (10 
to 49 employees) that can potentially offer PS schemes to their employees. For the 
small size companies in the pooled sample, the number of matched companies is 
9,602 (i.e., 42.93 per cent of 22,368 small firms in the sample). Applying the 42.93 
per cent figure to the total population of small companies in the EU (around 1.38 mil-
lion), one arrives at a total of 592,398 small companies that are likely to offer PS 
schemes based on the matched observed characteristics. 
c) Potential for ESO and PS across the EU 
As previously mentioned, the PSM technique uses “observed” characteristics to identi-
fy the matching group of companies that can potentially offer an EFP scheme. Given 
that there are also unobserved characteristics of firms, which the questionnaire has 
not identified or was unable to capture, the actual number of these potential compa-
nies will be less than those estimated under (a) and (b) above. However, if a margin 
of error of 50 per cent is allowed to account for the unobserved characteristics, there 
are still a very large number of companies (including small companies) that can poten-
tially offer an EFP scheme to their employees. Table 6, summarises the above discus-
sion and shows the number of companies in the ECS sample and the expected number 
of companies in the population of firms that currently offer EFP schemes to their em-
30.2 
56.6 
13.2 
Companies that offer a PS scheme 
Companies that can potentially offer a PS scheme 
Companies that do not offer a PS scheme 
30.2 
69.8 
Companies that offer a PS scheme 
Companies that do not offer a PS scheme 
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ployees. It also shows the number of potential companies that, under the right condi-
tions, may offer a scheme to their employees.    
Table 6. Number of actual and potential companies offering EFP schemes 
 ESO PS 
 
Percentage 
of companies 
Number of 
companies 
Percentage 
of companies 
Number of 
companies 
Number of companies in the 
ECS sample currently offer-
ing a scheme  
5.2% in 2013 1,195 in 2013 30.2% in 2013 6,938 in 2013 
Number of companies in the 
sample which can potentially 
offer a scheme  
36.37% 15,185 56.61% 23,636 
Number of companies in the 
population which can poten-
tially offer a scheme  
36.37% 
600,111 
(300,056*) 
56.61% 
934,095 
(467,047*) 
Number of small companies 
in population which can po-
tentially offer a scheme  
24.41% 
336,856 
(168,482*) 
42.93% 
592,398 
(296,199*) 
Notes: * Potential number of companies with a margin of error of 50 per cent to account for the unobserved 
characteristics. Source: Own calculation. 
Clearly, there are a few hundred thousand companies with the potential to offer EFP 
schemes. If these companies change from potential to actual by deciding to offer an 
ESO or PS scheme to their employees, a significant improvement in labour productivi-
ty (and therefore competitiveness) of EU companies and an equally significant in-
crease in their employment levels could be expected. 
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IV. Description and assessment of policy options for the 
promotion of EFP 
As described in Chapter I, section 5, a number of steps have already been taken dur-
ing the past decade to promote EFP. This chapter considers a wide range of policy op-
tions in order to evaluate which measures would be most feasible and appropriate to 
promote EFP in the short, medium and long term. The range of options available to 
the Commission, together with related activities and the instruments to implement 
them, are discussed in this Chapter.  
Taking into account the proposals for the promotion of EFP made during the last dec-
ade46, four main policy targets, each with a range of corresponding instruments 
and activities for implementation, can be identified: 
a) Assessing the current situation: 
! a report assessing EFP in the 28 Member States. 
b) Identifying best practice: 
! co-ordination initiatives by the Commission (e.g., as in the area of social 
policy the Open Method of Co-ordination) with regard to EFP; 
! a Commission Recommendation proposing best practice examples on EFP; 
! a Code of Conduct for EFP. 
c) Raising awareness and sharing information: 
! the launch of an information sharing strategy (e.g., Information Centre(s) 
for EFP; an Effective Tax Rate Calculator); 
! an Action Programme to raise awareness for EFP. 
d) Establishing a legal framework at the EU level: 
! a European Framework Directive on EFP; 
! the optional Common European Regime on EFP. 
Table 7 charts these policy options that are discussed in more detail below. 
                                           
46  See e.g. the results of the pilot project’s conference on Promotion of Employee Ownership and Participa-
tion on 30 January 2014 (http://www.intercentar.de/en/conference/download-the-materials/, the 2014 
EP Resolution on EFP in companies’ proceeds (P7_TA(2014)0013), the PEPPER Reports I-IV (1991, 1996, 
2006, 2009), Lowitzsch et al. (2008), The Nuttall Review (2013). 
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1. Assessing the current situation 
The assessment of the current situation has several objectives: Firstly, to facilitate the 
analysis of the reasons for the wide divergence in approaches between Member States 
and the existing barriers to cross-border implementation of EFP schemes. Secondly, to 
inform about the different national EFP schemes, especially with respect to taxation 
and social security contributions; this information is crucial to firms that actually plan 
to implement a new or expand an existing EFP scheme. Thirdly, to provide background 
information for all other activities promoting EFP which are discussed in this Study.  
To achieve these objectives, it is crucial that the results of this Study assessing the 
development of EFP in the EU-28, analysing potential policy options and giving 
concrete policy recommendations be made available to as many interested parties as 
possible, e.g., via publication online. In the past 25 years, several studies on the de-
velopment of EFP in EU Member States have been conducted (see an overview of the-
se studies in Annex 2). This Study updates the previous ones. It will make an up-
dated summary of national legislation on EFP available to all stakeholders in an official 
EU document, describing current status as well as presenting proposals for the promo-
tion of EFP. Country profiles of the 28 Member States on EFP and especially ESO, 
which are part of the deliverables of this Study, include all relevant legal and factual 
data as well as information on taxation and social security contributions. 
However, in order to widely disseminate the information and recommendations con-
tained therein simple publication would fall short. The objective of promoting EFP 
widely at EU and national levels, particularly to companies and their employees unfa-
miliar with the concept, requires measures that go far beyond mere publication. 
Furthermore, such a study might have divided influence beyond small circles of ex-
perts. Therefore it should be combined with other policy options discussed below.  
Table 8. SWOT analysis on assessing EFP in the 28 Member States 
Strengths 
< easy to execute;  
< low cost;  
< can build on existing studies  
Weaknesses 
< info dated; no continuous updates possible 
< mere publication may have limited influence be-
yond small circles of experts!and policy makers 
< limited direct value for firms and employees 
Opportunities 
< analysis of the reasons for the wide 
divergence in approaches between MS 
< information about the different EFP 
schemes in the Member States  
< background information for all other 
activities promoting EFP 
Threats 
< low impact if not combined with other policy 
options 
< not appropriate to reach companies and their 
employees unfamiliar with the concept 
< not an innovative approach; may not be no-
ticed among plenitude of existing other reports 
2. Identifying best practice 
A periodic evaluation of best practices from all 28 EU Member States along with re-
ports on policy development is another important method of promoting EFP. Any best 
practice approach should include schemes for information sharing as well as policy 
learning among the Member States. This could lead to closer alignment of national 
rules. The following policy options regarding the on-going formulation of best practice 
of EFP could be considered: 
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! co-ordination initiatives by the Commission; 
! a Commission Recommendation promoting best practice examples identified in 
this Study;  
! a Code of Conduct to be compiled with on the basis of best practice examples 
identified in this Study (see Annex 3). 
In this context, the question arises as to whether or to what extent the issue of taxa-
tion should be included in the formulation of best practice for EFP. Questions concern-
ing taxation and levies related to EFP are complex and touch upon areas of compe-
tence traditionally reserved for national sovereignty. Even non-binding recommenda-
tions on this subject have been viewed sceptically by some Member States. However, 
the European Parliament explicitly stresses the relevance of tax incentives for EFP in 
its 2014 Resolution on EFP in companies’ proceeds47, calling   
“on the Member States to provide tax incentives, in line with best practice 
principles, when promoting employee ownership schemes” (P7_TA 
(2014)0013, recital 8).  
Tax incentives—although not a prerequisite for EFP—have been shown to be the most 
effective and most commonly used instrument to promote EFP across the EU 
(Lowitzsch 2008, Annex II) and the U.S. (Freeman, Kruse and Blasi 2013). The Euro-
pean Parliament identifies the national differences in tax treatment as an obstacle to 
EFP uptake, both for companies with cross-border operations and their “employees, 
for whom double taxation may represent an infringement of the right to freedom of 
movement” (P7_TA(2014)0013, recital 1). Consequently, the EP 
 “is of the view, therefore, that the Commission should present guidelines on 
the taxation of EFP” (P7_TA(2014)0013, recital 10). 
In view of this, the following assessment of the future formulation of best practice in-
cludes taxation and social security contributions related to different EFP schemes. 
However, it should be stressed that due to the above-mentioned difficulties in agree-
ing on taxation issues across the 28 Member States—whether binding or non-
binding—the inclusion of taxation guidelines/recommendations in any form of best 
practice scenario may involve difficulties. 
a) Co-ordination of initiatives by the Commission (e.g., OMC) 
The Commission collaborates with Member States to establish guidelines and promote 
the exchange of best practices by conducting analyses and consultations and providing 
statements on the results.48 An example for this procedure in the area of social policy 
is the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC).49 Commission co-ordination may there-
                                           
47  2014 EP Resolution on EFP in companies’ proceeds (P7_TA(2014)0013) recital 9: “[The EP] points out 
that precisely targeted tax incentives could increase employee financial ownership in various Member 
States and even add to economic growth.” 
48  All relevant stakeholders are included and a regular information sharing procedure is put in place. The 
Council provides then, upon proposal from the Commission, detailed recommendations for achieving 
these objectives. This is supported by dialogue between social partners in the Member States and pro-
moted by the governments’ mutual recognition of existing best-practice models. 
49  The method was first introduced in the European Commission “White paper – Growth, competitiveness 
and Employment” from 1993. With the Reform Treaty Art. 156 TFEU codifies the Open Method of Co-
ordination practiced in social policy under the label “social protection and social inclusion”. 
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with contribute directly to the standardisation of political practices on EFP in the Mem-
ber States including determination of best practice for taxation of EFP. This procedure 
would provide a regular assessment of current conditions in the 28 Member States 
(assuring the comparability of the data collected, e.g., through Eurostat), which could 
prove useful for the comparison of best practices of EFP from different countries as 
well as for information sharing and policy learning; Member States would be obliged to 
report to the Commission.  
Although avoiding any binding agreements, the OMC in principle might lead to an 
eventual approximation of standards and the reduction of cross-border obstacles to 
EFP. However, the OMC is mainly an intergovernmental procedure and as such heavily 
dependent on the co-operation of the Member States. As for the differences between 
existing EFP schemes throughout the Member States and the relevance of the subject 
in different countries, political motivation to co-operate would differ significantly. 
When it comes to concrete recommendations within the OMC procedure concerning 
national EFP policies to be implemented by a Council Recommendation on a proposal 
by the Commission, it is doubtful that the Member States would arrive at a political 
consensus on any far-reaching measure. In fact, experience in other policy areas has 
shown the limits of this approach (Threlfall 2007 pp. 271, 285). In addition, progress 
in this respect would take several years at least.  
Table 9. SWOT analysis on co-ordination initiatives by the Commission 
Strengths 
< facilitates information sharing and policy 
learning among MS 
< regular assessment of current conditions 
in 28 MS, assuring comparability of data  
< avoids binding agreement 
< high degree of flexibility for national actors 
Weaknesses 
< political motivation to cooperate would dif-
fer significantly among MS 
< mainly intergovernmental procedure, thus 
heavily dependent on cooperation of MS 
< limited scope for EU coordination on taxa-
tion issues  
Opportunities 
< approximation of EFP standards  
< closer alignment of national rules through 
mutual adjustment 
< reduction of cross-border obstacles to EFP 
Threats 
< risk that the MS would not arrive at politi-
cal consensus  
< progress would take several years at least 
< difficulties in agreeing on taxation issues 
across the 28 MS 
b) Commission Recommendation including best practice on EFP 
A Commission Recommendation could make policy recommendations to Member 
States and stakeholders on the basis of results derived from this Study. By communi-
cating its view on EFP, thus pointing toward a future policy direction, and taking into 
consideration the Member States’ duty of co-operation and inclusion of Recommenda-
tions in the ECJ jurisdiction, a Commission Recommendation could—in the long term—
lead to closer co-operation (or even alignment) of the relevant national policies.  
Although—given the experience with the 1992 Council Recommendation—a Commis-
sion Recommendation might not prove to be a very strong instrument to promote EFP, 
it could have a certain political effect; it could be also be used, in addition to other pol-
icy instruments, to facilitate the process, to give political weight to the topic and to 
make policy recommendations through an official EU document. However, a Commis-
sion Recommendation proposing best practice examples of EFP—in view of its non-
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binding nature—would most likely provide limited incentives for Member States to act, 
thus having a weaker impact than binding legislation described in section (d) below. 
Table 10. SWOT analysis on a Commission Recommendation proposing best practice 
examples on EFP 
Strengths 
< facilitates policy learning among MS 
< points toward a future policy direction 
< MS’s duty of cooperation and inclusion 
of Recommendations in ECJ jurisdiction 
Weaknesses 
< limited effect 
< weaker impact than binding legislation 
< limited incentives for Member States to act  
Opportunities 
< gives political weight to the topic of EFP  
< policy recommendations on EFP through 
official EU document 
< closer cooperation or even alignment of 
the relevant national EFP policies 
Threats 
< limited scope for Union coordination regarding 
taxation and levies related to EFP 
< might not prove to be a very strong instru-
ment to promote EFP if not accompanied by 
other measures 
c) Code of conduct and guide on EFP for employees 
Another potential option for the Commission could be to develop a Code of Conduct 
providing (i) a standard template for companies that want to implement EFP schemes 
which spells out the details of best practice examples of EFP and (ii) a guide for em-
ployees on EFP.  
! The standard template for EFP schemes underlying such a Code of Conduct 
could provide a “EFP toolkit” covering general considerations relevant for the 
implementation of an EFP scheme, similar to the one introduced in the UK.50 
This “off the shelf” template could only be of a very general nature considering 
the diverging legal frameworks, forms and traditions of EFP in the 28 Member 
States as well as the different types of firms. While perhaps not an adequate 
tool to develop concrete taxation guidelines, it could provide common defini-
tions as well as a model for EFP schemes based on best practice and applicable 
in most Member States, including, e.g., a guide to the constitution of a compa-
ny with EFP. By providing common definitions, it would contribute to increasing 
clarity, as requested by both politicians and stakeholders.51  
! Together with a standard template for EFP schemes, a guide on EFP for em-
ployees could clearly describe the concept of EFP, the options employees 
have, as well as explain the standard template.  
However, the impact of a Code of Conduct may be limited due to its entirely voluntary 
nature and lack of awareness of the stakeholders concerned about EFP. Nevertheless, 
appropriately promoted, it could have both political and practical effects. By using best 
                                           
50  See e.g. the 2013 Model Documentation for a Company with Employee Ownership of the UK Govern-
ment, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (URN BIS/13/948), available under: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/210449/bis-13-948-
model-documentation-for-company-with-employee-ownership.pdf. 
51  See e.g. the results of the pilot project’s conference on Promotion of Employee Ownership and Participa-
tion on 30 January 2014 (available under: http://www.intercentar.de/en/conference/download-the-
materials/). 
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practice examples to construct a model EFP scheme, the Commission would prescribe 
a certain political direction for future actions while the model scheme would potentially 
reduce costs for businesses utilising it. Furthermore, especially in Member States with 
very little regulation on EFP, the Code of Conduct could fill the vacuum, and even lead 
to national legislation once demand reaches a certain level.  
The general nature of the template would ensure that existing national models and 
traditions of EFP would not be affected. A Code of Conduct would supply stakeholders 
all over Europe with a common toolkit that could be continuously amended and im-
proved, thus encouraging continued involvement. In order for such a voluntary Code 
of Conduct to achieve maximal impact, it would have to be widely disseminated and 
“made public” by broad awareness-raising measures. 
A Code of Conduct as an entirely voluntary tool providing a standard template for EFP 
and a guide on EFP for employees would be relatively easy to implement, especially as 
some of the information needed for its development will already be provided by this 
Study (see, e.g., Annexes 1 and 3); the Code could be rapidly compiled and then sub-
jected to a consultation process. A Commission expert group on EFP—be it formal 
or informal52—could for instance, be involved in developing such a Code of Conduct. 
The establishment of a permanent Commission expert group on EFP would ensure 
regular feedback and involvement of relevant stakeholders; it could also be part of a 
broader policy programme of the Commission to promote EFP. Such an expert group 
could take on the following tasks: 
! identify detailed best practice examples for EFP from the sampled information 
at regular intervals and make policy recommendations; 
! update the information on EFP to be made available through the Virtual Centre 
for EFP on a regular basis; 
! prepare the elaboration of a Code of Conduct for EFP, compile standard EFP 
templates, create an employee guide to EFP, and continuously improve this 
toolkit; 
! assist the Commission in determining the feasibility of and preparing a draft of 
potential future legislation on EFP. 
The following stakeholder organisations could be represented in such a Commission 
expert group: 
! employers’ organisations; 
! employees’ organisations; 
! civil society organisations close to SMEs (e.g., chambers of commerce); 
! interest groups and associations dealing with EFP;  
! companies offering best practice models of EFP schemes; 
! research organisations/universities, involved in the update of country data; 
! chosen organisations from the aforementioned willing to participate in the pilot 
phase of the Virtual Centre for EFP and the Effective Tax Rate Calculator. 
                                           
52  The former being set up by a Commission decision adopted by the college of Commissioners, whereas 
the latter, by an individual Commission department with the formal authorisation of the Secretariat Gen-
eral; See the Framework for Commission Expert Groups (C(2010)7649 final: 8). 
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Participation of a diverse group of stakeholders as well as researchers in the Commis-
sion expert group would not only provide the necessary expertise for development of 
the described tools and measures, but would also assure political acceptance of the 
results as well as subsequent recommendations and actions.  
Table 11. SWOT analysis on a Code of Conduct for EFP 
Strengths 
< bottom-up method, auto-regulation  
< spells out the details of best practice  
< direct value added for firms / employees, 
in addition to experts and policy makers 
< supplies stakeholders across the EU with a 
toolkit that could be continuously amended  
< easy implemented, based on existing in-
formation 
Weaknesses 
< standard template could only be of a very 
general nature considering different legal 
frameworks, traditions and types of firms 
< potential lack of acceptance by stakehold-
ers   
< impact may be limited due to entirely vol-
untary nature 
Opportunities 
< provides standard EFP templates for firms  
< a model EFP plan would potentially reduce 
costs for businesses utilising it 
< may fill vacuum especially in MS with low 
regulatory density on EFP  
< may trigger changes in national EFP legis-
lation once demand reaches a certain level 
Threats 
< lack of awareness about EFP could make 
wide dissemination difficult 
< standard template not an adequate tool to 
develop taxation guidelines for EFP  
< does not address lack of transparency 
about national fiscal treatment of EFP 
< possible conflict with existing national EFP 
schemes or practices  
3. Raising awareness and sharing information 
The concept of EFP suffers from limited awareness at the EU level due in part to a lack 
of information about its scope and benefits. This lack of information on EFP (especially 
among SMEs) has been repeatedly identified by stakeholders and policy makers as a 
major reason for the low incidence of EFP throughout the EU. The European Parlia-
ment has stated that: 
“the lack of information about existing financial participation schemes could 
be offset by increasing the quantity of information lending itself to compari-
son at international level, which would reduce costs for both larger compa-
nies and SMEs, enabling them to offer employee participation schemes that 
meet their particular needs” (P7_TA(2014)0013, recital 4). 
Not only does the level of awareness of EFP need to be raised, but information sharing 
needs to be reinforced as well. In this context, a strategy designed to raise awareness 
and to facilitate information sharing would be important elements in promoting EFP 
across the EU. Such a strategy would also be of crucial importance for the implemen-
tation of other non-binding measures, e.g., a Code of Conduct for EFP, as these can 
only have significant effects if accompanied by awareness raising actions. It is recom-
mended that such a strategy include customised practical activities, with special atten-
tion paid to coverage, accessibility and costs, designed to reach out to key stakehold-
ers, i.e., employers and employees, on the one hand, and policy makers on the other.   
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a) Information centre(s) 
The establishment of one or several information centres, called for in the 2012 EP 
Public Hearing and explicitly referred to in the subsequent tender for the Pilot Project 
and this Study, is seen as a key element to any awareness raising and information 
sharing strategy.  
Overall, as a one-stop source of all necessary information of EFP and respective legis-
lation, especially for SMEs and their employees, as well as for policy makers, an in-
formation centre(s) would directly reach the key target groups in an awareness raising 
and information sharing strategy. In addition to providing general information and 
raising awareness, such a centre(s) could offer current information on differing nation-
al legislation on EFP. This information would be particularly useful for SMEs that oper-
ate cross-border and plan to implement EFP schemes. The creation of such an infor-
mation source would also meet the policy objective of reducing cross-border barriers. 
A central EFP source could also have a certain political effect, as it would provide vet-
ted information sharing and identify best practices which could spread knowledge in 
countries with low EPF take up. This effect might be limited, however, if making infor-
mation available is the only measure undertaken.  
The form of implementation can vary from one online platform to centres in each 
Member State, i.e., 28 different information centres (Chapter VI provides an analysis 
of the forms, cost and benefits of each variant). A virtual centre was anticipated in the 
2014 EP Resolution53 and then presented at the Brussels Conference on employee fi-
nancial participation on 30 January 2014, receiving positive feedback from the stake-
holders present (Chapter V summarises the results of this event).54 Furthermore, a 
virtual centre for EFP as an awareness raising and information-sharing tool has al-
ready been mentioned by several policy actors (European Parliament, European Com-
mission, High-Level Expert Group, European Economic and Social Committee) and can 
thus rely on broad support from these actors and relevant stakeholders.  
Following the above, the authors of this Study would suggest creating a Virtual Cen-
tre for EFP to provide general information about EFP. This web application can be in-
tegrated into the websites of a multitude of partners, such as national chambers of 
commerce, employers’ associations and trade unions, the Commission, taxation con-
sultants and/or existing local centres with EFP expertise. The concept for such a Virtu-
al Centre for EFP has two parts, each of which builds upon the other: 
! an Information and Country Comparison Tool, which would provide all neces-
sary information on EFP in the 28 Member States in an easily accessible, com-
parative and dynamic way, and  
! an Effective Tax Rate Calculator as a simulation tool (see section (b) below and 
the detailed description in Chapter VIII). 
The Information and Country Comparison Tool would encompass both employee share 
ownership and profit-sharing schemes in the European Union, following the structure 
                                           
53  2014 EP Resolution on EFP in companies’ proceeds (P7_TA-PROV(2014)0013), recital 15: “[The EP] an-
ticipates the results of the pilot project, notably the development of a Virtual EFP Centre.” 
54  The Virtual Centre for EFP has been presented in the form of a “plug-in” that can be implemented on any 
existing website and thus uses existing information channels that are already widely used by the target 
groups, resulting in large-scale effects; for details see Chapter VI below. 
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of the country profiles in the PEPPER IV Report. For instance, users could select specif-
ic topics related to ESO and EFP in a given country, in particular (a) national legal and 
fiscal frameworks regarding employee involvement and EFP; (b) applicable tax rates, 
i.e., income tax, social security contributions and incentives offered through the taxa-
tion system for EFP plans, and (c) an overview of governments’ and social partners’ 
attitudes to EFP. This would include the possibility for both full-text search and ad-
vanced search within the country profiles. It would further provide the possibility to 
benchmark this comparative information. Making comprehensive information available 
at low cost, a Virtual Centre for EFP would serve as an efficient first step for compa-
nies and employees considering EFP in general or a particular scheme.  
Conducting a pilot phase of such an online centre is suggested as the next short-term 
step, especially because of the relatively low costs and large coverage.55 The launch 
of a pilot phase would be easy to implement, especially since an online prototype is 
available with updated information already provided as part of the deliverables of this 
Study. Country profiles could regularly be updated. The establishment of a Commis-
sion expert group to organise these updates and present policy options on a regular 
basis would be very helpful, and therefore is recommended.   
Table 12. SWOT analysis on information centre(s) for EFP 
Strengths 
Physical centre(s) 
< raise awareness, reach out to stakehold-
ers and reduce the lack of information 
< one-stop source of all necessary infor-
mation especially for SMEs and their em-
ployees 
Focus: Virtual centre 
< web application with like-to-like compari-
son tool has large coverage, easy access, 
low costs,  
< plug-in allows use of well-known estab-
lished information channels, dynamic  
< central and flexible administration 
Weaknesses 
Physical centre(s) 
< costly in set up and maintenance    
< exit costly, high expense of unwinding cen-
tre(s) as a consequence of institutional 
funding 
< lower degree of flexibility 
Focus: Virtual centre 
< much less of a local approach 
< no physical drop-in-centre 
< no personal support service and less oppor-
tunity for personal feed back 
Opportunities 
< visible first step for further promotion of 
EFP across EU that signals commitment 
< useful for firms that operate cross-border 
and plan to implement EFP schemes  
< supports the implementation of other 
non-binding measures 
Threats 
< employers and employees might not take up 
service as EFP is still little known in some 
jurisdictions  
< effect might be limited if making information 
available is the only measure undertaken 
< needs stakeholder support to spread 
knowledge in countries with low EPF take up 
                                           
55  Cost estimations indicate that independent centres in each Member State would cost roughly EUR 3.9 
million per year, whereas centralised information centre’s yearly costs would amount to about EUR 1.4 
million and those of the Virtual Centre for EFP to about EUR 250.000 per year; for details see chapter VI. 
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b) Calculating effective tax rates for EFP schemes 
An important element of an awareness raising strategy would be to highlight the tax 
and social security treatment of different EFP schemes in different countries. The Eu-
ropean Parliament stresses in its 2014 Resolution on EFP in Companies’ Proceeds that: 
“further transparency is needed in national employee ownership schemes 
and especially in calculating the effective tax burden across the EU-28 in or-
der to prevent double taxation and discrimination” (P7_TA(2014)0013), re-
cital 6). 
Responding to this call, it would be crucial also to provide up-to-date information on 
taxation, social security contributions and specific tax incentives relevant to different 
EFP schemes in the 28 EU Member States, in addition to general information on EFP, 
through the above-mentioned information centre(s). This data would facilitate compa-
nies’ decision-making when implementing EFP schemes, especially those having cross 
border operations.  
For instance, this data could be used to calculate the effective tax burden of different 
EFP schemes for employees and employers. In this way, the effective tax burden of 
applying different EFP schemes in different countries could be simulated for different 
scenarios, and making a like-to-like comparison available to all stakeholders. Further-
more, the resulting transparency of taxation of EFP schemes could facilitate mutual 
recognition among Member States. Finally, providing governments with information to 
simulate the fiscal impact of tax incentives for EFP would contribute to regulatory im-
pact analysis.  
A decision-making tool in the form of an effective tax rate calculator has already been 
proposed in the 2010 EESC Own-Initiative Opinion on EFP56 as a soft measure to ac-
company the current policy initiatives. In its 2014 Resolution the European Parliament 
referred explicitly to an Effective Tax Rate Calculator57 and both stakeholders and poli-
cy-makers welcomed this approach at the pilot project conference in January 2014. 
Therefore, the authors of this Study suggest using the effective tax rate calculator CE-
TREPS (Calculating Effective Tax Rates for Employee Participation Schemes) to pro-
vide EFP relevant tax information. For a detailed description thereof see Chapter VIII. 
SMEs expanding their operations cross border and not yet having subsidiaries in other 
Member States would especially benefit from this online calculation tool. Providing 
transparency for taxation across the EU-28 would also help to avoid double taxation 
and discrimination between resident and non-resident employees and facilitate mutual 
recognition. Up-to-date information on general taxation, social security contributions 
and specific tax incentives relevant to different EFP schemes from all 28 EU Member 
States would be used to calculate effective rates for different taxes, personal status 
and situations. This would be necessary to quantify the tax burden and to allow for a 
representative comparison of tax systems as well as of specific tax incentives. The 
system would provide users with a range of assumptions to choose from, such as (a) 
salary levels; (b) the value of the EFP arrangements as a percentage of annual in-
                                           
56  SOC-371, CESE 1375/2010; see recital 2.2.3 “Promoting optional tax incentives“. 
57  EP Resolution on EFP in companies’ proceeds (P7_TA(2014)0013), recital 15: “[The EP] anticipates the 
results of the pilot project, notably the development of […] the CETREPS Effective Tax Rate Calculator.” 
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come; (c) holding periods for shares; (d) types of EFP plans (cash profit sharing, share 
ownership, stock options, etc.), and (e) the concerned Member States. From a long-
term perspective, this dynamic and flexible tool could also be extended to other areas, 
e.g., pension schemes.  
Such a calculator could be made available through the online Information Cen-
tre mentioned above. This database with its like-with-like comparison tool would pro-
vide the background and the necessary information for the calculator. 
Furthermore, the operating costs for such a calculator would be relatively low (for de-
tails see Chapter VI.). The launch of a pilot phase would be easy to implement, espe-
cially as an online prototype also of the calculator is available with necessary updated 
information provided as part of deliverables of this Study. 
Table 13. SWOT analysis on the Effective Tax Rate Calculator as part of a virtual centre 
Strengths 
< potential for feedback, regular updating and 
on-going adaptation to user needs 
< central and flexible administration 
< reactivity to real time evolution 
< low operating costs, easy launch 
Weaknesses 
< data base needs to be updated regularly 
< representative comparison of tax sys-
tems and of specific tax incentives only 
approximation 
< technical support and adaptation to new 
developments of software necessary 
Opportunities 
< systematic up-to-date information on fiscal 
treatment for different EFP schemes in all 
28 MS becomes easily accessible 
< facilitates decision-making in SMEs opera-
ting or planning cross-border EFP schemes 
as well as communication to employees 
< transparency of taxation of EFP schemes 
may facilitate mutual recognition among MS 
< regulatory impact analysis: enables simula-
tion of fiscal impact of tax incentives for EFP 
Threats 
< underlying information on national EFP 
plans (legal, fiscal, taxation) not easily 
available  
< limited professional use if not linked to 
platform providing access to raw data 
< relies on broad support of political actors 
and stakeholders to reach EU firms 
< might be wrongly perceived as a tax 
planning tool 
c) Action Programme to raise awareness of EFP 
Another recommended mechanism is an Action Programme to raise Awareness of EFP 
embarked on by the Commission. This could provide general information on the activi-
ties of the Commission in the area of EFP, hopefully starting a dialogue between other 
EU institutions and leading to co-operation on the proposed activities.  
In terms of content this Action Programme could include a number of different activi-
ties to increase awareness of EFP such as: 
! Allocation of the EFP dossier to one specific Commissioner to increase 
the visibility of the topic, and to link responsibility for the EFP dossier to one 
political office. The appointment of a political steward is crucially important 
since the personal involvement of individual actors is a proven factor in moving 
initiatives forward. In this regard, it would be necessary to update the respon-
sible Commissioner regularly with information on EFP and to involve him/her as 
much as possible in all on-going EFP-related activities. It is through this politi-
cal office that information on current initiatives on EFP could be spread, possi-
bly connecting EFP to other policy initiatives or messages.  
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! Development of a network of officials and politicians at the EU level. 
Because EFP is a cross-sectorial topic, the individual actors from different polit-
ical bodies and their network can have a considerable effect. Furthermore, 
benefits from sharing knowledge of the different aspects of EFP and synergies 
from working together on wider awareness-raising activities could be gained 
from such a network.58 The benefits of direct contact with Member of the Euro-
pean Parliament, EU officials and other individual stakeholders should not be 
underestimated; of equal importance is ensuring the continuity of knowledge 
within the political bodies. The Commissioner responsible for EFP could initiate 
a network like this.  
! A European EFP Day and additional publicity actions. Establishment of a 
European EFP Day could be an occasion for enhancing visibility and media cov-
erage, e.g., events at both the EU and national levels, press releases, speeches 
of high-level EU politicians or personalities, etc. The organisation of an EFP Day 
would of course require a certain budget to be successful. 
The concrete impact of specific actions depends on the extent of their implementation 
and on the commitment of the individual actors involved, e.g., the establishment of an 
EFP Day could only be effective if policy-makers and stakeholders were motivated to 
use the suggested instrument for individual initiatives. The presentation of such a 
package of awareness raising measures could in itself have a political effect by signal-
ling the Commission’s intention to promote the concept of EFP.  
Implementation of the Action Programme to Raise Awareness for EFP would meet a 
policy objective emphasised by stakeholders and policy makers; it follows that most of 
could be expected to be in favour of it, including the European Parliament who in its 
Resolution on EFP59 explicitly called on the Commission to launch an information cam-
paign. 
Table 14. SWOT analysis on an Action Programme to raise awareness for EFP 
Strengths 
< concise information on concrete activities 
of the Commission in a policy area  
< network of officials and politicians at the 
EU level gain benefits and synergies  
< large scale visibility and perceivable signal 
of Commission commitment 
Weaknesses 
< involves substantial personal and material 
resources to be effective in the mid term  
< relies on broad political support from 
stakeholders to unfold its potential 
Opportunities 
< conceptual framework that connects EFP 
to other policy initiatives or messages 
< a dialogue between EU institutions ignites 
cooperation on proposed EFP activities 
< a European EFP Day and publicity actions 
could create visibility and media coverage 
Threats 
< the concrete impact of specific actions de-
pends on the extent of their implementa-
tion and on the commitment of the indi-
vidual actors involved, 
< policy-makers and stakeholders are not 
motivated to use it for individual initiatives 
                                           
58  Cf. a similar network created by the UK Government, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills, on 
ESO in 2013. 
59  EP Resolution on EFP in companies’ proceeds (P7_TA(2014)0013), recital 26: “[The EP] calls on the 
Commission and the Member States in this regard to better organise information campaigns ….” 
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4. Establishing a legal framework at EU level 
Establishing a binding legal framework at the European level would be the ultimate 
action to promote EFP within the hard law instruments. Two policy options can be 
identified: 
! A European Framework Directive setting minimum requirements for nation-
al legislation on EFP to be implemented by the Member States.  
! An optional Common European Regime on EFP. The EU rules governing EFP 
would be implemented in parallel to existing national legislation, with employ-
ers and employees free to choose between the two legislative systems. A 
Common European Regime on EFP would offer an “opt-in” alternative, i.e., the 
national rules are standard, but private parties would have the right to choose 
the alternative law rooted in EU legislation. This common regime could be im-
plemented through either a Directive or a Regulation. 
The “Common European Framework on EFP” proposed in this Study is similar to that 
in the Commission proposal for a Common European Sales Law. Although it stems 
from the concept of a so-called “29th Regime” as mentioned in the 2010 EESC Own-
initiative opinion INT/499 and the EP Resolution T7-0013/2014, the legal concept has 
been developed in other contexts (for details see Chapter IX). 
a) European Framework Directive 
A European Framework Directive would establish the minimum mandatory require-
ments to be implemented by Member States within a certain period of time. Being a 
hierarchical approach the flexibility for national actors to deviate from these require-
ments would be relatively low. By defining only basic aspects—e.g. general European 
guidelines—European Directives may provide flexibility to follow previously agreed 
standards. This could be a first move towards a common European fiscal treatment of 
EFP not previously available at the EU level. Succeeding national laws could then sup-
port the process facilitating further political integration. This approach might be par-
ticularly suitable for the issue of taxation since taxation is subject to national sover-
eignty. However, any European Directive including taxation issues would most likely 
require consensus, which in the past has proven difficult to attain and in particular 
hampered the introduction of Directives concerning company taxation or the co-
ordination of direct tax systems. 
As a Directive involving taxation issues appears to be unlikely, a European framework 
Directive on EFP, excluding taxation issues, could be considered. The harmonisation of 
national regulations on EFP through a Directive would create an effective instrument to 
lessen cross-border obstacles to EFP. Barriers to the Single Market, e.g., legal risks 
and costs created by differences in national law would be overcome. Businesses aim-
ing at introducing cross-border EFP schemes would profit from significant cost savings 
(IAFP 2010). However, as with any European framework Directive defining minimum 
requirements for legislation implementation might be impeded by a collision with na-
tional law mainly caused by differences in national traditions. Furthermore, for busi-
nesses that only offer EFP at national level or already have implemented a cross-
border company plan the additional costs of adapting their scheme to the new Europe-
an regulations must be taken into account. 
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Table 15. SWOT analysis on a European Framework Directive on EFP 
Strengths 
< minimum mandatory requirements for na-
tional legislation to be implemented by MS  
< harmonisation of national legislation 
< vertical/hierarchical approach, “top-down” 
structure based on compliance  
< defining only basic aspects (e.g., guide-
lines) Directives may provide flexibility 
Weaknesses 
< might conflict with national models and 
traditions 
< uncertain if necessary political majority / 
consensus for  Directive can be obtained  
< flexibility for national actors to deviate 
from these requirements relatively low 
< substantial investment of time and re-
sources needed to prepare and implement  
Opportunities 
< harmonisation of national laws on EFP to 
eliminate cross-border obstacles  
< succeeding national laws could facilitating 
further political integration 
< in countries with no/rudimentary regula-
tion on EFP, creates of a legal framework 
in first place 
< it could serve as the first step towards a 
common European fiscal treatment of EFP 
not currently available at the EU level 
Threats 
< potential collision with national law mainly 
caused by different national traditions 
< complex and lengthy legislative process 
< potential additional costs to adapt to Di-
rective for companies that only offer EFP 
on a national scale or already have trans-
border company plan 
b) Common European Regime on EFP (optional regime) 
An optional Common European Regime on EFP was suggested in the 2010 EESC Own-
Initiative Opinion60 as an entirely new approach for creating a framework for EFP at 
the EU level. It would constitute an optional second contract law regime parallel to na-
tional legislation on EFP, providing employers and employees with an option between 
two regimes, one originating in national legislation and the other—the Common Euro-
pean Regime on EFP—in European legislation. As a market-based approach it would be 
implemented by the mode of governance of competition61, allowing for a higher de-
gree of flexibility for national actors. In its 2014 Resolution, the European Parliament 
describes a potential Common European Regime on EFP (opt-in 29th Regime) as fol-
lows: 
“an optional single legal framework open to employers throughout the EU, 
which would respect areas of Member State competence on fiscal and labour 
law, in terms of: 
a) a set of simple, elementary and basic supportive models developed 
from best-practice examples for each type and size of company, 
                                           
60  SOC-371, CESE 1375/2010; see recital 4.2.1. 
61  In the multilevel system of the European Union, hierarchy refers to the traditional EU legislative proce-
dures, which produce hard law in form of Regulations and Directives and are enforceable by the ECJ 
(Bähr, Treib and Falkner 2008 p. 93); they have a vertical, “top-down” structure based on compliance. 
Competition is a horizontal form of interaction where the EU is not intervening with regulation; instead, 
the Member States start—through mutual adjustment—to compete for location advantages and national 
welfare (Bähr, Treib and Falkner 2008 p. 93), leading to a minimum set of regulations. Negotiation is 
based on the horizontal co-ordination of the Member States by means of best practice and benchmarking 
procedures or the like which might be supported or monitored by EU institutions and can lead to an ap-
proximation of standards through mutual adjustment; as with competition, the actors are (formally) 
equal. 
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b) a market-based approach where only companies finding the single 
regime useful would use it, 
c) allowing differences in Member States’ legal culture in that the na-
tional regimes continue to exist in parallel, 
d) improving transparency and access to information to facilitate equal 
implementation in different Member States, 
e) the applicability at national and/or EU level when needed and not be-
ing restricted to cross-border companies, taking into account tax is-
sues as well as financial risk for employees.” 
 
Taxation issues would have to be left out of a Common European Regime on 
EFP, as “a framework for a European model of employee ownership should 
not override national taxation rules.” (P7_TA(2014)0013, recital 7)  
The optional Common European Regime would allow businesses to operate an EFP 
scheme throughout the EU on the basis of a single set of legal rules. In firms operat-
ing these schemes, employees would benefit from better portability across the EU. 
Further it would leave the decision on its application to the market and would there-
fore only be chosen were interested parties considered it to be an advantage. The in-
dividual legal culture of each Member State would be left untouched, making it politi-
cally more acceptable. The Common European Regime would not require compromise 
on the lowest common denominator, thus avoiding the lowering of standards (“race to 
the bottom”). In countries that do not provide for any regulation on EFP yet, it 
would establish a regulatory framework in the first place. Since it draws basic 
principles and standards from existing national models, the optional Common Europe-
an Regime would have the advantage of higher political legitimacy among Member 
States.  
A Common European Framework on EFP would meet the policy objectives in respect of 
reducing legal complexities and transaction costs. At the same time, companies who 
would decide not to make use of the regime would not face any costs, as this option 
would not affect them. However, to unfold its approximation potential the common 
European regime, above all, needs to be used in practice. Only when market partici-
pants, decide to choose it will governments be enticed to adopt legislation that confers 
with the rules set therein. Should the rules of the common European regime turn out 
not to be sufficiently attractive the risk of not being taken up by employers and em-
ployees arises. This could result either from a lack of awareness about the new in-
strument or from its contents. Should the Commission decide to pursue this approach, 
it is therefore of crucial importance to accompany the introduction of the new legisla-
tion with an appropriate awareness and information campaign. Furthermore, as a new 
legislative instrument little experience for practical implementation exists. Therefore, it 
might prove difficult when formulating the contents of the common European regime 
to strike the appropriate balance between rules that are neither too detailed nor re-
main too general.  
As the Common European Regime on EFP would aim at the reduction of obstacles 
caused by the different national frameworks, the establishment and functioning of the 
internal market could be considered as its main objective, and therefore such a pro-
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posal could be based on Art. 114 TFEU as the adequate legal basis.62 At the same time 
the downside of such an approach would be that the regime would be far from all em-
bracing as for example it would exclude labour law or taxation issues (for details see 
Chapter IX). Therefore, the implementation of such a regime would need to be incor-
porated into a more comprehensive plan. It would thus important that measures are 
adopted to lay the foundation for the subsequent design and adoption of such a re-
gime, including an impact assessment. In fact, in its resolution on EFP of 14 January 
201463 the EP also called for an impact assessment and  
“Encourages the Commission to present an independent impact assessment 
on such a ‘29th regime’ for EFP, anticipates the inclusion of information 
thereon in the Commission’s interim report” (P7_TA(2014)0013, recital 20). 
 
Table 16. SWOT analysis on the optional Common European Regime on EFP 
Strengths 
< market-based approach to harmonisation 
triggers competition, flexibility for MS  
< does not override national legislation; cre-
ates optional second parallel law regime  
< allows differences in MS legal culture; na-
tional regimes continue to exist in parallel 
< does not require as much compromise on 
the lowest common denominator as a pro-
posal harmonising national laws might do 
Weaknesses 
< as a new legislative instrument little expe-
rience for practical implementation exists 
< regime would be far from all embracing as, 
e.g., labour law and taxation issues would 
be excluded 
< target groups need to be informed proper-
ly about the regime, which is unknown 
< substantial investment of time and re-
sources needed to prepare and implement 
Opportunities 
< overcomes barriers to the Single Market, 
i.e., legal risks and costs for cross-border 
EFP plans  
< allows firms to operate an EFP scheme 
across the EU on the basis of a single set 
of legal rules 
< reduces legal complexity / transaction costs 
of cross-border EFP plans esp. for SMEs  
< portability across the EU for employees 
< in countries with no / rudimentary regula-
tion on EFP, creates of a legal framework 
in the first place 
Threats 
< may not being taken up by employers and 
employees if awareness remains low 
< may be ignored by the market participants 
if EFP rules turn out not to be attractive 
< only when market participants decide to 
choose this regime, governments will be 
enticed to adopt legislation on EFP that 
confers with rules set therein 
< complex and lengthy legislative process 
 
                                           
62  When the proposed activity aims at improving the conditions for the establishment and functioning of 
the internal market by eliminating or preventing obstacles deriving from disparities or potential dispari-
ties between the legislation of the Member States, the activity in question can be considered to fall with-
in the scope of Art. 114 TFEU. 
63  Resolution on EFP in Companies’ Proceeds P7_TA(2014)0013, recitals 17, 20, 21. 
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V. Comparative assessment of policy options and 
recommendations  
1. Comparative assessment of the policy options 
a) Non-binding instruments 
In order to take advantage of the current momentum for EFP, short-term options need 
to be considered. These can be implemented by non-binding, i.e., soft law instru-
ments. The assessment of the current situation in this Study is a necessary foundation 
for further policy actions. In order to broadly disseminate these results, however, pub-
lication of the Study is not sufficient. Additional actions are necessary (for details see 
below section 2). Furthermore, various details of the Study and best practice exam-
ples would need to be disseminated widely if the policy objectives of promoting EFP at 
the EU level are to be successful. 
Co-ordinating initiatives by the Commission (similar to the OMC procedure) 
would offer the possibility of regular assessments involving key stakeholders and oth-
ers. This could help disseminate information and contribute to policy development. But 
experience from other policy areas casts doubt on the impact of this approach in par-
ticular with regard to the actual implementation of policy recommendations; although 
a convergence of standards in some areas could be achieved in the long term, it might 
lead to recommendations conflicting with national EFP models in others. However, 
such a co-ordination procedure could be an adequate tool to prepare and/or accompa-
ny further policy actions, especially with a view to stakeholder involvement. As for a 
one-time promotion of best practice examples, a Commission Recommendation, 
although non-binding, could potentially inspire legislative change. However, a non-
binding commitment offers fewer incentives for Member States to initiate pro-EFP poli-
cies, thus its impact might be low. Earlier experience with the 1992 Council Recom-
mendation on EFP suggests that this might not prove to be the most effective way to 
promote best practice EFP models. 
A Code of Conduct for EFP, offering a template as well as a guide for employees, 
may be preferable to a Commission Recommendation, as it might stimulate an easier 
future elaboration and use. Because templates for EFP schemes are general in nature, 
existing national models and traditions would remain unaffected. Experts should be 
assigned the responsibility of refining and improving this EFP toolkit. A Commission 
Expert Group, for example, including relevant stakeholders, could be involved. A mod-
el template for EFP schemes could be useful in the context of potential future work on 
an optional Common European Regime on EFP. Therefore the Code of Conduct for EFP 
could be considered the best soft law option for identification of best practice, one that 
could lay the groundwork for subsequent legislation. However, to be successful, a vol-
untary Code of Conduct would have to be accompanied by extensive awareness rais-
ing and information sharing measures to ensure that it were broadly applied and 
amended according to the needs of the users.   
A strategy to raise awareness and to share information is of critical importance for the 
promotion of EFP itself, and as a supporting measure for all policy options. An Infor-
mation Centre, beginning with a Virtual Centre for EFP and including an Effective 
Tax Rate Calculator, could provide all necessary information on EFP in the 28 Member 
States in an easily accessible, comparative and dynamic form. The potential for feed-
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back, regular updating and on-going adaptation to user needs, plus its low cost easy 
implementation and wide reach—especially among SMEs—make this policy option the 
best for information sharing. A prototype for an online platform is included in this pilot 
project (for details see Chapter VIII). To be sure, the Virtual Centre for EFP would 
need to be supplemented by additional measures to raise awareness as summarised in 
the proposed Action Programme above. These “soft” options are particularly attrac-
tive, as they appear to be supported by most stakeholders and policy makers. 
b) Binding/legislative instruments 
The establishment of a binding legal framework on EFP through hard law instruments, 
e.g., by means of a Directive, would lead to harmonisation of national legislation. This 
would clearly have the largest impact on reducing obstacles to cross-border EFP 
schemes. However, as previously discussed, such an initiative might conflict with na-
tional models and traditions. Thus it is uncertain whether the necessary political con-
sensus for a Directive could be obtained, even if the critical issue of taxation were ex-
cluded.  
Therefore, with regard to EU legislation, an optional Common European Regime 
on EFP, which allows for different national models to remain in place while at the 
same time offering an optional Regime by means of EU legislation parallel to the na-
tional law obtaining in all 28 Member States could present a better solution. Instead of 
achieving approximation through the top-down harmonisation of national law, the de-
sired effect would be achieved through market mechanisms, i.e., the incentive to 
harmonise national legislation with the Common European regime when increasing 
numbers of employers and employees make use of the latter.   
Further, a common European regime would trigger horizontal regulatory competition 
between national legal provisions and the alternative European ones. Since national 
best practice influencing the Common European Regime would be expected to prevail 
in this market-based approach, over time, this development could eventually lead to 
mutual approximation of national regulation. Unlike a binding legal framework intro-
duced by a Directive, the Common European Regime on EFP might not be adopted in 
every particular, e.g., a model for a particular firm size or EFP type might be ignored 
by the market participants and thus would not have an approximation effect. The ap-
proach is thus much more flexible than imposing a set framework. However, in those 
Member States where regulatory density is low or no regulations exist, the Common 
European Regime on EFP would result in immediate harmonisation in the traditional 
sense. In these countries, the Common European Regime on EFP would initiate a 
regulatory framework.  
Companies could utilise the Common European Regime on EFP even in domestic set-
tings. This advantage is of primary importance for SMEs, which could easily extend a 
plan based on the Common European Regime on EFP across borders as they grow and 
expand. In short, the approach of a common European regime would provide an alter-
native form of harmonisation as employers and employees in all EU member states 
could choose to operate under one single European regulatory framework. Since it 
would exclude taxation issues, this proposal would also be the least invasive legislative 
measure; thus it could achieve the necessary consensus within the ordinary legisla-
tive procedure according to Art. 114 TFEU. Nevertheless, the drafting and imple-
mentation of a Common European Regime on EFP remains a medium- to long-term 
project; thus it should be reined by additional short-term policy measures at the EU 
level. 
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2. Five-Point Plan: Recommended measures to promote EFP 
On the basis of the assessment of the different policy options described above, and 
also taking into account the conference results (reported in Chapter VI), it is recom-
mended that the policy options suggested above be phased in according to the follow-
ing “Five-Point Plan”. This is an action programme of short, medium and long-term 
measures, which build on one another and consist of specific actions to be implement-
ed within a certain period of time. Considering the current interest in EFP, triggered by 
the 2014 EP Resolution and this project, immediate action is advisable in order to 
maintain momentum. 
a) Short-term measures 
The Five-Point Plan begins with the launch of the Virtual Centre for EFP and the Effec-
tive Tax Rate Calculator developed in the context of this Study; details are further de-
veloped in Chapter VIII.   
b) Medium-term measures 
The establishment of a Commission Expert Group is proposed as one of the medium-
term measures. The tasks of the Commission Expert Group could include elaboration 
and on-going amendment of a template for EFP schemes, which would later become 
the core of the Code of Conduct, another medium-term activity of the Five-Point Plan.   
It is suggested that all actions be accompanied by an Action Programme to raise 
Awareness for EFP, another medium-term measure. A PR strategy would also be a 
useful addition to the awareness raising campaign. It would build on the information 
dissemination experience of previous EFP projects and be directed to various target 
groups. This PR strategy could involve, for instance:   
– A new media strategy – Designed to channel new insights into electronic publica-
tions for groups with various interests and levels of expertise, the strategy should fo-
cus on people who have not yet been exposed to EFP. This approach would comple-
ment the Virtual Centre for EFP in integrating diverse media, users and concepts for 
knowledge transfer. To encourage social partners, companies and related actors to 
adopt financial participation or increase their involvement, the strategy should be to:  
! pass on new data from the project to bloggers and policy analysts to aid in dis-
semination throughout the EU-28; 
! create web-based knowledge resources on EFP in the EU-28.  
Among the ways that new insights can be channelled into electronic media for differ-
ent groups are the following: 
! scientific publications available online, preferably in multilingual versions;  
! blogs and social media, including Facebook; 
! popularisation of EFP via short animated features (as an example, “Capital at 
Work”, available in three language versions, namely EN/DE/FR, at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yxzwxOcbsHM). 
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- The research community – Portals for digital archives, research, teaching and 
public education would be an important complementary element. Relying on know-
how from these specific formats of knowledge transfer could be helpful in presenting 
results to business people, politicians, academics and others. In addition, existing digi-
tal platforms could be used to disseminate research results. Interactive use of website 
based applications could provide opportunities to co-ordinate the work of country ex-
pert teams for future information exchange. From experience in previous projects, the 
large expert network that already exists could employ Web 2.0 and Web 3.0 technolo-
gies. Such an expert platform – together with the proposed Virtual Centre for EFP - 
could ensure data access for further interdisciplinary research.  
– The creation of a knowledge database and a distribution network – In order 
to advance information sharing about EFP in the EU, an online platform (e.g., the “Vir-
tual Centre for EFP” described in Chapter VI) could be used to store relevant infor-
mation in an easily accessible and searchable web database. Such a platform can 
serve as a resource for key groups from government to academia and transnational 
organizations as they share new information, write papers on the topic and prepare for 
summits and meetings on the issues. There should be ways to search for relevant in-
formation, post comments about current or future research on the same topic, and 
ways to contact and network with key players in this space. Hosted by existing or new 
online platforms, this online tool should have built-in functionality to allow feedback 
from the users. The network’s database of contacts would be seeded with key players 
and set up so that people could subscribe to news and updates. Establishing this 
online system may save the expense and environmental costs of using printed-paper 
newsletters.   
c) Long-term measures 
Finally, the long-term measures would include verification of the feasibility of a legisla-
tive proposal on EFP, e.g. of an optional Common European Regime on EFP; legal ba-
sis and feasibility are discussed in Chapter IX.  
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VI. Outreach event, stakeholder feedback  
1. Conference “Taking Action: Promotion of Employee Share Ownership” 
In the context of the Pilot Project a conference entitled “Taking Action: Promotion of 
Employee Share Ownership” took place on Thursday 30 January 2014 in Brussels at 
the Albert Brochette Congress Centre. With 140 registered participants the event 
gathered high-level representatives of all relevant stakeholders in EU policy-making to 
discuss options to promote ESO in Europe (see conference program on the following 
page). In line with the Commission’s initiative as well as the European Parliament’s 
resolution of 14 January 2014, the following five priorities broadly shared by the par-
ticipants can be summarised from the discussions: 
! Promoting the exchange of best practice 
In order to establish a functioning exchange of best practice, it was thought that sys-
tematic processing and editing of information was very important. Rather than produc-
ing “another study for the shelf”, the creation of one-stop shops was favoured by the 
conference participants. A “Virtual Centre for EFP” (as presented during the conference) 
was seen as a potential first step in that direction. 
! Providing transparency with regard to fiscal treatment and tax incentives 
It was discussed whether tax incentives should be seen as a prerequisite for successful 
implementation of ESO; participants agreed that they were important to effectively 
promote EFP. Therefore, while harmonisation was not seen as a necessary condition for 
using the ESO schemes, transparency with regard to the different national fiscal treat-
ment of ESO was thought to be of key importance. An Effective Tax Rate Calculator (as 
presented during the conference) could provide a useful decision-making tool for com-
panies with cross-border activities that plan to introduce EFP schemes. 
! Combining economic and labour market policies and reducing inequality 
ESO was seen as fitting logically into the EU’s multi-dimensional approach of combing 
economic and labour market policies as ESO schemes may help to create and secure 
jobs, reactivate unemployed and facilitate business succession in SMEs. To establish a 
level playing field, conference participants agreed that it would be useful to develop 
recommendations at EU level for fiscal and other incentives for SMEs interested in im-
plementing ESO schemes. In this respect, investigating and promoting the transferabil-
ity of best practice ESO schemes like the Sociedades Laborales and Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans (ESOPs) was seen as important.  
! Link to Corporate Governance and Long-Term Investment strategies 
It was agreed that ESO can contribute to transparency, sustainability and responsibility 
in corporate decision-making, all objectives of the EU’s corporate governance policy. 
Further, as ESO can help to foster growth of SMEs and facilitate business succession, it 
was thought that financing ESO schemes should become one of the objectives of the 
Commission’s Long-Term Investment strategy. For instance, it could be considered to 
integrate ESO in the EIB products for SME financing and take ESO into account in the 
Commission’s work on European Long-Term Investment Funds (ELTIFs). 
! Establishing a legal framework on ESO 
An optional legal framework at the EU level that in particular could facilitate cross-
border ESO schemes was supported. A EU framework was thought to be necessary to 
establish a level playing field creating especially opportunities for SMEs which are most 
affected by the financial crisis. It was thought that especially SMEs should receive more 
policy support, in particular considering the significant unexploited potential for ESO 
among SMEs. Establishing a Common European regime on EFP appears a promising op-
tion. The Pilot Project should include a preliminary impact assessment of such a regime. 
Commissioner Barnier’s speech is available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/con-
ferences/2014/0130-employee-ownership/index_en.htm; a conference trailer and all con-
ference materials are available at: http://www.intercentar.de/en/conference/conference/. 
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2. Follow-up and consultation on conference results 
To receive stakeholder‘s responses regarding their assessment of the overall feasibility 
as well as the importance of the main conclusions of the conference an online ques-
tionnaire was launched.64 Nine of eleven questions (Q1-Q9) aimed at assessing the 
feasibility of the measures in question and the importance of the next steps to be tak-
en for the promotion of EFP.  Participants could choose for each question between five 
values on a Likert-type scale (see Figure 10). The last two questions (Q10, Q11) 
aimed at the overall evaluation of the outreach event. The following evaluation takes 
into consideration 47 responses submitted until 31 July 2014. All responses were con-
sidered, including incomplete surveys. Missing values are marked as not applicable. 
The results of the survey show a general confirmation of the conclusions drawn in 
chapter IV of this Study. Respondents showed an affirmative attitude towards all is-
sues raised at the conference. The proportion of respondents ranking different 
measures aimed at fostering EFP as feasible or somewhat feasible, very important or 
somewhat important ranges from over 50 per cent (24 respondents) to over 90 per 
cent (43 respondents).65 The assessments of feasibility vary from over 50 per cent (24 
respondents) regarding the establishment of a legal framework on EFP at EU level to 
facilitate cross-border EFP schemes (Q1) to over 80 per cent regarding the creation of 
one-stop shops for EFP, e.g. a “Virtual Centre for EFP” in a first step (Q3). 
Interestingly the viability assessment in relation to the assessment of the importance 
of different actions differs. At all questions the positive assessment of the importance 
exceeds the positive responses concerning the feasibility. The most obvious deviance 
appears at Q1. While over 90 per cent see the importance of a legal framework to es-
tablish a level playing field especially for SMEs, only approx. 50 per cent of them do 
believe that it can be put into practice. However, only 20 per cent marked this ques-
tion either as somewhat unfeasible/important or not feasible/not important at all. A 
similar deviation between practicability and significance appears in Q2 concerning a 
“29th regime on EFP”. Although the European Parliament already formulated in its 
resolution of 14 January 201466 such an optional opt-in single legal framework, re-
spondents were somewhat sceptic with regard to its actual implementation (64 per 
cent vs. 84 per cent). These results indicate that the formulation of potential new leg-
islative proposals being the most ambitious policy to promote EFP, might also turn out 
to be the most challenging one.  
The deviation of responses between the viability and significance of actions is less ob-
vious at the other questions. Over 79 per cent of the respondents believe that ESO 
would play an important role in increasing good corporate governance, while 71 per 
cent believe that this is also feasible (Q6). It looks somewhat similar with Q7 regard-
ing ESO as a business succession tool: While 73 per cent view ESO as an important 
                                           
64  http://www.intercentar.de/de/pilot-project-efp/questionnaire/. 
65  The second largest group is that of somewhat reserved responses ranging from 6 per cent at Q1 to 27 
per cent (questions Q1, Q7 and Q8, which also showed responses of assessing the raised issues neither 
as feasible/important nor as unfeasible/unimportant highest). The least optimistic view of respondents 
appears in the question regarding the establishment of a legal framework on EFP at EU level to facilitate 
cross-border EFP schemes (Q1, 9 respondents). 
66 Resolution of 14 January 2014 on financial participation of employees in companies' proceeds 
(2013/2127(INI), P7_TA-PROV(2014)0013). 
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tool for solving business succession problems, 64 per cent do believe that this would 
be practicable. The narrowest results between importance and feasibility are found at 
Q3 and Q4. 89 per cent of the respondents marked one-stop shops as being important 
for fostering EFP, and 86 per cent also think in the introduction of such (Q3). 84 per 
cent consider that the “calculation of effective tax rates”, i.e. the assessment of tax 
treatment and social security contributions would be important to making the different 
national fiscal treatments more transparent, and with 82 per cent almost all these re-
spondents reckon this would be actually possible to implement. 
Figure 10. Results of online questionnaire on the feasibility and importance of the 
main conclusions of the conference 
 
Source: Online survey. 
On the whole, the positive feedback from the Survey indicates the commitment of the 
stakeholders to take actions to promote EFP in the future. 89 per cent of the partici-
pants rated the quality of the overall organisation, the programme and the speeches 
high or highest. 
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VII.  EFP information centres: forms and feasibility  
An important element of an awareness and information campaign, and thus an inte-
gral part of the Pilot Project, is the establishment of an information platform for EFP.  
Here, European firms could find both general information on national legal frameworks 
and information on fiscal treatment of different EFP schemes in the EU-28 to assist in 
deciding whether or not to introduce a cross-border plan. For SMEs especially, the cost 
of investigating different national fiscal treatment (taxes and social security contribu-
tions)—information necessary in order to assess the feasibility of any given EFP 
scheme—discourages implementation. As a first step in the search for information, 
available at little or no cost a one-stop-shop information centre(s) should provide an 
up-to-date EU overview.67  
The costs, impact and administration of such an information platform would differ ac-
cording to form. Should these centres be actual or virtual? The following sections pre-
sent evaluation criteria relevant to this question, e.g., cost, administration, scope or 
sustainability. Assessment of feasibility is given for each alternative, e.g., economies 
of scale in costs, knowledge transfer and administration. As local costs differ substan-
tially from country to country, this Study uses average estimates in the following 
sample calculations intended as illustrations. 
1. Forms of information centre(s) and assessments of their costs and 
benefits 
There are three forms an information platform might take:   
! one physical information centre in each Member State (i.e., 28 information cen-
tres);  
! one centralised physical EU information centre;  
! an online platform, i.e., a virtual information centre. 
a) Setting up 28 physical information centres in the Member States 
The concept of 28 physical centres for EFP would include a local office in each Member 
State, staffed by at least one country expert. The number of experts per country 
would largely depend on the size of the economy; countries with a large population of 
enterprises would need more than one. A larger centre would also require more ad-
ministrative and managerial personnel. To ensure mutual information exchange, co-
ordination between the national centres would best be centrally managed, e.g., a hub-
and-spoke network.68 
The local character of the physical centres would be the chief benefit in terms of sup-
plying and obtaining information to and from local firms. On the other hand, econo-
mies of scale, in terms of costs and cross-border knowledge or activities, might be 
                                           
67  Resolution of 14 January 2014 on financial participation of employees in companies' proceeds 
(2013/2127(INI), P7_TA-PROV(2014)0013) recital 27. 
68  The spoke-hub distribution paradigm is a system of connections arranged like a chariot wheel, in which 
all information moves along spokes connected to the hub at the centre. 
     
European Commission: Promotion of Employee Ownership and Participation 
 
70  |  October 2014 
 
limited. The flexibility of this alternative has two-sides: National changes in the condi-
tions for EFP, e.g., new legislation or fiscal regulations, could be quickly expedited, 
although this process might move more slowly to other Member States because of a 
time lag in communication. Establishing and promoting such an on-the-ground net-
work would take considerably more time than setting up a virtual centre. Consulting 
costs could be recouped by means of fees which firms would be required to pay after 
consultation reached a certain level. However, there is the danger that local private 
agents (e.g., taxation or administrative consultants) might view this service as compe-
tition to their own services and oppose it. 
Description of advantages and limits of the service 
The creation of 28 physical centres would provide one centre per country to function 
as a direct source of information to local companies. The experts in each centre69 
would be required to have expertise in both the local culture and EFP regulation, as 
well as in the cross border implementation of EFP plans. This specific knowledge would 
be most appreciated by trans-national firms.    
Table 17. Sample cost estimation for 28 physical centres  
28 Local centres (all figures in column 2 and 4 are EUR) 
  Cost per unit  Units Total Comments 
Experts 52,722* 37 1,950,714 37 experts for all EU countries:  
1 expert for small country (22);  
2 experts for mid-size country (3);  
3 experts for large country (3) 
Support staff 30,160* 28 844,480 1 per country 
Overheads 100% staff cost 28 2,800,000 Including office rent, equipment, 
additional costs 
Marketing ** 10% of total budget 28 560,000 Online and offline marketing 
  
Total estimate per year 6,155,194 
 
Average per country 219,821 
* The stated cost of experts is the averaged maximum eligible daily rates for EU staff researchers / EU admin-
istrative staff across the EU-28 on an annual basis (21 working days per month, data base of March 2013, 
Tempus IV Program). ** Based on the so-called percentage approach, marketing costs are calculated at 10% 
of the overall budget. 
Costs 
Capital expenses: Twenty-eight local sites would need to be purchased or rented. Al-
ternatively the centres would need to be hosted by local entities e.g., commercial, ed-
ucational or philanthropic.   
Operating expenses: Salaries for each expert (amount depending on size of national 
economy) and for supporting employees (e.g., administration), as well as experts’ 
travel expenses, would need to be included.  
                                           
69  The estimated number of experts varies per country depending on the number of firms per country, the 
smallest countries (22) will have 1 expert; mid-sized countries (3) will have 2 experts and larger coun-
tries (3) 3 experts (the size classification refers as mentioned to the population of firms). 
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Impact 
Medium-term impact could be expected since the search for a site, training and espe-
cially creating awareness are all time consuming activities. On the other hand, the 
personal service offered by the local centres would be beneficial to and appreciated by 
local firms. 
Management factor 
Management would be decentralised, as each branch would consist of its own expert 
with his own views. However, central management of the local centres would also be 
necessary, imposing extra managerial and administrative tasks and costs on the con-
cept as a whole. The risk of bureaucratisation and maintenance of transparency are 
potential problems. 
Adaption to change 
Delays in adapting to various changes (e.g., at the EU level or concerning transnation-
al issues) can be expected, as changes would need to be communicated to the local 
experts. On the other hand, the local centres would adapt more quickly to changes in 
the economy since the experts, being locally based, could create feedback loops. 
Ease of promotion 
Making local companies and stakeholders aware of the existence of these new centres 
could well be time consuming. Hence, transition from awareness to action (i.e., actual 
consultation) may take a long time; firms might be hesitant to utilize the consultation 
service. Firms may not learn about this new resource early. 
Table 18. Advantages and disadvantages of establishing 28 physical information cen-
tres 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Local approach High overall costs 
Feedback loop from local experts Decentralised approach 
Personal support Lower degree of flexibility 
Physical drop-in centre Longer lines of communication 
 Might be seen as competition by local agents 
 Exit costly - high expense of unwinding centres 
as a consequence of institutional funding 
 
b) Establishing one physical EU centre 
The second alternative would be a single physical European Centre for EFP. This would 
involve a regional approach featuring regional experts instead of country specialists. 
One expert for a group of Member States, rather than an expert from each Member 
State, would be advisable and beneficial from several perspectives, among them 
costs, specialised knowledge and management of cross-border activities. This struc-
ture would provide some national market feedback—although less than would be the 
case with 28 national centres—as regional managers presumably would stay closely 
attuned to the national markets in their regions. The main advantages of this structure 
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would lie in cross-border information exchange and economies of scale. Further, this 
structure would cost less than the Hub and Spoke network due to the number of cen-
tres being reduced to one, with a smaller number of experts involved. A disadvantage, 
though, would be the lesser impact of a system having no local character.   
A single European centre for EFP might prove difficult to promote as it is not as close 
to the market as local centres would be. On the other hand, it would have the ad-
vantage of representing a large cross-border expertise. Local private agents would be 
less likely to perceive such a centre as a competitor to their services, thus more readi-
ly accepting it as a partner. 
Description of the advantages and limits of services 
In this scenario, one physical European Centre would be established to provide infor-
mation about EFP and consulting services to firms across the entire EU. While cross-
border expertise would be necessary, there should be at least one expert for each re-
gion, in order to ensure the timely assessment, stock-taking and sharing of all availa-
ble knowledge on regional/local regulations and business practices. A one-time or an-
nual membership fee might be required for different classes of groups. If fees apply, 
these could be lower for local support centres on account of lower costs and econo-
mies of scale. 
Table 19. Sample cost estimation for one physical EU centre 
1 European centre (all figures in column 2 and 4 are EUR) 
  Cost per unit  Units Total Comments 
Experts 90,700* 15 1,360,800 5 regions - 3 experts per region 
Support staff 53,928* 5 269,640 1 per region 
Overheads 100% staff cost 1 1,630,440 Including office rent, equipment, addi-
tional costs 
Marketing** 10% of total 
budget 
1 326,088 Online / offline marketing per region 
  
Total per year 3,586,968 
 
Average per country 128,106 
* Based on the assumption that such a centre would be based in Brussels the cost of experts / administrative 
staff is calculated using the maximum daily rates for EU staff researchers in Belgium on an annual basis (21 
working days per month, data base of March 2013, Tempus IV Program). ** Based on the so-called percent-
age approach, marketing costs are calculated at 10%of the overall budget (however, the marketing costs of 
one physical centre might be more as—like the 28 centres—it would still have to reach the whole of the EU). 
Costs 
Capital costs would be lower as only one location within the EU would be necessary. 
Using regional experts might decrease expert cost; economies of scale would be pos-
sible with regard to support staff and the use of regional experts. 
Impact 
Medium-term impact would be expected, as the centre would have to be set up, ex-
perts trained, and service publicised. As there would be no local representation, this 
concept lacks the personal touch in its relations with local firms. This missing local el-
ement might result in fewer requests for consultation and thus lessen the expected 
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impact. Consequently, communication gaps between firms/employees and the centre’s 
experts might widen. 
Management factor 
Management centralisation would make it easier to direct and oversee the activities of 
experts. Substantial administrative support would still be necessary to co-ordinate 
team operations and client support. 
Adaptation to change 
Closer internal communication lines could accelerate the speed of innovation com-
pared to local centres. Regional experts could more readily observe changes in the 
business environment. 
Ease of promotion 
The presence of a EU centre might be more visible than individual local centres and 
the EU centre could be perceived as an important source of knowledge and expertise. 
However, a single centre would have to accommodate a larger clientele and would be 
more distant from firms and markets. Partners such as consulting services might be 
less likely to view the centre competitively and more willing to access it as a source of 
information. 
Table 20. Advantages and disadvantages of establishing one physical EU centre 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Medium costs Lower degree of flexibility 
Central management of experts Larger clientele to deal with while lower 
reach when promoting centre 
Regional approach possible No local approach 
Feedback loop from regional experts Exit costly - high expense of unwinding cen-
tre as a consequence of institutional funding 
Personal support Distance from firms and markets 
Physical drop-in centre  
 
c) Creating a single virtual centre for the entire EU-28 
The purpose of a virtual centre for EFP would be to deliver conceptual and concrete 
information on EFP to both companies and their employees. It would be programmed 
as a web application that can be integrated into the websites of all kinds of different 
partners, e.g., national chambers of commerce, employers associations and trade un-
ions, the Commission, taxation consultants and local centres of EFP expertise. As an 
easily accessible online tool, the virtual centre would be highly useful to companies at 
an early stage of their search for information (i.e., internet research) thus saving both 
time and expense. The virtual centre would provide background information on EFP, 
explain differences between European countries, and enable the user to compare vari-
ous types of EFP across the EU-28. Country profiles could describe the legal frame-
works of current EFP schemes, their fiscal treatment, as well as the history and tradi-
tions of EFP, which influence the attitudes of government and social partners.   
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Further, a virtual centre could include an online tool for calculating the effective tax 
burden of different EFP schemes for employees and employers. Such an effective tax 
rate calculator would facilitate the implementation of EFP schemes especially in SMEs 
and companies that operate cross-border and that otherwise might not obtain this 
specific information in such a clear and low cost way. As previously mentioned, an ef-
fective tax rate calculator was explicitly referred to in the 2014 Resolution the Europe-
an Parliament. 
The following section is a description of a model Virtual Centre for EFP which the au-
thors of this Study developed and equipped with current country information as part of 
deliverables of this Study. 
Description of the advantages and limits of services 
The Virtual Centre consists of a web application to be integrated into the websites of 
various partners. Feedback would be provided by either experts familiar with the local 
business environment and regulations, or professionals implementing the application 
on their website. In the latter case, the pool of experts providing feedback would be 
larger and more knowledgeable. Consulting costs could be negligible because of the 
low operating cost. A one-time annual membership fee might be imposed on groups 
seeking more detailed information. Feasibility of a self-funded tool is more likely due 
to low costs of operation and membership. An agent license fee might apply as an al-
ternative or option. 
Table 21. Cost calculation for a virtual EU centre 
1 Virtual centre (all figures in column 2 and 4 are EUR) 
  Cost per unit Units Total Comments 
Experts 90,700* 1 90,700 1 expert for research & implement-
ing feedback from local agents 
Expert network 7,500 28 210,000 Yearly update of country files 
Support staff 53,928* 1 53,928 Administrative and marketing expert 
Overheads 100% staff cost  354,628 Including office rent, equipment, ad-
ditional costs 
Marketing** 10% of total budget 28 70,926 Online marketing only 
  
Total per year 780,182 
 
Average per country 27,864 
* Based on the assumption that such a centre would be based in Brussels the cost of experts / administrative 
staff is calculated using the maximum daily rates for EU staff researchers in Belgium on an annual basis (21 
working days per month, data base of March 2013 Tempus IV Program).  ** Based on the so-called percent-
age approach, marketing costs are calculated at 10% of the overall budget (however, the marketing costs of 
one virtual centre might be more as—like the 28 centres—it would still have to reach the whole of the EU). 
Costs 
Programming and testing of the web tool would involve a one-time setup expense with 
low operating costs; rather than a physical infrastructure, a server hosting the applica-
tion would be sufficient to operate the system while a single administrator would man-
age the content though a central backend. At the same time, this administrator—an 
EFP expert—could integrate user feedback. 
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Impact 
The use of established information networks (through host websites of partners al-
ready involved in the pilot project) would substantially reduce the launch time. Once 
the co-operation agreements with the strategic partners were in place, the tool could 
be launched immediately. The simultaneous use of different agents would produce a 
large multiplier effect.  
Management factor 
One individual through a central backend would manage the tool. Although based on a 
central server, the plug-in would be embedded in an unlimited number of websites 
graphically mimicking their web-design. The institution employing the management 
expert could arrange the hosting. Input from external local experts would be centrally 
fed into the system at the hosting institution to ensure quality. 
Adaption to change 
Updates would be automatically pushed to the front end on the host websites without 
risk of human errors. Lines of communication would be as short as possible which 
would result in a quick response to change. Updates would be automatically be im-
plemented without further maintenance of the web application.  
Ease of promotion 
Partners involved in the pilot project would expedite promotion of the online tool. Co-
marketing is also a possibility, through which the tool could benefit from the sponsor-
ship of an already established partner. Multiplier effects would be generated by both of 
these methods. 
Table 22. Advantages and disadvantages of establishing a single virtual centre for the 
entire EU-28 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Low overall costs – esp. operating costs Much less of a local approach 
Short term impact (shorter start-up phase) Feedback loop should come 
over external experts 
Centrally managed No personal support service 
Fast adaption to market needs No physical drop-in centre 
Supporting element to local agents  
Better opportunities for self funding due to lower 
costs 
 
Resort to awareness of local agents  
Low cost of exit - unwinding centre comparably easy  
 
2. Comparative evaluation of the options  
The main advantage of the Virtual Centre for EFP, in comparison with physical centres, 
would be to provide quality information at low cost (EUR 780,000 compared with EUR 
3.6m for one physical centre and EUR 6.2m for 28 centres). The differences between 
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these would largely depend on the number of experts and the rental cost. The virtual 
centre is more cost effective since it requires only one central administrator. This facil-
itates quick response to local market changes via push updates to the web application 
and shorter communication lines in general. Furthermore, it is easier to promote an 
online substitute for an actual physical centre because of the ease in enlisting co-
operating partners that implement the web-application on their websites as well as 
local experts from the EFP network. 
Multiplier effect of the “plug-in” architecture  
A further important advantage of a virtual centre is the multiplier effect. Twenty-eight 
physical centres would involve a heavy volume of communication since there would be 
no central point of reference (assuming the absence of a hub and spoke network). A 
virtual centre for EFP would provide clear streams of communication directed from the 
central administrator to the different local experts through the web-application. A 
feedback loop to adapt to local markets and to guarantee the quality and accuracy of 
information would be automatically provided by co-operation with local experts. The 
presence of the web-application on multiple websites of local partners would also re-
sult in an increase in reach to local business owners, improving awareness and acces-
sibility of the information. 
Exit strategy 
In the event the EFP centre should become obsolete or costs too high, an exit strategy 
might be necessary. Cost to and impact on stakeholders would depend on the struc-
ture. For the 28 national centres, this would mean the loss of jobs for 65 employees 
and the closure of 28 locales. Closing a Virtual Centre for EFP would have a much low-
er impact since it is staffed by only two regular employees.  
Figure 11. Different options for information centre(s) for EFP  
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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Summary 
In summary, a virtual information centre, particularly the Virtual Centre for EFP pro-
posed in this Study, would deliver best results vis-à-vis the given criteria. Physical 
centres would be significantly more expensive to establish and maintain than a virtual 
centre. However, the larger and more personal scope of the physical centres could 
justify their higher costs. Their establishment, however, should be made conditional 
on self-sustainable financing. 
3. Options to provide information on taxation and social security 
contributions 
In addition to the examining alternative types of information centres, this section 
analyses the various options for providing information on tax and social security con-
tributions, which could be done through all of the above mentioned types of centres. 
a) Publication of a comparative study on effective tax rates 
The easiest solution would be to compile and publish a new study on the fiscal effects 
(taxes and social security contributions) of introducing various forms of ESO and profit 
sharing. Information from country reports could be translated into comparative over-
views of countries according to a fixed set of parameters. Distribution would most like-
ly include both paper and e-paper formats, static forms compared to an online tool.  
Time to market 
Marketing would take somewhat longer time compared to other methods, depending 
on the publication form. Revisions would also take longer, e.g., when a study needs to 
be rewritten. 
Flexibility and lifetime 
Publication would be of limited use in reporting effective tax rates and social security 
contributions; nor could they be amended or be expanded. Revision or addition of new 
data would be impossible for already published versions; a new study would need to 
be undertaken within the same framework. The publication would become obsolete 
when new data is available. 
Impact and user friendliness 
A study would be most useful to informed experts in the relevant area. Basic 
knowledge about and interest in the subject would be needed to fully understand and 
interpret the information. Therefore, the impact on European companies would be lim-
ited.  
Table 23. Advantages and disadvantages of a comparative study on effective tax rates 
Advantages Disadvantages 
No need for service after published Short lifetime 
 Single topic covered 
 Fixed set of parameters 
 Low impact 
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b) Development of an effective tax rate calculator as a static tool 
An alternative to the publication of a comparative analysis of the fiscal effects of EFP 
schemes for a number of scenarios in the EU Member States would be the program-
ming of a tool with all this information, i.e. an “effective tax rate calculator”. This tool 
would enable the calculation of a comparative overview of the effective tax burden for 
EFP schemes across the EU Member States. Users could interact with the programme, 
by changing a number of pre-set parameters. A calculator in this form would, howev-
er, not allow for integration of new (additional) characteristics. The tool would be 
available as a CD-ROM included in the study mentioned above in section a) or as a 
download online. 
Time to market 
Marketing would take somewhat longer then would other methods depending on the 
form of publication.  
Flexibility and lifetime 
The calculator tool would be more flexible than a static study. Changes in the legal 
and regulatory environment could be reported via updates, once the user installs the 
tool. Distribution of a CD-ROM takes longer and its lifetime is shorter than that of an 
online tool. It would be difficult to integrate the tool into local websites; nevertheless, 
opportunities to distribute download links do exist.  
Impact and user friendliness 
The calculator programme would be user-friendlier than a mere study, though more 
limited in its information base than an online tool (programme size). The data output 
would be partially customizable and adaptable to user needs, although limitations in 
parameters may exist. 
Table 24. Advantages and disadvantages of an effective tax rate calculator as a static 
tool 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Interactive – user friendly Hard to update 
Framework to be used for other topics Limited lifetime 
 Limited program size 
 Need for service to update 
c) Launching an effective tax rate calculator as an online tool 
This option describes the previously mentioned tax rate calculator as an online imple-
mentation, which provides multiple benefits to the user. In addition to possibilities for 
dissemination on EU websites, the online calculator could also be integrated into the 
websites of local partners (as described for the Virtual Centre for EFP). Hence, among 
the advantages of the online tool is a multiplier effect both with respect to its range 
and its power to raise awareness. As the output at the front-end could be flexibly 
adapted to user feedback, it would be easier to tailor the display of detailed infor-
mation to the user’s needs. Furthermore, this option would allow for introduction of 
more parameters and different forms of taxation, thus extending its potential applica-
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tion. Targeting different users via different front-ends would allow for more specific 
interaction. Different groups could select different pre-set parameters so that only 
those parameters relevant to them were displayed. 
Time to market 
Once the product is ready to be launched, fast implementation is possible. Increased 
reach would be possible with distribution of the tool over multiple local partners. 
Flexibility and lifetime  
Updating the tool instantly provides users with the latest version. The architecture—a 
“plug-in”—would allow for simple integration into an unlimited number of existing 
websites. The lifetime of the tool could easily and regularly be expanded by feeding-in 
new and updated information via the back end. The dynamic nature of the concept 
allows for the use of different sets of data, making it possible to import tax rates for 
new eventualities (e.g., the inclusion of pension plans) the tool could be used across 
other policy areas. 
Impact and user friendliness 
The tool provides a user-friendly method of communicating complex data. The integra-
tion into multiple local websites would achieve a broad reach. Feedback could easily be 
collected in order to customise the online application to the user’s needs. There would 
be few technical prerequisites to deal with, since the software would be cloud-based.   
Integration in existing online platforms  
The integrated online calculator could build on the accessible database provided by the 
Virtual Centre for EFP with single country files containing all raw data involved in the 
calculation.  
Table 25. Advantages and disadvantages of an effective tax rate calculator as an 
online tool 
Advantages Disadvantages 
Interactive – user friendly Need for service after published 
Easy to update  
Framework to be used for other topics  
Easier to expand lifetime  
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4. Overview of the options and their main characteristics 
 
Table 26. Overview of the options and their main characteristics 
 
 
Criteria 
for evalu-
ation 
Information Centre for EFP Information on taxes 
and social security contributions 
Creation of 
28 physical 
centres 
Creation of 
one physi-
cal centre 
Creation of 
a “Virtual 
Centre“ 
Compara-
tive study 
on effective 
tax rates 
Develop-
ment of an  
“Effective 
Tax Rate 
Calculator“ 
“Effective 
Tax Rate 
Calculator“ 
as an 
online tool 
Associated 
cost vs. 
impact 
High cost / 
medium-
term impact 
Medium cost 
/ medium-
term impact 
Low cost / 
short-term 
impact 
Low cost / 
Questionable 
Medium cost 
/ user     
oriented 
Medium cost 
/ user 
friendly 
Manage-
ment 
Decentralised 
/ inflexible 
Centralised / 
inflexible 
Centralised / 
flexible 
Decentralised 
/ inflexible 
Centralised / 
inflexible 
Centralised / 
flexible 
Lines of 
communi-
cation 
Long Medium Short - - - 
Adoption 
to change 
Slow Medium Fast Impossible Hard Easy 
Accuracy - - - Out-dated 
under a year 
Only newest 
version 
Up-to-Date 
Promotion From start / 
time con-
suming / 
very costly 
From start / 
time con-
suming / 
costly 
From start / 
co-marketing 
with local 
partner /    
low cost 
- - - 
Exit     
straegy 
Very costly / 
locked-in to 
institutional 
funding 
Costly / 
locked-in to 
institutional 
funding 
No cost / no 
institutional 
funding 
- - - 
Feedback Local ex-
perts 
Regional 
experts 
External 
experts or 
local agents 
Impossible 
to imple-
ment 
Hard to im-
plement 
Easy to im-
plement 
Source: Own elaboration. 
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VIII. The Virtual Centre for EFP and the CETREPS effec-
tive tax rate calculator for EFP schemes 
The Inter-University Centre’s expert team has developed a prototype of the Virtual 
Centre for EFP including the effective tax rate calculator CETREPS (Calculating Effec-
tive Tax Rates for Employee Participation Schemes) over the past three years. As the 
contractor implementing the pilot project, Inter-University Centre has made the proto-
type available online as one of the deliverables of this Study.  
1. Description of the prototype available online  
Figure 12. Landing page of the Virtual Centre for EFP (programmed as a plug-in)  
The prototype of the Virtual Centre for EFP has two modules with different functionality: 
An Information and Country Comparison Tool and the Effective Tax Rate Calculator. 
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a)  EFP information and country comparison tool 
The information and country comparison tool makes it possible to compare all Member 
States over a range of criteria, e.g.: 
! An overview of governments’ and social partners’ attitudes to EFP; 
! The national legal and fiscal frameworks pertaining to employee involvement 
and EFP;  
! Applicable tax rates, i.e., income tax, social security contributions and incen-
tives offered through the taxation system for EFP plans. 
Figure 13. Front end of the Information and Country Comparison Tool 
The information collected for this Study (current as of August 2014) would be made 
available through the Virtual Centre for EFP for all different EFP schemes from all 28 
Member States. 
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Figure 14. Sample output of the Information and Country Comparison Tool 
b) CETREPS – Calculating Effective Tax Rates for Employee Participation Schemes 
The data entry screen of CETREPS allows the insertion of a set of parameters model-
ling the economic and other factors of the planned EFP scheme(s). This includes the 
employee’s status, the total value of EFP granted, and general assumptions reflecting 
the economy and countries of operation. The system provides users with a range of 
assumptions to select from, e.g.:  
! salary levels;  
! the value of the EFP arrangements as a percentage of annual income;  
! holding periods for shares; 
! general assumptions about the economy (average interest rate, increase in 
share prices, etc.); 
! types of EFP plans (cash profit sharing, share ownership, stock options, etc.); 
! Member States. 
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Figure 15. Front end of the CETREPS Effective Tax Rate Calculator  
The CETREPS would make information on general taxation, social security contribu-
tions and specific tax incentives relevant for different EFP schemes from all 28 Member 
States for any given scenario (corresponding to the inserted parameters) available in 
order to calculate effective rates of differing taxation, personal status and situations. 
This information would be necessary to quantify the effective tax burden and allow for 
a representative comparison of tax systems as well as of specific tax incentives. In 
Figure 16, for the purpose of illustration, we have calculated taxes and social security 
contributions for 1 January 2014.  
However, the calculation tool developed for this purpose is a flexible and adaptable 
instrument that provides comparative calculations of variable values. The calcula-
tions can be performed for any scenario. The result is a graphic comparative 
overview of the effective tax burden on different EFP schemes (including social securi-
ty contributions and other levies; see Figure 16) as a per cent of the final amount of 
the benefit in the five selected EU countries. To deliver comparable results, simplifica-
tions are inevitable; thus the comparative overview represents an approximation.  
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The calculator is a dynamic and flexible tool, which could be extended to other areas, 
e.g., pension schemes. 
Figure 16. Sample output of the CETREPS Effective Tax Rate Calculator 
The calculator would allow real time simulation by changing the parameters above the 
output chart. It would permit European SMEs to gain a quick and-up-to-date EU over-
view online, providing a cost-effective alternative to buying expertise from private 
consultancies. Once the decision to introduce an EFP scheme is made by an SME, their 
accountants could calculate the exact values for the chosen EFP scheme by using the 
CETREPS database. 
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c) Timeframe and partners 
It is suggested that a pilot phase involving chosen strategic project partners and their 
members be launched as soon as possible after publication of this Study. This launch 
would be easy to implement since no new institutions are required. During the pilot 
phase of around 18 months:  
! the Virtual Centre for EFP would be made fully accessible, and 
! the Effective Tax Rate Calculator CETREPS would be password restricted during 
a 6-12 months test phase  
to receive feed back from selected stakeholders.  
The cost of launching the Virtual Centre and the CETREPS Calculator for a pilot period 
of 18 months is estimated at EUR 75,000. Once tested, the operating cost for the Cal-
culator (EUR 100,000 per year) and the annual operating cost of the Virtual Centre 
(EUR 250,000 per year) are estimated to be roughly EUR 1 million for a pilot phase of 
three years.   
As mentioned above, the Virtual Centre for EFP in the form of a widget, i.e., a web-
based plug-in, could be easily integrated into an unlimited number of existing websites 
to make information on EFP broadly available. Since well-established information 
channels used by the target groups would have a multiplier-effect, the coverage is po-
tentially wide and the cost low. Information would be handled centrally; updates at 
the backend keep the information current allowing for real time adaption to changes. 
Figure 17. Embedding the Virtual Centre – Visualisation for sample host website  
The Virtual Centre for EFP, with its expected multiplier effect, could be a powerful tool 
for information dissemination. A prerequisite to success, however, would be a number 
of strategic partners that would agree to host the tool on their websites during the pi-
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lot phase. To attract and convince these potential partners and to market the tool, a 
promotional film demonstrating the functionality of the Virtual Centre for EFP and the 
CETREPS Tax Rate Calculator was produced. This video illustrates how the tool 
can solve actual problems showing in particular benefits at the firm level. The video is 
available at: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCAjGsS9IY-_iN8_B_d47I_Q. 
Since both employers and employees will be utilizing this tool, the EESC has already 
signalled interest in proceeding with the pilot phase by setting up both the Virtual 
Centre of EFP and the Effective Tax Rate Calculator CETREPS on several members’ 
websites. Based on the test phase feedback for the virtual centre and the calculator, 
the question of the centre’s long-term supervision should be decided.   
2. Pricing and financing strategy 
The Virtual Centre for EFP could be financed in several ways, although the method cho-
sen will directly affect the rate of adaptation. The service could be offered free of charge 
or there could be a service fee. Willingness to pay for a service generally depends on 
how much the customer values the service. Hence, the fee level could limit use if it is 
too high. The non-profit model, discussed below, combines the best features of both, 
providing a financing structure and low usage cost by utilising economies of scale. 
a) No pay usage or partially paid usage 
Of the financing options, the free service for all data would result in the widest usage. 
The financing of a no-fee structure could be done through a central institution or by 
the local agents that implement the tool on their website. If a central institution fi-
nances the Virtual Centre for EFP, it would probably increase both adaptation by local 
agents (serving as a platform for the Virtual Centre) and by users. Although compa-
nies seeking information on EFP/ESO would save money, economies of scale would be 
sacrificed. Alternatively local partners would have to pay for offering the service on 
their website. This would limit the likelihood of their implementing the Virtual Centre 
for EFP through their websites, since they would not directly profit from it. A more 
preferable option might be for users to partially pay for the service that they actually 
use as shown in table 27).  
Table 27. Combining free and paid usage 
 Free Paid 
Detailed information on employee ownership ! ! 
Country reports Basic ! ! 
Country reports Expert incl. underlying data sheets " ! 
Effective Tax Rate Calculator Basic/Demo ! ! 
Effective Tax Rate Calculator Expert/Full " ! 
Yearly price EUR 0,00 EUR 50,00 
Source: Authors calculations. 
For instance, general information on EFP as well as the simulator function of the effec-
tive tax rate calculator might be provided free of charge. However, access to the data 
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underlying the effective tax rate calculator might be made available only by subscrip-
tion over a certain period. Users requiring a higher level of information and who wish 
to download this data (i.e., firms that actually plan to implement and EFP scheme) and 
make it available to their accountants or tax consultants would be charged a fee. The 
outcome could be a self-funding system, making external funding no longer neces-
sary.  
b) Non-profit model – combination with partially paid usage 
The non-profit model is based on the principle of economies of scale. Hence, the more 
firms make use of the service, the lower the cost per company. Users would pay a 
fixed Europe-wide price for the services of, e.g., EUR 50 for twelve months. If more 
users register and pay for the service than necessary to cover all costs, registered us-
ers could be reimbursed for the difference. With an estimated cost of roughly EUR 
250,000 per year (for all EU countries), the break-even point would be as low as 
5,000 companies per year from the entire European Union.  
At the country level, adjusted to country size, this would amount to roughly three 
companies in the smallest country (Malta) and 928 in the largest (Germany). It is es-
timated that, on average, 10,000 companies per year would use the effective tax rate 
calculator. That would result in an actual cost per company of EUR 25, implying a prof-
it of EUR 25 per company, which could be refunded under a non-profit structure. As-
suming these economies of scale, the calculator would finance itself at a cost of EUR 
25 per company user. A guarantee could also be provided so that if the user were not 
satisfied the fee would be refunded. With the broad spread between initial and subse-
quent costs, the offering price of the programme could later be adjusted depending on 
how many companies subscribe. 
A combination of the non-profit and partial payment models would seem most feasi-
ble. Company owners would be able to obtain all information necessary to consult with 
a local professional. By comparison, the fully paid service model might result in mak-
ing the Virtual Centre for EFP less effective. 
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IX. EU legislative proposal for a Common European Re-
gime on Employee Financial Participation   
The main barrier to implementing cross border EFP schemes is the patchwork nature 
of the national rules for schemes already in place. These schemes reflect the different 
political and economic histories of the 28 Member States. Their legislative and regula-
tory frameworks are necessarily diverse; some are advanced; others are rudimentary 
(for a mapping of the diversity of regulatory density across the EU-29 see Table 1). As 
mentioned earlier, difficulties occur in particular from both different range of applica-
tion and different regulatory density of national legislative frameworks as well as from 
differences in legislative requirements, which have been identified as a major factor 
hampering the implementation of EFP schemes.70 Amending present laws or passing 
new ones for this purpose would be a cumbersome process that could take years, 
even decades, to accomplish. 
To overcome this barrier, one of the options discussed in Chapter IV could be a new 
legislative initiative, the “Common European Regime in EFP”, which would aim to cre-
ate a level playing field for EFP across the EU-28. This proposal responds to the call for 
a legal European framework for EFP71 referring to the suggestions of the EP resolution 
on EFP of 14 January 201472 and further developing the approach73 therein postulated. 
As the name suggests, this would be a second contract law regime parallel to national 
legislation on EFP.74 It would offer employers and employees a choice between two 
alternative EFP regimes one originating in national legislation, the other in European 
legislation. The choice between these two alternatives would be entirely optional. The 
common European regime would neither replace nor override national legislation but 
would serve as a cross border alternative to national laws, to be used at the discretion 
of the parties involved.  
In its resolution on EFP of 14 January 201475 the EP—referring to the Pilot Project and 
its interim report—also called for an impact assessment and  
“Encourages the Commission to present an independent impact assessment 
on such a ‘29th regime’ for EFP, anticipates the inclusion of information 
thereon in the Commission’s interim report” (P7_TA(2014)0013, recital 20). 
Against this background a discussion of a potential future legislative proposal for an 
optional “Common European Regime on EFP” follows.  
                                           
70  See the Report of the High-Level Group of Experts (2003), p. 6 ff.  
71  For references of this aim in the current and past policy development see above Chapter I d) “EFP on the 
EU policy agenda”, Chapter II 2. a) “Current challenges of EFP - Differences between national legal 
frameworks on EFP” and Chapter V 2. “Follow-up and consultations on conference results”. 
72  Resolution on EFP in Companies’ Proceeds P7_TA(2014)0013, recitals 7, 16. 
73  The EP approach roots in the concept of a so-called “29th Regime” as mentioned in the 2010 EESC Own-
initiative Opinion INT/499 and the EP Resolution T7-0013/2014.  
74  Similar to the Commission proposal for a Common European Sales Law to which this potential proposal 
refers in the following; COM(2011) 635 final. 2011. 
75  Resolution on EFP in Companies’ Proceeds P7_TA(2014)0013, recitals 17, 20, 21. 
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1. Legal basis and content of a potential European legislative proposal 
on EFP  
A EU legislative proposal creating uniform rules for EFP schemes could be based on 
Art. 114 (1) TFEU. Art. 114 serves as the legal basis for approximating national laws, 
which directly affect the establishment or the functioning of the internal market.76 The 
proposal could further be based on Art. 352 TFEU, whereas Art. 81 TFEU would not be 
eligible.77 
a) Classification of the instrument proposed 
There have already been several initiatives to create European optional Regimes78, 
i.e., the European Company79, the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG)80, the 
European Co-operative Society (SCE)81, and the Community Trademark82. There were 
also proposals on the implementation of a Common European Sales Law (CESL)83, a 
European Private Company84, a European Foundation Statute and a European Union 
Patent85. These legislative initiatives appear to involve two types of proposals: 
! Introducing a supranational European regime to create a genuine European le-
gal form sui generis (as in the case of the proposal for a European Company 
Statute, a European Co-operative Statute, and a European Foundation Stat-
ute), which would exist in parallel to national legal forms and as a voluntary 
option. This type of proposal would have to be introduced through European 
legislation because Member States themselves could not create such a supra-
national form through national legislation. 
! Introducing, through an EU level proposal, the creation of 28 identical laws on 
a particular issue (e.g., the European sales law) which are to constitute a se-
cond legal regime within each Member State, parallel to existing national laws 
on this issue and providing national stakeholders a choice between the two. 
                                           
#"!$ Art. 114 TFEU serves as legal basis for approximating laws, which “directly affect the establishment or 
functioning of the Common Market” and in particular are aimed at creating an area without internal fron-
tiers in relation to the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital. 
77 While Art. 81 TFEU offers widespread competences to regulate cross-border conflicts to the EU, its core 
areas are the international civil procedure and private international law. It aims at a more transparent 
design of judicial and extrajudicial procedures. Therefore, Art. 81 TFEU does not cover the regulation of 
substantive law. 
78 These are characterised by a regulatory nature but only come into effect if the parties agree on their 
application and are derived from the principle of private autonomy; see also Regulation (EC) No 
593/2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations, OJ L 177, 17 December 2009, p. 6, Recital 
11; (Streinz 2012 Art. 16 GRC margin no. 6). 
79 Council Regulation 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001 on the Statute for a European company, OJ L 294 , 10 
November 2001. 
80 Council Regulation 2137/85 of 25 July 1985 on the European Economic Interest Grouping (EEIG), OJ L 
199, 31 July 1985. 
81 Council Regulation 1435/2003 of 22 July 2003 on the Statute for a European Co-operative Society 
(SCE), OJ L 207/1. 
82 Council Regulation 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community trade mark, OJ L 78/1. 
83 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Common European Sales 
Law, COM(2011)0635 final, 11 October 2011. 
84 Proposal for a Council Regulation 2157/2001 on the statute for a European Private Company (SPE), COM 
(2008) 396. 
85 Proposal for a Council decision authorising enhanced co-operation in the area of the creation of unitary 
patent protection, COM(2010)790, 14 December 2010. 
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Member States themselves could also—at least in theory—introduce this type 
of proposal by the simultaneous adoption of identical national legislation; in 
practice, however, this eventuality is most unlikely and therefore, EU legislation 
has to be introduced equally.   
The distinction between these two proposals is of particular importance in light of the 
European Court of Justice decision on the European Co-operative Society! !Case C-
436/03)86 holding that Art. 114 TFEU could not be referred to as legal basis in the con-
text of a supranational European regime, because the introduction of a new legal form 
differs from approximation of laws and thus falls under Art. 352 TFEU.  
As in the case of the CESL proposal, a potential legislative proposal on a “Common Eu-
ropean Regime on EFP” would not constitute a new legal form within the meaning of 
the Court’s decision. While there was no way that a new form of co-operative society 
could have been created by equivalent legislation by each Member State87, the situa-
tion appears to be different for a “Common European Regime on EFP”. The Member 
States could, hypothetically, establish an identical legal regime on EFP schemes by in-
dependently adopted national law. Therefore, this Study argues that this proposal 
could be based on Art. 114 TFEU introducing the “Common European Regime on EFP” 
as a second regime at the national level. 
b) Objective: Approximation measures aiming at the establishment and the 
functioning of the internal market 
In pursuit of internal market integrity88 this potential legislative measure would create 
a regulatory framework for EFP schemes, creating consistent rules across the EU. 
Within a single EFP scheme, the contractual parties would have to choose between en-
tire instruments, i.e., the current national regime or the new EU regime, thus preclud-
ing “cherry-picking”.89 The proposed common European regime would create a robust, 
yet flexible, set of rules that correspond as closely as possible to cross border plans. 
They would enable employers to operate an EFP scheme throughout the EU on the ba-
sis of one set of rules. Furthermore, employees of firms implementing these schemes 
would be assured their contractual claims to be portable across the EU. 
The proposed rules would also establish a level playing field between companies of dif-
fering size. Reducing complexity would lower transaction costs; this would benefit 
SMEs, which are presently disadvantaged. Harmonising the operating conditions for all 
players in the area of EFP would benefit all types of companies and their employees, 
thus enabling the single market to function more smoothly and efficiently. Companies 
could also utilise these rules in domestic situations; this would facilitate EFP, especially 
in SMEs, as they could extend their EFP scheme across borders as the firm grows and 
expands. 
The European Court of Justice has established that EU legislation may rely on Art. 114 
when there are disparities or potential disparities between the national rules of 
                                           
86  ECJ decision of 2 May 2006 Parliament v. Council (2006) ECR, p. I-3733. 
87  See the justification of the Council in Case C-436/03 for declining Art. 95 EG (Art.114 AEUV) as legal 
basis for the European Co-operative Society. 
88  It is settled case law that legislation only may rely on Art. 114 TFEU only for the adoption of measures 
that genuinely aim at the improvement of the functioning of the internal market. 
89  Cf. EESC Own-Initiative Opinion INT/499, 2010 The 28th regime – less lawmaking, recital 18. 
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Member States, which obstruct fundamental freedoms or create distortions of compe-
tition.90 Furthermore, the European Court of Justice requires that the purpose of the 
measures in question is to improve the conditions for the establishment and function-
ing of the internal market by eliminating or preventing obstacles resulting from 
the multifarious development of national laws.91  
(1) Disparities between the national rules of Member States obstructing 
the fundamental freedoms and creating distortions of competition 
Thirty years of research has confirmed the positive effects of EFP for European enter-
prises (see Chapter I 4a above and Annex II). In fact, approximately 31 per cent of EU 
private firms offer some form of EFP, i.e., either employee share ownership or profit 
sharing (ECS 2013). However, the need for employers to identify the applicable law, 
to discover the provisions of a foreign applicable law, often involving translation, to 
obtain the legal advice necessary to understand its requirements, and to adapt their 
EFP-plans to the different national laws that may apply in cross-border situations, 
makes implementation of cross-border EFP schemes more complex and costly than 
operating a plan in one Member State.92 This situation is exacerbated by the fact that 
EFP in some Member States is not regulated, or if so only to a very limited extent, 
thus adding to the uncertainty. 
Contract-law-related barriers are thus a major contributing factor in dissuading a large 
number of firms with operations in more than one Member State from offering cross-
border EFP plans to their employees. In cases where a successful EFP plan is an im-
portant part of corporate culture, this could even prevent firms from expanding 
operations into additional Member States. This deterrent effect is particularly 
strong for SMEs whose costs of entering foreign markets are particularly high in rela-
tion to their turnover. In this event, both employers and employees are deprived of 
the cost savings that an EFP plan based on one uniform contract law for all cross-
border transactions could achieve.  
Differences in national laws governing the two main forms of EFP, i.e., employee share 
ownership (ESO) and profit sharing (PS) are therefore major barriers, which pre-
vent both employers and employees from reaping the advantages of the in-
ternal market.  Those civil law barriers would be significantly reduced, if EFP 
schemes could be regulated by the same contract law rules, irrespective of country. 
By reducing legal complexity, a common European framework would also significantly 
reduce transaction costs. Uniform contract law rules should apply to the full life cycle 
of an EFP scheme and thus would include provisions most important to contractual 
agreements on EFP. These should also include provisions to assure trans-national 
portability for employees. 
Differences between national company, tax and contract laws as they affect imple-
mentation of cross-border EFP plans also contribute to limiting competition. EFP, in 
particular ESO, is a valuable means of attracting and retaining key employees (IAFP 
                                           
90  This includes even measures whose aim is “[…] to prevent the heterogeneous development of national 
laws leading to further disparities”; cf European Court of Justice. 1995, C-350/92. Spain v Council. 1995. 
ECR I-1985.  
91  cf European Court of Justice. 2002, C-491/01. British American Tobacco. 2002. ECR I-11543. margin no. 
60 and 2000, C-376/98. Tobacco Advertising. 2000. ECR I-8419. margin no. 84 
92  See the Report of the High-Level Group of Experts (2003), pp. 7, 24, 26, 28, 30.  
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2011 pp. 25, 125, 133). With a low level of cross-border EFP plans, there is less com-
petition for key staff, and thus less incentive for firms to become more innovative and 
to improve the quality of working conditions. The barriers to cross-border EFP plans 
may jeopardise competition between SME and larger companies, particularly in the 
area of attracting and retaining key employees. Because of the significant impact of 
transaction costs in relation to turnover, an SME is much less likely to extend its EFP 
plan to a foreign market than a larger competitor.   
(2) Elimination of obstacles resulting from the multifarious development 
of national laws 
The “Common European Regime on EFP” would complement existing national laws 
aiming primarily at their harmonisation. Its objective is to eliminate obstacles to the 
single market that mainly, though not exclusively, stem from heterogeneous regulato-
ry density. The existing condition is due to the multifarious development of national 
laws governing EFP in the Member States: These schemes—and their resultant legisla-
tion—have only recently been introduced in some countries, while in others they have 
a long tradition. Depending on national tradition, corporate culture and social partners’ 
attitudes, they vary greatly in both form and extent across the EU-28 (see the over-
view of EFP in EU-28 in Annex 1).  
In fact, unlike for example in the case of the European Company Statute or the Com-
mon European Sales Law the average density of existing national regulation on EFP 
across the EU is entirely different, i.e., very low. While some countries, e.g. France 
and the UK, recognise all main types of EFP schemes that could be contained in a 
“Common European Regime on EFP” (i.e., profit sharing, employee shares, stock op-
tions and Employee Stock Ownership Plans) the majority of Member States regulates 
only one or two types. Furthermore, in many countries these rules are only rudimen-
tary, e.g., Estonia, Luxembourg; for a mapping of the diversity of regulatory density 
across the EU-28 see Table 1 (p. 25). Such the “Common European Regime on EFP” 
would be above all an optional solution to match national law where rules do not or 
not sufficiently exist. While in some Member States the common European regime 
would introduce coherent rules for the first time, in the majority of countries, it would 
overlap only the area of existing national regulation dealing with a specific EFP 
scheme. Only in a minority of Member States would it actually duplicate national law.  
Similar as in the case of the Common European Sales Law the “Common European 
Regime on EFP” concerns a legal area where wide national differences (with regard to 
company, tax and contract law) exist. But regulation of EFP is further complicated by 
differences and discrepancies stemming from heterogeneous regulatory density and 
scope of application leading to contradictions and legal uncertainties across borders, 
and thus obstacles to cross border plans. It is in cases where no or very limited na-
tional legal rules exist that the approximation effect is strongest. As the “Common Eu-
ropean Regime on EFP” would provide an optional EU-wide default solution for coun-
tries where regulatory density is low, it would give governments a clear incentive to 
harmonise national legislation with EU-wide best practice and that of advanced coun-
tries. Thus, the “Common European Regime on EFP” would induce governments to 
amend national law in line with the newly introduced EU-wide rules.      
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c) Content of the proposed potential legislative proposal 
The scope of the Common European Regime on EFP would be limited, as it would not 
include some areas of law, due to either a lack of necessity or a lack of competence. 
! Despite differences in the company laws of the Member States, no regulations 
prohibiting different forms of EFP are observed.93  
! Laws governing taxation and social security contributions are difficult to har-
monise and EU competence does not extend to direct taxation. 
! Labour law and laws governing employee participation in decision-making also 
remain under exclusive national jurisdiction.    
Thus employee rights under labour law would not fall under the Common European 
Regime on EFP. Rules regarding participation of employees or their representatives in 
decision-making when introducing an EFP scheme or those linking specific conse-
quences to changes of the labour contract, e.g., right to sell shares upon termination, 
would remain to be governed by national law. This applies to all rules/laws that only 
indirectly affect the EFP scheme while primarily concerning the underlying employment 
relationship, which would continue to follow national labour law. Furthermore, the 
Common European Regime on EFP would exclude taxation issues and thus impose no 
tax incentives; national taxation rules would apply. An explanatory section could rec-
ommend tax incentives as identified from best practice across the EU-27.94 Therefore, 
the content of the Common Regime on EFP described above would also be within the 
scope of application of Art. 114 TFEU, as they would not touch upon any of the mat-
ters enumerated in the derogation of Art. 114 (2) TFEU, namely fiscal provisions, 
those relating to the free movement of persons or those relating to the rights and in-
terests of employed persons, which would exclude its application (Herrnfeld 2012 Art. 
114 AEUV margin no. 18). 
Consequently, and as a first step towards a uniform set of EFP rules the Common Eu-
ropean Regime on EFP would harmonise the contract laws of the Member States by 
creating within each Member State's national law a second contract law regime for 
contractual arrangements for EFP schemes within its scope.95 As such it would not re-
quire amendments to existing national contract law. The requirements under this se-
cond regime would be identical throughout the Union and would exist alongside the 
already existing rules of national laws governing EFP schemes. The Common European 
                                           
93  In fact a rare example of a legal “common ground” for EFP rooting in the acquis communautaire are 
some of the national rules on listed and unlisted joint-stock companies originating in the implementation 
of European Law, i.e., the Second Council Directive on Company Law 77/91/EEC, dating back to 13 De-
cember 1976, OJ L 26, 31 January 1977. Articles 19 para. 3, 23 para. 2 and 41, para. 1 and 2 of the Di-
rective allow Member States to deviate from the European legal framework of joint-stock companies in 
order to encourage EFP. Although primarily referring to share ownership schemes these—optional—
regulations also leave room for combination with profit-sharing schemes. For details see Lowitzsch et al. 
(2008) pp. 36 pp. 
94  The 2014 EP Resolution on EFP in companies’ proceeds (P7_TA(2014)0013) also postulates taxation is-
sues to be left out of a Common European Regime on EFP as “a framework for a European model of em-
ployee ownership should not override national taxation rules” (P7_TA(2014)0013, recital 7).  
95  The proposal follows the rationale of the ECSL proposal; cf. European Commission (2011), p. 8: “[An 
optional regime on CESL] harmonises the national contract laws of the Member States not by requiring 
amendments to the pre-existing national contract law, but by creating within each Member State’s na-
tional law a second contract law regime for contracts covered by its scope that is identical throughout 
the European Union and will exist alongside the pre-existing rules of national contract law.” 
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Regime on EFP should apply on a voluntary basis, upon an express agreement of the 
parties, to a cross-border EFP plan.  
The structure of such a potential legislative proposal could follow that of the ECSL in 
that the main body of legislative proposal would confine itself to specifying certain def-
initions and rules while the provisions of the “Common European Regime on EFP” 
could be set out in the annex. Stressing common definitions—and not, for example, a 
new form of EFP—as the core of the proposal and leaving the different models derived 
from best practice in the Member States to the annex would signal the priority for cre-
ating “common ground” instead of establishing an entirely new concept.  
For instance, the main body of the legislative proposal could cover the following is-
sues:  
! Range of application: What type of firms: Ltd, JSC, etc. / Eligibility: e.g., 1-
year waiting period; non-discriminatory, i.e., also part-time employees (e.g., 
minimum of 500 hours worked per year). 
! Mechanism: PS – pre-defined formula; broad-based; deferred; ESO – blocking 
period; financial assistance; voting rights; ESOP – holding company; blocking 
period; voting rights.  
! Employer contribution: Discretionary; but possible ceiling, e.g., 25 per cent 
of payroll; matching contribution possible, etc.  
! Vesting: conditions of forfeiture; vesting period, etc. 
! Distribution (form/timing): For each scheme PS / ESO / ESOPs – retire-
ment, death, termination; payments in five annual instalments; repurchase ob-
ligation; 
! Investments: Catalogue of (authorised) instruments; diversified vs. non-
diversified. 
In turn, the Annex could contain the “Common European Regime on EFP” defining a 
set of model rules for the different forms of EFP as identified in the Commission fund-
ed “Building Block Approach to EFP” (Lowitzsch et al. 2008 pp. 27). The model 
schemes contained therein could be derived from best practice across the EU-28 and 
are formulated according to firm size (i.e., large, small and medium, micro) as well as 
with regard to the different forms of EFP (four basic building blocks profit sharing / 
ESO / stock options / ESOPs). 
2. Choice of the legal form 
The selection of an instrument for the implementation of a legal act is left to the insti-
tutions unless the legal basis does specify the instrument (Craig and Búrca 2011 p. 
104). They have, as a rule, discretion for the choice of one instrument while, of course 
having to observe the principles of subsidiarity (Art. 5 (3) TFEU) and proportionality 
(Art. 5 (4) TFEU) (Rossi 2012).  
a) Instruments for implementation  
The Common European Regime on EFP could be introduced either by a Directive or a 
Regulation. The authors of this Study would suggest the legislative proposal to be es-
tablished by means of EU Regulation in order to avoid any national discrepancies due 
to transposition work.  
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The proposal for a Common European Regime on EFP would apply only to contractual 
arrangements between private parties, i.e., EFP schemes, introducing uniform re-
quirements (similar to the CESL proposal). With the aim being an optional regime to 
be used throughout the EU-28 ensuring that the wording and thus the content and 
scope of the proposed regime would be the same in all Member States is of particular 
importance (Staudenmayer 2011 p. 3496). Since this proposal would confine itself to 
a set of definitions and principles, it would be even more important that they are iden-
tical across the EU-28. Therefore, direct applicability of the regulation would be of cru-
cial importance for the assumption of a swift approximation of national laws. Given its 
direct applicability, a Regulation would be suitable to achieve these aims. Implementa-
tion via a Directive could be more complex and difficult, as the room for national 
transposition might conflict with the aim to establish a set of uniform rules and defini-
tions.  
However, Directives in general might be more suitable to ensure the observance of the 
principles of proportionality and subsidiarity. As they only set the aim, not the 
measures to reach it, Member States would be left with some flexibility to find the 
best way to implement the measure into their national systems. On the other hand, 
experience shows that Directives may not suffice to fulfil the internal market's needs 
in some fields (Tuleasca 2011 p. 448). Furthermore, the resulting differences in na-
tional regulations might in turn cause obstacles for the internal market, exactly what 
the proposal would aim to eliminate. In particular if the Directive were to be based on 
minimum harmonisation giving Member States some leeway for differences legal un-
certainty is likely to remain. This, of course, could be avoided by choosing maximum 
harmonisation, which, however is not the aim of the proposal for a Common European 
Regime on EFP. Furthermore, attempts at maximum harmonisation have proven to be 
politically difficult.96  
Finally, a disadvantage of Directives might be considered that the Member States of-
ten transpose them too late or incorrectly into national law. While the transposition 
deficit in the EU is at an average of 0.7 per cent and therefore is in line with the set 
target of 1 per cent, there are five Member States, which exceed it.97 The Commission 
proposed a target of 0.5 per cent for the compliance deficit in the 2011 Single Market 
Act.98 Only eight Member States meet that target or stay below it.99 A Regulation, on 
the other hand, would in this case only introduce an optional instrument parallel to 
existing national legislation, with limited impact on the Member States’ legal systems.   
However, it is not within the scope of this Study to analyse in detail which legal in-
strument is best suited; this question could therefore be looked upon in the context of 
a future impact assessment. 
                                           
96  European Commission, Report from the Commission on Subsidiarity and Proportionality. COM(2010)547 
final, 8 October 2010 p. 9; see also European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament on European Contract Law, COM(2001)398 final, 11.07.2001 p. 
62–65; Heijden and Keirse (2011) p. 573–574.  
97  The Member States need an average of 7.5 months to transposition overdue Directives although some 
need 10 months or more. 
98  European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. COM(2011)206 final, p. 21. 
99  The overall performance of three Member States is below average, eight are average and 11 perform 
above average. 
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An advantage of both instruments would concern legal protection, as the proposal for 
a Common European Regime on EFP would introduce an alternative national law root-
ing in European legislation. The parties to a legal dispute would not need to plead or 
prove the law that applies to their case; the principle “iura novit curia” (“the court 
knows the law”) would apply, courts could not treat it as a chosen "foreign" law and 
access to national Supreme Courts as well as the ECJ would be unrestricted; this is 
often not the case when foreign law or general principles are applied.100 The jurisdic-
tion of ECJ in relation to the Common European Regime on EFP would ensure its uni-
form application within EU.  
b) Subsidiarity 
Pursuant to the “principle of conferral” codified in Art. 5 (2) TEU the EU is only allowed 
to act in those areas where the Member States transferred their competences to the 
EU in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out in them. The Common European Re-
gime on EFP would aim at a removal of obstacles to the internal market, an area of 
the shared competences according to Art. 4 (2) lit. a TFEU where the principle of sub-
sidiarity (Art. 5 (3) TFEU) must be adhered to. Thus a regulation introducing the 
Common European Regime on EFP would only be possible “if the proposed action can-
not be sufficiently achieved by the Member States individually and, therefore, can be 
better achieved by the EU due to its scale or effects” (Art. 5 (3) TFEU). 
(1) Shortcomings of national solutions 
National regulatory approaches are inherently limited to the Member State in question. 
As of today, national regulations of EFP schemes in the EU Member States vary great-
ly. While some states like Belgium, Ireland and Slovenia show a good regulatory den-
sity and support measures, others like Bulgaria, Estonia and Cyprus only have little to 
no regulations and support measures. But however high or low the regulations are, 
they all have one thing in common: their use is limited to their implementing Member 
State. Regulating the product profile of an EFP scheme only at national level and then 
using it in a cross border context entails the risk of different EFP plans all being of-
fered as cross border plans with different characteristics. There would be as many dif-
ferent EFP plans offered, as there are Member States. This would create employee 
confusion and would impede the emergence of a EU-wide level playing field for those 
companies wishing to offer EFP schemes to their employees on similar terms across 
the EU. This problem is exacerbated by the lack of common definitions, which in prac-
tice leads to the result that mutual recognition or exchange of best practice is a rare 
exception.101  
As the operation of European firms is essentially cross-border in nature, the current 
lack of common definitions, the fragmentation of the rules for EFP and their different 
regulatory density has prevented the spill-over of best practice from one country to 
another. In contrast to the U.S., the potential of EFP for enhancing the competitive-
                                           
100  Equally, institutions offering out-of-court complaint and redress mechanisms could not refuse to hear a 
case using the argument that it would be submitted to foreign law; See the Own-Initiative Opinion 
INT/499. 
101  However, mutual recognition of EFP schemes has been postulated for many years; see, e.g., the Report 
of the High-Level Group of Experts (2003), pp. 9,10. 
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ness of European firms has not been harnessed yet.102 As a result EFP schemes oper-
ate below the efficient level (see above b) (1)) although their benefits have been 
widely acknowledged. In contrast, the proposed harmonised and sustainable frame-
work covering employee share ownership as well as profit sharing schemes will act as 
a source of modernisation for the European economy. Based on best practice the new 
framework would ensure a high level of protection for employees in their position as 
contractual partners of EFP schemes (which would leave the relationship from their 
employment contract untouched). It would apply to various sizes of firms and sectors 
and may potentially provide stable sources of capital especially for European SMEs.  
(2) Need for the proposed EU approximation mechanism 
This proposal would aim to achieve the desired approximation effect through the in-
troduction of an optional Common European Regime leaving the incentive to harmo-
nise national legislation with the newly introduced European rules to the market 
mechanism of competition. The rationale behind the idea of competition would be the 
same for both vertical (meaning competition between supranational EU law and na-
tional legal systems) and horizontal (meaning competition between different national 
legal systems) competition is the same. Private actors would tend to choose to move 
to the Member State whose national legal systems offer them the best advantages for 
their undertaking. This would put competitive pressure on the Member States to adapt 
their laws as to attract foreign parties as well as to keep their own actors within their 
own borders.  
In practice, however, the situation presents itself differently. Many parties prefer to 
stay in their own jurisdiction simply because that is the one they are familiar with, 
even if a preferable one exists. If they do try to compare systems coincidental factors 
figure in. A jurisdiction that is already known to the party for some reason or on which 
information is accessible in their own language will rather be chosen than one com-
pletely unknown. Enterprises might choose the satisfactory alternative or the one, 
which is easier to understand instead of the best possible one. Furthermore, infor-
mation on all options available cannot be readily accessed so that it is unlikely that 
firms will have knowledge of all available choices. The amount of choices might even 
lead to a choice overload resulting in the party keeping their national law (Low 2013 
pp. 295). Here, multinational firms are at an advantage since they are better ac-
quainted with choosing between different laws while SMEs will tend to know only those 
they have already worked with, namely their own national laws and would most likely 
not have been in a situation where they had several laws to choose from.  
Due to all of the factors mentioned above, the number of actors who do chose another 
jurisdiction is comparatively small and their reasons for opting into or out of a law are 
not obvious. Consequently, there is little incentive for national legislators to act, which 
is why optional instruments at the EU level become necessary. The most obvious ad-
vantage is that information on European instruments is available in the 24 official lan-
                                           
102  In the U.S., 46 per cent of employees are participating financially in the employer firm through either a 
profit sharing or an employee share ownership scheme; cf. Blasi, Kruse and Freeman (2013). 
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guages of the European Union103, instead of only in the national language of one 
Member State. 
Therefore, an optional European legal framework for EFP schemes can be deemed 
necessary and the proposed legislative measure would be consistent with the subsidi-
arity principle set out in Art. 5 (3) TEU and the Second Protocol on the Application of 
the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality.104  
c) Proportionality 
Pursuant to the “principle of proportionality” codified in Art. 5 (4) TEU the content and 
form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of 
the Treaties.105 Thus, measures of the EU have to be suitable, necessary, and propor-
tionate stricto sensu. 
Suitability – A measure is suitable if it causes or supports the attainment of its aim. 
While the range of its impact remains to be seen, the Common European Regime on 
EFP could in principle improve the functioning of the Single Market. A regulation at the 
EU level would provide all concerned parties with a set of rules valid throughout the 
Union thus making it easier and more attractive for companies to make use of their 
freedom of establishment (Art. 49 TFEU), as they could apply their EFP schemes in 
every Member State without being faced with obstacles resulting from national laws. 
Additionally, the free movement of workers (Art. 45 TFEU) would be supported as em-
ployees could rely on the EU regulations, instead of having to work through national 
laws to find out about national regulations, if they would want to participate in an EFP 
scheme used by a company in another Member State. Thus, the measure in principle 
would be suitable. 
Necessity – A measure is necessary if a less severe measure is not able to reach the 
aim with the same success. The Common European Regime on EFP retains party au-
tonomy, as it would only be applicable if the parties of a contract decide so. It leaves 
the decision on its application to the market and would, therefore, only be chosen 
where interested parties considered it to be an advantage. The individual legal culture 
of each Member State would be left intact, making intrusion of the measure far less 
drastic than that of traditional harmonization and thus rendering it more politically ac-
ceptable. The requirements imposed on the different parties concerned—if they choose 
to make use of the optional regime—have to be carefully calibrated. Whenever possi-
ble, requirements should been crafted as minimum standards (e.g., eligibility criteria, 
vesting periods, diversification limits, blocking periods) and regulatory requirements 
should be tailored so as not to unnecessarily disrupt existing business models. Existing 
business models should not be disrupted more than absolutely necessary and only 
when they are extended to cross border use (this, however, would also be necessary 
in this case without the introduction of the Common European Regime on EFP). To do 
                                           
103 Regulation No 1 determining the languages to be used by the European Economic Community. OJ P 017, 
06 October 1958 
104  Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality annexed to the Trea-
ties.  
105  This principle was further defined by the ECJ ruling that “when there is a choice between several appro-
priate measures recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be 
disproportionate to the aims pursued“; European Court of Justice. 1990, C-331/88. The Queen v Ministry 
of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte FEDESA and Others. 1990. ECR I-04023 p. para. 13.  
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less than what is proposed would mean not regulating at all. Therefore, the measure 
would appear also necessary.  
Proportionality stricto sensu – Proportionality stricto sensu refers to the respective 
interests of the public and of the parties concerned to be weighted against each other 
and is given when the disadvantages of one do not outweigh the advantages of the 
other. The proposed rules would seek to create common “EFP product rules” for which 
there is a solid public interest and which would lay down a foundation for a common, 
competitive and cost-efficient framework for EFP schemes across the Union. At the 
same time, its optional nature would not require compromise on the lowest common 
denominator, thus avoiding the lowering of standards and would be less intrusive than 
traditional harmonization. Furthermore, the cost of implementation would be signifi-
cantly lower than that of a full harmonisation Directive as its optional character would 
not require compulsory compliance but only when chosen in the individual case. 
Prudential rules of application—deriving basic principles and standards from existing 
national EFP models—would establish rights and limit risks linked to participation in 
EFP schemes that are targeting mainly (but not exclusively) cross-border situations. 
As such, these rules would not cover problems of tax law or touch upon labour law or 
employment law in force in the Member States but would govern the contractual way 
EFP schemes are offered. Such they would provide a level playing field for employers 
and employees, while at the same time ensuring protection of the weaker contractual 
party of EFP schemes. This in turn would underpin the correct functioning of the inter-
nal market and in particular remove obstacles to the single market. In particular, the 
proposed Regulation would combine different parameters suitable for specific EFP 
schemes and specific firm sizes, by taking into full account the Commission principles 
for EFP schemes as put forward in the 1992 Recommendation on EFP and as reiterated 
in the 2002 Communication on EFP relating to employee protection. The Proposal 
therefore would not go beyond what is necessary to achieve a common legal frame-
work for EFP schemes, while at the same time addressing the regulatory issues, which 
would affect the reliability of a European optional framework. 
Therefore, as regards proportionality, set out in Art. 5 (4) TEU, the proposal in princi-
ple would be both suitable as well as necessary and would strike the appropriate bal-
ance between the public interest at stake and the cost-efficiency of the measure. 
3. Specific factors influencing the impact of the proposal  
In summary, an optional regime on EFP introduces a “market approach” to harmonisa-
tion as it triggers competition between the existing national regulation and the newly 
introduced second EU-wide regulation similar to the approach for a Common European 
Sales Law. The Common European Regime on EFP would thus provide for an alterna-
tive form of harmonisation as employers and employees in all EU member states could 
choose to operate under one single European regulatory framework. At the same time 
it would do without the conventional EU harmonisation procedure. Excluding taxation 
issues, this proposal would be the least invasive legislative measure and thus could be 
expected to achieve the necessary consensus within the ordinary legislative proce-
dure according to Art. 114 TFEU. 
Against this background there are a number of specific factors, which differ from the 
mentioned proposals using the mechanism of an optional European regime that could 
have a major influence on the impact of this proposal and thus should be considered 
separately:  
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! Limited regulatory scope to contractual issues – As mentioned above the 
scope of the Common European Regime on EFP would be limited as some areas 
of law are not included either due to a lack of necessity (i.e., company law) or 
a lack of competences (taxation, social security contributions, labour law. Of 
the areas excluded from the Common European Regime on EFP, in particular 
taxation could benefit from the harmonisation effect at a later stage. 
! Differences in Regulatory density as a driver for approximation – The 
spread of the use of the “Common European Regime on EFP” in a growing 
number of companies across an increasing number of countries would create in 
the process an increasingly favourable environment. The pro-activism of coun-
tries with an advanced tradition like France or the United Kingdom would at the 
same time encourage others to emulate them and thus directly contribute to 
approximation of national laws. Over time this development could eventually 
lead to mutual approximation of national regulation as national best practice in-
fluencing the Common European Regime may prevail in this market-based ap-
proach. Unlike in the case of a harmonisation Directive it is possible that parts 
of the Common European Regime, e.g., a model for a particular firms size or 
EFP type, which are ignored by the market participants will not unfold an ap-
proximation effect.  
! “First Regime” in Member States having low regulatory density or no 
regulation on EFP at all – In those Member States that only have low regula-
tory density or no regulation on EFP at all, the Common European Regime 
would mean immediate harmonisation in the traditional sense. In these coun-
tries, the Common European Regime on EFP would establish a regulatory 
framework in the first place. 
! Obstacles to the implementation of the proposal – Of course, optional in-
struments bare the risk of being viewed as being too complex and difficult to 
understand and apply resulting in them not being chosen (Rühl 2012 p. 148). 
Furthermore, firms might choose the satisfactory alternative or that which is 
easier to understand instead of the best possible one. In these cases the con-
tract law market in the EU would not be competitive and as a result there 
would be no improvement or innovation of any of the legal products currently 
on offer due to the introduction of an optional instrument (Low 2010). 
These difficulties could be considered in the context of the preparation of a regulatory 
impact assessment for the Common European Regime on EFP as requested by the Eu-
ropean Parliament. 
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X. Conclusion  
Employee share ownership is a time-tested idea, which has been highlighted as crucial 
to motivating production, providing economic opportunity and fostering institutions, 
which support political democracy and social cohesion. In 1885, John Bates Clark, 
founder of the American Economics Association, wrote that “productive property 
owned in undivided shares by labouring men” is an ideal which humanity has never 
abandoned. France's “la Participation”, inaugurated by President de Gaulle, Spain's 
Mondragon Co-operative, the U.K.’s John Lewis Partnership, and most recently the 
United States’ Employee Stock Ownership Plan, exemplify the power of this ideal and 
its potential for Europe.   
The Commission has pursued the idea of employee share ownership and participation 
for almost forty years now. From the Green Paper on Employee Participation in No-
vember 1975 and the Memorandum on Employee Participation in Asset Formation in 
August 1979, it has reached a point where the promotion of employee ownership and 
participation is included in the Action Plan to reform European company law and cor-
porate governance. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, employee shareholding is 
receiving serious attention as a stabilising factor on the capital market, a counter bal-
ance to the speculative short-term investment, which caused havoc on capital markets 
in 2007-08. Employee share ownership is, by its very nature, a long-term investment, 
which reduces the impact of shareholders and managers with short-term focus. 
Against this background, this Study is different from previous studies in that it is 
linked to a Pilot Project and follows the Action Plan in which the Commission commit-
ted to investigate potential obstacles to cross-border ESO schemes and to encourage 
ESO and other forms of EFP throughout the EU. 
Benefits of EFP and employee share ownership in particular 
As highlighted in this Study, thirty years of research on the impact of various forms of 
EFP have confirmed that enterprises partly or entirely owned by their employees are 
more profitable, pay more taxes, create more jobs and are more resilient to economic 
fluctuations than their competitors without employee ownership. Moreover, since em-
ployees are long-term shareholders, broadening employee shareholding also tends to 
stabilise capital markets. For example, the official index of share price movement for 
employee owned companies (those with at least 10 per cent of shares belonging to 
non-board member employees), calculated by the London Stock Exchange, indicates 
that firms with employee ownership have consistently performed better than compa-
nies without employee ownership.106  
As the largest employers, SMEs and micro-enterprises are crucial to economic and la-
bour market policy. According to 2011 figures, each year some 450,000 firms in the 
EU look for successors, affecting up to 2 million employees. Every year, there is a risk 
of losing approximately 150,000 companies and 600,000 jobs due to inefficient busi-
ness transfers. The Commission, the European Parliament and the European Economic 
and Social Committee (EESC) have highlighted employee buyouts as one possible so-
lution to the business succession problem of European SMEs.  
                                           
106  http://www.employeeownershipindex.co.uk/wiki/index.php5?title=The_Employee_Ownership_Index. 
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The growing income inequality and the concentration of wealth in fewer and fewer 
hands is a threat to the social cohesion of the European countries. The employees’ 
share of national income, according to the OECD, has steadily declined over the past 
thirty years. (OECD 2011) At the same time the social strata of society, which are fi-
nancially well of increase their wealth through capital income rather than through 
wage income. The ownership of capital is highly concentrated in Europe and so is the 
income from these assets. This development is particularly worrisome in the light of 
the current discussion about increasing wealth concentration.107 Employee share own-
ership can contribute to halting or even reversing this trend.  
A field for EU action 
Despite the positive effects and the widespread use of ESO throughout the EU, as de-
scribed in this Study, only few EU Member States have they been extended to a signif-
icant proportion of the work force. France and the UK are positive examples; both 
grant generous incentives for the promotion of EFP schemes. The UK Government has 
just committed a wide range of resources to increase the number of employee-owned 
businesses, especially for business successions (The Nuttall Review 2013).  
Today about 68 per cent of companies in the EU do not offer any form of employee 
financial participation to their employees108 but many of them have the potential to do 
so if their knowledge of the relevance and usefulness of EFP is enhanced by infor-
mation and awareness raising measures. Moreover, ESO is much less common in Eu-
rope than, for example, in the U.S. and therefore there is much room for it to grow. 
This becomes particularly relevant as the European Company Survey (ECS) data indi-
cates a highly significant rise in the likelihood of improvement both in productivity and 
employment in firms with ESO or PS schemes. 
Using the ECS data, this Study has estimated the number of firms that have the po-
tential to introduce ESO at around 300,000 (including 170,000 small firms) across the 
EU-28. This is a considerable number and, given the positive effect of ESO on produc-
tivity and employment, the adoption of an ESO scheme by these firms could have a 
significant effect on employment and income for European workers and on productivity 
and competitiveness for European firms. 
Potential policy options  
If this still largely unexploited potential is to be harnessed to stimulate sustainable and 
inclusive growth of the European economy, the further promotion of financial partici-
pation, ESO in particular, should be part of an overall strategy. Two important poten-
tial policy fields, namely to create a level playing field through an optional common 
European legal framework and to establish transparency with regard to taxation and 
social security contributions were identified during the Pilot Project. The European Par-
liament emphasised these two points in its resolution of 14 January 2014 on financial 
participation of employees in companies’ proceeds.  
                                           
107  On the inequality and concentration of wealth, see Thomas Piketty’s “Capital in the 21st Century” (2014), 
which has caused a widespread debate in the media and academia.  
108  The companies that offer either ESO or PS or both schemes are 31.7 per cent of all private companies in 
the EU-28 (ECS 2013). 
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Above all, the knowledge of ESO and EFP amongst both employers and employees 
should be further improved, and we hope that the publication of the results of this 
Study can contribute to this as part of potentially a wider awareness-raising pro-
gramme. In the short-term, the information made available in this Study could be 
launched and made accessible through a centre for EFP. 
 
Sharing best practices is another measure suggested by this Study. It would not only 
enhance the stakeholders’ understanding of EFP and its many features, but also en-
courage employee shareholding across the EU-28, thereby contributing to making the 
European economy more competitive. One important element of best practice is to be 
completely transparent about how the tax, social security contributions and incentive 
issues are dealt with for different EFP schemes in different EU countries and how these 
may affect companies with cross border operations and their employees located in dif-
ferent countries. 
 
The adoption of a Code of Conduct on EFP, offering a template for different EFP 
schemes and a guide for employees, is another useful policy option for the Commis-
sion. Given the experience with the 1992 Council Recommendation on EFP, this ap-
proach may be preferable to a new Recommendation.  
 
In the long-term creating a level playing field for EFP through a European legal 
framework is an important policy option proposed by this Study. 
 
As an overall approach, an Action Programme to promote EFP with package of differ-
ent short, medium and long-term initiatives, coordinated and promoted by the Com-
mission is suggested. 
 
 
A “Virtual Centre for EFP” as presented in this Study could be the first step to es-
tablish one European physical centre or even 28 national ones. This would make the 
results of the Pilot Project both tangible and visible, and perceivably different from 
previous initiatives in the field. The cost of launching the Virtual Centre and the CE-
TREPS Calculator for a pilot period of 18 months is estimated at EUR 75,000. 
The “CETREPS effective tax rate calculator”, presented in this Study, would allow 
quantifying the effective tax burden for EFP schemes across the EU-28 and thus 
provide a representative comparison of tax systems as well as of specific tax incen-
tives. However, the tool would need to be tested with stakeholders and practitioners. 
A Commission Expert Group could be assigned the responsibility of refining and im-
proving such an EFP toolkit.  
The elaboration and implementation of an optional Common European Regime for 
EFP either through a Regulation or a Directive would present the most ambitious 
policy option in the long term.  
Combined in a “Five-Point Plan to promote EFP”, parallel measures to raise aware-
ness, e.g., a European EFP Day, could accompany and frame the above measures. 
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Outlook: The future role of ESO  
Employee financial participation may be associated with a more equitable distribution 
of wealth and support social cohesion. As the Economist recently stated: “a good anti-
dote to labour’s falling share of national income would be to boost ordinary workers’ 
share of capital.”109 It can also play a role in the long term financing of European com-
panies, particularly the SMEs. While in the past employee ownership has been an as-
pect of social policy, it has now moved to be a part of economic and enterprise policy 
and can also play a part in the European Union’s labour market policy.   
Given the various parallel initiatives and developments it seems that the conditions for 
improving the legal framework for financial participation of employees in general and 
employee share ownership in particular are now more favourable than ever. There-
fore, it is even more important to make employee share ownership a positive policy 
priority, not only highlighting obstacles but instead concentrating on benefits. 
The promotion of EFP can contribute to a number of elements of the EU policy agenda, 
most notably to improve competitiveness, corporate governance and working condi-
tions in European companies.  
                                           
109  See “A shrinking slice – Labour’s share of national income has fallen. The right remedy is to help work-
ers, not punish firms”, The Economist, 2 November 2013. 
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Appendices  
ANNEX 1 – Overview of the updated EU-28 country 
profiles on EFP: Government and social 
partners’ attitudes, legal framework, 
incidence 
Country General attitude 
[A] Social partners 
[B] Government 
Legislation and  
fiscal or other incentives 
Schemes and their incidence 
CRANET: Offer in firms > 200 Empl. 
EWCS: Take-up rate of employees  
EU-15    
Belgium [A] TU opposed, but 
do support ESO to a 
certain extent; EA in 
favour; 
[B] Since 1982, legis-
lation for ESO; 
amendment 1991; 
since 1999 legislation 
for SO; since 2001 
new law on ESO and 
PS, 2002 Royal De-
cree on EFP. 
All plans: EmpC up to 20% of 
after tax profit per annum; up to 
10% of total gross salary;  
ESO: discounted ES in JSC, fi-
nancing by firm possible; in cap-
ital increases: up to 20% of eq-
uity capital, ES discount limit 
20%; (restricted stock grant) 
value reduced by 16.7%, taxa-
tion deferred if 2 years not 
transferable, 15% tax on bene-
fit, no SSC; (stock purchase 
plan) benefit tax base 83.33% of 
fair market value;  
SO: since 1999 taxed at grant 
on a lump-sum basis, no SSC;  
PS: tax 15% for PS in an in-
vestment savings plan, 25% for 
other plans. 
2013 ECS: ESO 5.2%, PS 21.2%; 
2010 Cranet: ESO 16.7%, PS 19.1%; 
2010 EWCS: ESO 4.18%, PS 12.49%; 
firms involved mainly from financial 
sector, large firms and multinationals; 
SO 2005 Cranet: 2%; EU Report 
2003: 75,000 employees benefit; most 
of 20 largest Belgian firms operate 
plans; 40% of firms with more than 50 
employees. 
 Den-
mark 
[A] TU indifferent to 
EFP; EA opposed to 
any extension of EFP; 
[B] Employee Funds 
discussed in 1970-
80s, PS popular; later 
support for ESO and 
SO; in 2000s Gov-
ernment support for 
share-based schemes; 
all incentives abol-
ished in 2012. 
All tax incentives repealed in 
2012: ESO, SO and PS taxed as 
income with progressive tax rate 
from 24% to 56%; 
SO: subject to PIT on exercise, 
no SSC; on sale subject to 27% 
CGT (above DKK 48,300 gain 
42% CGT); 
PS: none. 
 
2013 ECS: ESO 6.8%, PS 38.2%; 
2010 Cranet: ESO 22.7%, PS 7%; 
2010 EWCS: ESO 9.09%, PS 18.56%; 
SO 2005 Cranet: 2%; EU Report 
2003: 20% of 500 largest firms by 
1999, one-third of quoted firms 2000. 
Ger-
many 
[A] TU partly scepti-
cal/partly hostile be-
cause of ‘double risk’, 
recently growing in-
terest; EA support 
individual firms; 
[B] Traditional focus 
on savings plans (to-
tal capital higher than 
that of ES company 
plans); EFP since 
2006 on political 
agenda of all parties; 
2009 Law on Capital 
ESO: discounted ES in JSC, fi-
nancing by firm possible; state 
savings bonus of 20% of up to 
EUR 400 (EUR 80 per annum) 
invested in employer stock; 6-
year blocking period; no tax/ 
SSC on up to EUR 360 per an-
num employer matching contri-
bution; no PIT on contributions 
from salary reduction; since 
2009, law provided for Special 
Employee Participation Funds, 
but repealed in 2013;   
PS: none. 
2013 ECS: ESO 3.3%; PS 30.5%; 
2010 Cranet: ESO 11.8%; PS 45.6%;  
2010 EWCS: ESO 1.89%, PS 11.63%; 
2005 IAB: ESO 3%, PS 12%;   
2003 WSI: PS in one-third of firms; 
SO: EU Report 2003, in over two-
thirds of DAX-listed firms; 
ESO: 2006 AGP, 3,000 firms, 2.3m 
employees, EUR 19bn; to date (2014) 
Special Employee Participation Fund 
not accepted by markets. 
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Country General attitude 
[A] Social partners 
[B] Government 
Legislation and  
fiscal or other incentives 
Schemes and their incidence 
CRANET: Offer in firms > 200 Empl. 
EWCS: Take-up rate of employees  
Participation of Em-
ployees.  
SO: in capital increase, nominal 
amount restricted to 10%, that 
of increase to 50% of equity 
capital; on exercise subject to 
PIT and SSC; CGT on sale. 
Ireland [A] EA strong sup-
port; TU support if 
financial and intrinsic 
reward to employees; 
managers/employees 
pragmatically moti-
vated; Lobby 
groups/institutions 
(e.g., banks) support 
ESO; 
[B] Support in privat-
isation; improvements 
in 1995 and 1997; 
promoting voluntary 
adoption of SPS, e.g. 
Approved PS Scheme 
(APSS). 
ESO: PrivL - 14.9% ESOT stock 
paid for by loan/by state; ES/ 
SPS in JSC, financing by firm 
possible; New shares: limited 
PIT tax base deduction for 
Empl., no SSC; tax incentives 
abolished for shares subscribed 
as of 8 Dec. 2010; 
SO: Savings Plan: bonus/ inter-
est on savings tax-free, no PIT 
on grant/exercise, no SSC; ex-
emption of SSC abolished; 
Approved Plan: no PIT at exer-
cise, no SSC; tax incentives 
abolished for options subscribed 
as of 24 Nov. 2011; 
ESOP: Trust Act - taxed 15% 
interest / 10% investment; 
ESOT: tax incentives as for 
APSS if ESOT part of APSS; no 
CGT on disposal of shares; 
PS: APSS: at transfer no PIT, no 
SSC up to limit; salary foregone 
- up to 7.5% of gross salary 
deductible. 
2013 ECS: ESO 6.4%, PS 24.2%; 
2010 Cranet: ESO 39.3%, PS 27.6%; 
2010 EWCS: ESO 3.92%, PS 7.45%; 
SO: 2002 IBEC: 90 firms with SAYE, 
15 firms with Approved Share Option 
Schemes; 
PS: 2002 IBEC: 400 firms with APPS; 
ESOP: n.a. 
 Greece [A] TU moved from 
scepticism to support 
since 1990s; EA indif-
ferent, not a current 
topic; collective bar-
gaining includes facili-
tation of EFP; 
[B] Some regulations 
on CPS (1984) and 
ESO (1987); since 
1999 more attention 
on SO; not a current 
issue. 
ESO: ES in JSC discounted or 
free; within capital increase for 3 
years not transferable, up to 
20% of annual profit; benefit 
subject to PIT;  
SO: since 2014 profit at exercise 
subject to PIT, but no SSC; 
PS: up to 15% of company prof-
its, 25% of employees’ gross 
salary; subject to PIT and SSC; 
as of 1 Jan. 2012 tax incentives 
for SO and PS repealed; special 
tax of 25 % and full SSC for ESO 
2013 ECS: ESO 2.2%, PS 17.3%; 
2010 Cranet: ESO 15.7%; PS 6.9%; 
2010 EWCS: ESO 0.21%, PS 3.33%; 
SO: 2005 Cranet 2%; EU Report 
2003: only a limited number of firms. 
 
 Spain [A] Low priority: TU 
only support plans on 
top of regular wages; 
EA indifferent to 
broad-based plans; 
[B] Government con-
stitutionally obliged to 
facilitate ESO; long 
tradition of social 
economy: COOPs new 
law 1997 and EBO; 
PS supported in 1994 
then shift to ESO / 
SO; active support. 
ESO: ES/SO in JSC, financing by 
firm possible; tax benefits on 
PIT after 3-year holding period; 
no SSC if benefits per annum,  
not more than EUR 12,000;                  
PS: NLL; 
SO: after 2-year holding period 
40% reduction of taxed plan 
benefit; subject to SSC; 
EBO: ‘Workers Companies’ with 
more than 51% ESO,20% of 
profits in Reserve Fund; Protect-
ed Co-operatives 30% of profits 
in two reserve funds; ”Workers’ 
2013 ECS: ESO 4.7%, PS 25.7%; 
2005 Cranet: ESO 2.5%, PS 17%; 
2010 EWCS: ESO 1.6%, PS 4.94%; 
SO: 2005 Cranet: 19%; EU Report 
2003: plans in 40 firms of which 50% 
in IBEX 35;  
ESO: 2003 CNMV 20% of large firms 
with share purchase plans;  
EBO: 2011 13,465 Workers’ Compa-
nies  
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Country General attitude 
[A] Social partners 
[B] Government 
Legislation and  
fiscal or other incentives 
Schemes and their incidence 
CRANET: Offer in firms > 200 Empl. 
EWCS: Take-up rate of employees  
Companies” tax exempt from: 
capital transfer tax, tax on for-
mation/capital increase, and 
notary fees; Protected Coopera-
tives – CIT reduced by 50%; 
NSL: unemployed can receive 
unemployment benefit as a lump 
sum, if they invest it into a 
“Workers’ company” or a Pro-
tected Co-operative. 
 France 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[A] TU show mixed 
attitudes: sceptical 
but actively involved, 
favour if not substi-
tute to pay; EA gen-
erally in favour, espe-
cially if voluntary;  
[B] PS/ESO strong 
continuous support 
since 1959; also in 
privatisations; climate 
friendly toward EFP, 
focused policy. 
ESO: PrivL- 10% ES reserve, up 
to 20% discount; discounted ES 
in JSC, financing by firm possi-
ble, also capital increase; re-
duced SSC of 8% and 13,5% tax 
on returns; free ES and SO 
taxed at 2.5% for employees if 
benefit per annum less than EUR 
35,352 (if higher 8%); 
SO: capital increase; tax on ex-
ercise gain 26-30% after 4-year 
holding period; 
French Qualified SO Plan: spread 
and capital gain subject to PIT 
and CGT; reduced tax base if 
conditions met; 
BSPCE: at least 25% of compa-
ny capital; at sale benefit sub-
ject to 19% PIT and SSC; 
ESOP/EBO: Law on Trusteeship 
2007; special reserve for EBO 
possible;        
PS: DPS compulsory/CPS volun-
tary; DPS: 2% special tax for 
employers and SSC of 8% on 
97% of employee’s contribution, 
special SSC of 13.5% on re-
turns; 
PEE broad-based, 5-year block-
ing period (PERCO until retire-
ment); no PIT, special SSC of 
8% and 13.5% on returns. 
2013 ECS: ESO 8.6%, PS 41.3%; 
2010 Cranet: ESO 11.9%, PS 69.5%; 
2010 EWCS: ESO 7.65%, PS 26.02%; 
2004 FONDACT: DPS covered 53% of 
non-agriculture private sector firms 
employees (that is 6.3m); 
SO: 2005 Cranet 3%; SO EU Report 
2003: approx. 50% of quoted firms 
and 28% of limited companies, total 
approx. 30,000 employees; 
ESO/PS in savings plans: AFG 
2009: 230,000 companies with 11.8m 
employees; EUR 84.8bn assets in 
2009, of which 41% shares of EmplC 
and 59% in diversified funds. 
Italy [A] TU mixed atti-
tudes, recently inter-
ested in topic / EA 
divided, but mostly 
supportive;  
[B] Trilateral agree-
ment 1993 supported 
PS; then shift to sup-
port ESO/SO; recent-
ly discussed on politi-
cal agenda; Code of 
Participation in 2010.  
ESO: CivC - discounted ES in 
JSC, financing by company pos-
sible; in capital increases devia-
tion from pre-emption rights and 
preferential ‘ES’ possible; PIT 
and SSC exemption up to EUR 
2,066 after 3-year holding peri-
od; in limited liability companies 
free share up to EUR 7,500 tax 
and SSC exempt; 
PS:  tax and SSC exempt on up 
to 3% of total pay; 
SO: no tax or SSC on grant if 
the option is non-tradable; on 
exercise subject to PIT, no SSC. 
2013 ECS: ESO 3%, PS 16.8%; 
2010 Cranet: ESO 7.3%, PS 5.8%; 
2010 EWCS: ESO 2.06%, PS 8.12%; 
SO: 2005 Cranet 1%; EU Report 2003, 
approximately 6% of employees in-
volved. 
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Country General attitude 
[A] Social partners 
[B] Government 
Legislation and  
fiscal or other incentives 
Schemes and their incidence 
CRANET: Offer in firms > 200 Empl. 
EWCS: Take-up rate of employees  
Luxem-
bourg 
[A] TU/EA growing 
interest in 1990s, not 
supportive of share 
schemes; [B] EFP not 
a current issue. 
ESO:  ES in JSC, financing by 
company possible; 
SO: subject to PIT, but no SSC; 
tax relief of 5-20% per annum 
depending on vesting period; 
PS: none. 
2013 ECS: ESO 11.3%, PS 30.2%; 
2010 EWCS: ESO 7.02%, PS 18.5%; 
SO: EU Report 2003, estimates 25% 
of firms - mainly financial sector; 
PS: PEPPER II, 1995 CPS in 25% of 
firms, mainly banks. 
 
Nether-
lands 
[A] TU/EA generally 
in favour; TU support 
if supplement to pay, 
prefer PS to ESO; 
[B] Traditional focus 
on savings plans; 
support for SO in 
2003. 
All tax incentives were abolished 
as of 1 Jan. 2012. 
ESO: ES in JSC, financing by 
company possible;  
PS: none; 
SO: specific tax incentives abol-
ished in 2005;    
IntE: Qualified Savings Funds. 
 
2013 ECS: ESO 6.7%, PS 34.8%; 
2010 Cranet: ESO 4.6%, PS 23.5%; 
2010 EWCS: ESO 4.9%, PS 25.25%; 
ESO: 2009 Kaarsemaker for SNPI 
3.6% of all companies have broad-
based ESO plans; 2009 Poutsma / 
Braam for SNPI 13% of all AEX com-
panies have broad-based ESO plans;  
SO: 2005 Cranet 4%; EU Report 2003, 
more than 80% of all listed firms;  
2009 Kaarsemaker for SNPI 1% of all 
companies have broad-based SO 
plans; 2009 Poutsma/Braam for SNPI 
16% of all AEX companies have broad-
based SO plans; 
PS: 3m participants (2000); 
2009 Poutsma / Braam for SNPI 7% of 
all AEX companies have broad-based 
PS plans. 
Austria [A] TU/EA currently 
support EFP and co-
operate; different 
views about participa-
tion in decision-
making 
[B] Legislation since 
1974; first tax incen-
tives since 1993; 
more active support 
since 2001; 2014 Par-
liament motion to 
increase tax incen-
tives. 
ESO: discounted ES in JSC; fi-
nancing by company possible; 
PIT/SSC allowance for benefit up 
to EUR 1,460 if conditions are 
met; CGT or 1/2 PIT for divi-
dends; tax exemption for share 
sale gain; 
IntE: Employee Foundation: 
EmpC buys own stock, sheltered 
in Intermediary Entities, divi-
dends paid out; EmpC: contribu-
tion to Intermediary Entities, 
setting-up/operation cost de-
ductible; Intermediary Entities: 
tax allowance on contributions; 
Employee: CGT on dividends;  
SO:  capital increase: nominal 
amount max. 10%, increase 
max. 50% of equity capital; 
max. 20% of equity capital for 
total amount of shares receiva-
ble; 10% of benefit per annum, 
max. 50% of total benefit tax 
free and carry forward of taxa-
tion for the remaining amount; 
tax incentives for SO abolished 
as of 1 April 2009; 
PS: none. 
2013 ECS: ESO 7%, PS 47%; 
2010 Cranet: ESO 9.4%, PS 42.4%; 
2010 EWCS: ESO 1.6%, PS 9.06%; 
2005 WKÖ/BAK: ESO 8%, PS 25%; 
SO: 2005 Cranet: 2%; 2005 
WKÖ/BAK: 1%. 
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Country General attitude 
[A] Social partners 
[B] Government 
Legislation and  
fiscal or other incentives 
Schemes and their incidence 
CRANET: Offer in firms > 200 Empl. 
EWCS: Take-up rate of employees  
Portugal [A] TU / EA indiffer-
ent, low priority: TU 
prefer PS to SO;  
[B] ESO mainly sup-
ported in privatisa-
tion, especially around 
1997; not on the 
Agenda; EFP is gener-
ally ignored. 
ESO: PrivL - discounted ES; ES 
in JSC, financing by firm possi-
ble; in capital increase: suspen-
sion of pre-emptive right of 
shareholders for ‘social reasons’ 
possible; 
PS: NLL - not considered remu-
neration, no PIT and SSC; 
SO: subject to PIT, no SSC. 
2013 ECS: ESO 3.4%, PS 21.9%; 
2010 EWCS: ESO 1.72%, PS 3.26%; 
2008 PEPPER IV: ESO 5.3%, PS 28%;  
SO: EU Report 2003, from 60 firms 
listed at Euronext Lisbon Stock Ex-
change, about 22% have implemented 
SO. 
Finland [A] TU/EA generally 
support EFP, especial-
ly desire to improve 
the environment for 
personnel funds; oth-
er forms not dis-
cussed;  
[B] Discussions on 
EFP since 1970s; 
1989 Law on Person-
nel Funds (major form 
until now); 2010 
amendments to the 
Law on Personnel 
Funds. 
ESO: discount tax free, no SSC; 
earnings tax exempt if less than 
9% per share and less than EUR 
90,000 total;  
SO: none; PS: CPS none; SPS 
‘Personnel funds’: in firms with 
more than 10 employees, if all 
participate, registration with 
Ministry of Labour, up to 15% 
per annum can be withdrawn; 
20% of payments to employee 
tax free; earnings of fund tax 
free.   
2013 ECS: ESO 13.3%, PS 51%; 
2010 Cranet: ESO 9.3%, PS 71.4%; 
2010 EWCS: ESO 2.07%, PS 27.27%; 
SO: 2005 Cranet 5%; 2003 EU Re-
port: 84% of companies listed at Hel-
sinki Stock Exchange; 
PS: 2007 54 Personnel Funds with 
126,000 members. 
 
Sweden [A] TU neu-
tral/opposed, advo-
cated Wage Earners’ 
Funds; EA favour PS 
for wage flexibility, 
but no active support; 
[B] In 1992–97 tax 
incentives for PS in 
firms; since then no 
support. 
ESO: ES in JSC, financing by 
company possible; in capital 
increase suspension of pre-
emptive right of shareholders 
possible;     
PS: CPS none; SPS ‘Profit-
Sharing Foundations’: one-third 
of employees on similar terms, 
after dissolution assets to be 
distributed; for the employer 
24.26% payroll tax instead of 
32.28% SSC; 
SO: none. 
2013 ECS: ESO 10.2%, PS 41.7%; 
2010 Cranet: ESO 7.8%, PS 15.8%; 
2010 EWCS: ESO 8.15%, PS 35.92%; 
PS: 2003 Heissmann: 15%;  
Wage Earners’ Funds created in 1983, 
abolished in 1991. 
UK [A] Climate friendly 
and supportive toward 
EFP; TU involved, but 
reservations: prefer 
SO to PS; EA positive, 
favour flexibility with 
regard to form of 
schemes; employees 
interested; 
[B] Long tradition of 
EFP, especially ESO 
and ESOP; now more 
active support for SO 
that is SAYE and 
Sharesave; 2000 new 
of Enterprise Man-
agement Incentives; 
very little participation 
in decision-making; 
2012 Nutall Report 
ESO: Share Incentive Plan 
(Share Incentive Plans) dis-
counted: no PIT/SSC; no divi-
dend tax if dividends reinvested 
in shares, generally no SSC; no 
CGT if sale immediately after 
taking shares out of the plan;  
Employee Ownership Trust 
(EOT): if controlling interest is 
transferred to EOT, no CGT for 
selling owners; no PIT for up to 
GBP 3,600 of bonus payments 
per employee in EOT owned 
companies; 
SO: Savings-Related SO-Plan, 
Firm SO Plan: generally no PIT 
at grant or exercise, no SSC; 
SAYE: tax bonus on savings; 
Enterprise Management Incen-
tives: no PIT, no SSC at grant or 
2013 ECS: ESO 8.3%, PS 26.5% 
2010 Cranet: ESO 30%, PS 9.8%; 
2010 EWCS: ESO 5.16%, PS 12.78%; 
ESO/SO: 2006 ifsProShare: approved 
plans in 5,000 firms, some with 
ESOPs; Share Incentive Plans in 830 
firms;  
SPS: 2002 1m employees under ap-
proved schemes, average per head 
less than GBP 700; 
ESO: 2010 HM Revenue and Customs: 
Share Incentive Plans in 840 compa-
nies;  
SO: 2005 Cranet: 2%; 2006 
ifsProShare: SAYE in 1,300 firms, 
2.6m employees; Company Share Op-
tion Plans in 3,000 firms; Enterprise 
Management Incentives in 3,000 
firms; 2010 HM Revenue and Cus-
toms: SAYE in 600 companies; Com-
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Country General attitude 
[A] Social partners 
[B] Government 
Legislation and  
fiscal or other incentives 
Schemes and their incidence 
CRANET: Offer in firms > 200 Empl. 
EWCS: Take-up rate of employees  
sparked new activities 
and legislation on ES. 
exercise; (Employee Benefit 
Trust);  
ESOP:  up to GBP 125 per 
month shares for pre-tax salary 
in Trust, EmpC up to 2 matching 
shares / share worth up to GBP 
3,000 per annum; shares ex-
empt from income tax and SSC 
after 5 years; EmpC contribution 
to trust tax deductible;  
PS: approved PS; tax benefits 
abolished in 2002.  
pany Share Option Plans in 1,490 
companies; Enterprise Management 
Incentives in 10,610 companies. 
EU-13    
Bulgaria [A] TU open to EFP, 
EA indifferent; not a 
current topic on either 
of their agendas;  
[B] ESO strong sup-
port 1997-2000, then 
ignored; in 2002 PrivL 
incentives abolished; 
EFP generally ignored. 
ESO: none; uniform 7% divi-
dend tax; 
SO: on exercise 10% flat tax 
and 30.3% SSC; transactions of 
shares listed on regulated mar-
kets are PIT exempt, no SSC; 
PS: none; SPS PIT exempt. 
 
2013 ECS: ESO 4.4%, PS 33.2%; 
2010 Cranet: ESO 15.8%, PS 12.3%; 
2010 EWCS: ESO 0.73%, PS 7.99%; 
SO: 2005 Cranet 14%; 
ESO: 10% mass privatisation, 4-5% 
cash privatisation; low, decreasing; 
MEBO: 1,436, 28% privatisations; 
managers took over most;  
PS: AI, few cases survey evidence. 
Croatia [A] TU recently pro-
mote ESO in revision 
of privatisation; EA 
indifferent to FP; long 
tradition of self-
management ;  
[B] ESO supported 
until 1995,since then 
FP ignored;  ESOPs 
planned in PrivL 2010 
and in 2012; 
ESO: ES in JSC: financing by 
firm possible; dividends tax ex-
empt; profits from sale of shares 
not taxed; up to 10% of capital 
may be special ES 
ESOP: general rules of NCL ap-
ply;  
PS: none. 
 
2013 ECS: ESO 3.4%, PS 20.1%; 
 2008 PEPPER IV: ESO 34%, PS 29%; 
ESO: 2005 more than 10% of value of 
privatised firms (1996 20%); 2004 
12% firms with majority ESO;  
ESOP: Survey evidence, ESOP ele-
ments in 9.4% of firms (52 out of 
552), completed ESOP approx. in one-
fourth of them; 
PS: AI. 
Czech 
Republic 
[A] TU / EA indiffer-
ent to EFP, not a cur-
rent topic on their 
agendas; 
[B] ESOP discussed 
in 1990; EFP ignored 
after introduction of 
voucher concept.  
ESO: Discounted ES/SPS in JSC; 
not considered public offering; 
ES discount limit: 10% of equity 
capital, financing by company 
possible; uniform 15% dividend 
tax; 
PS: CPS/SPS in JSC; PIT of 
15%. 
2013 ECS: ESO 4.7%, PS 51.4%; 
2010 EWCS: ESO 0.98%, PS 20.74%; 
2005 Cranet: ESO 7.4%, PS 11.1%; 
SO: 2005 Cranet: 3%; 
ESO: insignificant; 0.31% of the pri-
vatised assets; 
PS: AI, insignificant. 
Estonia [A] TU indifferent to 
EFP, EA opposed to 
any extension of em-
ployee participation; 
[B] PrivL supported 
ESO until 1992; after 
1993 EFP ignored.  
ESO: rights attached to shares 
issued before 1995 remain valid; 
no public prospectus for ES 
needed; Emp.: no income tax on 
dividends from resident firms; 
EmpC: 22% on distributed prof-
it, only ‘bonus issue’ in capital 
increase exempt;       
SO: spread subject to PIT and 
SSC; 
PS: none.   
2013 ECS: ESO 8.4%, PS 42.2%; 
2010 Cranet: ESO 10.5%, PS 5.3%; 
2010 EWCS: ESO 1.17%, PS 12.23%; 
ESO: 2005 2% (1995 after privatisa-
tion 20%) of firms majority employee-
owned, 20% minority;     
PS: AI, survey evidence, very few 
cases. 
Hungary [A] TU lobbied 
ES/ESO in privatisa-
tion, recently only 
ESO: PrivL - preferential sale; 
discount up to 50% of share 
price and 150% of annual mini-
2013 ECS: ESO 2.6%, PS 16.4%; 
2010 Cranet: ESO 22.9%, PS 2.9%; 
2010 EWCS: ESO 0.85%, PS 9.15%; 
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Country General attitude 
[A] Social partners 
[B] Government 
Legislation and  
fiscal or other incentives 
Schemes and their incidence 
CRANET: Offer in firms > 200 Empl. 
EWCS: Take-up rate of employees  
sporadic support; EA 
indifferent; 
[B] ESOP/ES strong 
support in PrivL until 
1996; climate friendly 
towards EFP. 
mum pay, instalments; Decree 
‘Egzisztencia’ Credit; specific 
‘ES’ in JSC, discounted/free, up 
to 15% of equity capital, financ-
ing by company possible; since 
2003 tax-qualified stock plans, 
first HUF 1m free, then 20% 
CGT;     
SO: PIT base is value at exer-
cise;    
ESOP: ESOP Law 1992; prefer-
ential credit; corporate tax ex-
empt until end 1996; contribu-
tion to plan up to 20% tax de-
ductible; subject to 16% CGT;  
PS: none.  
SO: 2005 Cranet 27%; 
ESO: 2010 HWERS 7% of companies; 
2009 Labour Force Survey of the Hun-
garian Central Statistical Office 0.4% 
of employees; 
ESOP: initially 287 companies employ-
ing 80,000, in 2010 79 companies left; 
PS: 2010 HWERS 7% of companies 
(plan pre-defined and broad-based). 
Cyprus [A] EFP not an issue 
on TU / EA agendas; 
[B] EFP so far ig-
nored.  
ESO: discounted ES in JSC; fi-
nancing ES by company possi-
ble; dividends/gains from share 
sale tax-free; 
PS: none. 
2013 ECS: ESO 6%, PS 22% 
2010 Cranet: ESO 3.9%, PS 7.7%; 
2010 EWCS: ESO 2.2%, PS 4.61%; 
SO: 2005 Cranet: 4%; 
ESO/PS: AI only, insignificant.  
Latvia [A] TU / EA tradi-
tionally indifferent to 
EFP; 2011 bilateral 
agreement to put on 
agenda; 
[B] Few support for 
ESO in PrivL; EFP so 
far ignored. 
ESO: PrivL - up to 20% ES, but 
abolished in 1997; Specific ES in 
state / public firms; preferential 
ES in JSC free/discounted, in 
capital increases up to 10% of 
equity capital non-voting stock;                 
PS: none, subject to 25% PIT.      
2013 ECS: ESO 1.4%, PS 22.5%; 
2010 EWCS: ESO 1%, PS 9.04%; 
ESO: PrivL 110.6m vouchers to 2.5m 
people; AI, 1999 16% of 915 firms 
dominant ESO but falling over time;  
PS: AI, 7% of firms; mostly IT, con-
sulting, real estate. 
Lithu-
ania 
[A] Climate EFP 
friendly; TU interest-
ed, lack of actions; EA 
support individual 
firms; 
[B] ESOP/ES strong 
support in PrivL until 
1996; EFP included on 
government agenda 
2014. 
ESO: PrivL - 5% ES deferred 
payment up to 5 years; in cor-
porations ES for 3 years non- 
transferable/non-voting, financ-
ing by company possible; uni-
form 15% dividend tax; after 
holding period profits from sale 
of shares not taxed; 
PS: none, subject to 15% PIT.       
2013 ECS: ESO 13.9%, PS 55.4%; 
2010 CRANET: ESO 7.3%; 
2010 EWCS: ESO 0.56%, PS 12.52%; 
2008 PEPPER IV: ESO 4%, PS 36%; 
ESO: low and decreasing; AI, 2000 
36% (1995 92%) privatised firms 
dominant ESO, falling over time;  
PS: AI; CPS mostly foreign (IT, con-
sulting, advertising); DPS few cases 
2005 linked to employee savings plan. 
Malta [A] TU support 
schemes in practice; 
EFP not a current top-
ic in national tripartite 
dialogue; 
[B] EFP collateral 
effect of nationalisa-
tion (1980s) and pri-
vatisation (1990s) not 
a current issue. 
ESO: ES in corporations, exempt 
from prospectus/investment 
rules; up to 10% discount, fi-
nancing by company possible; 
SO: only taxable at exercise; tax 
limited to 42.85% of the tax rate 
on the excess of share market 
value at exercise over the option 
price; 
ESOP: Trust Act refers to EFP; 
taxed 15% interest / 10% in-
vestment; 
PS: mentioned in NLL. 
2013 ECS: ESO none, PS 13%; 
2010 EWCS: ESO 1.53%, PS 4.21%; 
ESO: AI; banking sector: ES, SAYE, 
SO;  
ESOP: AI, Trust Funds in Bank of Va-
letta / Malta Telecom; 
PS: AI; 2004 public sector (Shipyard 
1,761 employees); private (foreign) 
firms, mostly reserved for manage-
ment. 
Poland [A] TU/EA indifferent 
to EFP; managers/ 
employees pragmati-
cally motivated; lobby 
ESO: PrivL - 15% ES for free, 2 
years non transferable, up to 
value 18 months minimum pay, 
National Investment Funds 
2013 ECS: ESO 4.2, PS 37.2%; 
2010 EWCS: ESO 1.49%, PS 13.8%; 
2008 PEPPER IV: ESO 40%, PS 26%; 
ESO: low and declining; AI in privat-
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Country General attitude 
[A] Social partners 
[B] Government 
Legislation and  
fiscal or other incentives 
Schemes and their incidence 
CRANET: Offer in firms > 200 Empl. 
EWCS: Take-up rate of employees  
groups/financial insti-
tutions supportive to 
ESO; 
[B] EFP supported in 
early privatisation 
period; ESO in most 
privatisations, since 
mid-1990s more and 
more ignored; PS 
increased emphasis in 
the context of collec-
tive bargaining 
agreements; in 2009-
11 on political agen-
da. 
1995, shares for symbolic fee; 
ES/SPS in JSC, financing by 
company possible; uniform 15% 
dividend tax; 
EBO: PrivL - Leverage Lease 
Buyout (LLBO), anticipated own-
ership transfer possible; interest 
50% of refinance rate; interest 
part of lease payments are 
costs; Insolvency Law - buyout 
right; 2009 govt. program ‘Sup-
porting Privatization through 
Granting Sureties and Guaran-
tees to employee companies and 
civic activity companies” state 
guaranties possible if at least 
33% ESO. 
PS: CPS/SPS in JSC. 
ised firms, 2000 approximately 11.4% 
(1998 12.7%); NIF adult citizens 1 
share in 15 funds; 
EBO: LLBO 2002 one-third of privati-
sations, most frequently used single 
method, 1,335 firms employing 
162,000, 14% over 250 employees;  
PS: AI, limited to management.   
Romania [A] TU support indi-
vidual cases; EA avoid 
topic; tripartite coun-
cil tackled EFP sporad-
ically; Collective La-
bour Contract 2007-
2010 social partners 
committed to sustain 
employees’ share-
holder associations in 
privatisation; 
[B] ESO supported 
until 1997 especially 
MEBO; then support 
declined; current gov-
ernment gives little 
support. 
ESO: PrivL - aim 30% of privat-
ised assets vouchers/ES; vouch-
ers free; 10% discount ES; ES in 
JSC, financing by company pos-
sible; 10% dividend tax; 
ESOP: PrivL on Employee 
Shareholder Associations; lever-
aged transaction, preferential 
credit, up to interest rate 10%; 
30% minimum participation of 
workers in ESOP; 
PS: Ordinance – CPS compulso-
ry in state/municipal firms, max-
imum pay-out of 10% of overall 
profits. 
2013 ECS: ESO 2.2%, PS 32%; 
2010 EWCS: ESO 1.97%, PS 5.68%; 
2008 PEPPER IV: ESO 6%, PS 42%: 
ESO: ES 10% of shares issued at pri-
vatisation, decreasing;  
ESOP: 1998 one-third of privatisa-
tions, most frequently used single 
method 2000: 2,632 firms, average 
65% ESO, 1,652 majority ESO;  
PS: estimated 1.2m employees in 
public sector covered; AI, phased out 
in some enterprises. 
Slovakia [A] TU/EA indifferent 
to EFP, not a current 
topic on their agen-
das; 
[B] ESOP discussed 
in 1990; EBO concept 
failed 1995; EFP now 
generally ignored.  
ESO: discounted ES and SPS in 
JSC; up to 70% discount and 
financing by company possible; 
PS: CPS/SPS in JSC, subject to 
19% PIT. 
2013 ECS: ESO 3.1%, PS 54.3%; 
2010 Cranet: ESO 26.9%, PS 6.7%; 
2010 EWCS: ESO 3.31%, PS 25.62%; 
SO: 2005 Cranet 10%; 
ESO: insignificant; AI, banking sector 
/ new privatisations; 
EBO: AI, in privatisation, usually man-
agement-led.  
Slovenia [A] TU/EA very sup-
portive to EFP; Em-
ployee Ownership 
Association lobbies 
legislation; active 
support by Works 
Councils/Managers 
Association;  
[B] Strong political 
support to EFP; draft 
laws 1997/2005 in 
parliament rejected; 
new Law on EFP in 
2008. 
All Schemes: since 2008, 70% 
tax relief for PS and ESO with 1-
year holding period (100% relief 
with more than 3-year); up to 
20% profits or 10% total sala-
ries per annum and up to EUR 
5,000 per employee; 
ESO: PrivL - up to 20% ES for 
vouchers; vouchers free, shares 
for overdue claims; ES/SPS in 
corporations; discount / financ-
ing by company possible; up to 
10% of company capital;    
EBO: up to 40%, shares 4 years 
2013 ECS: ESO 9.3% PS 59.8%; 
2010 Cranet: ESO 8.5%, PS 20.8%; 
2010 EWCS: ESO 3.74%, PS 23.17%; 
SO: 2005 Cranet 4%; 
ESO/EBO: 90% of privatised firms; 
CS 1998 60% majority; ESO while 
only 23% of capital (2004 18% strong 
decline);  
PS: CS, in statutes of 32% of firms, 
but unexploited in 22%; for board 
members 20% of listed firms. 
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Country General attitude 
[A] Social partners 
[B] Government 
Legislation and  
fiscal or other incentives 
Schemes and their incidence 
CRANET: Offer in firms > 200 Empl. 
EWCS: Take-up rate of employees  
non-transferable; Worker asso-
ciation proxy organisation under 
Takeover Law;     
PS: SPS/CPS; up to 20% of net 
profits. 
Benchmark countries   
Turkey [A] TU supportive, 
EA sceptical, partly 
opposed; 
[B] EFP issue 1968 in 
Tax Reform Commis-
sion; some attention 
in individual privatisa-
tions; 2002 program, 
lack of concrete 
measures 
ESO: PrivL decrees for individual 
firms; discount/instalments; NTL 
- after 1 year share-sale profits 
not taxed; 10% of share buy-
backs for ESO; for SO limited 
tax on dividends/profits from 
sale; conditional capital increase 
for employee SO; 
IntE: NCL/CivC “welfare/mutual 
assistance funds” of firms; fi-
nancing by firm profits / contri-
butions; 
PS: NCL/CivC both CPS and 
SPS; up to 10% prior reserve 
2005 Cranet: ESO 4.4%, PS 8.9%, 
SO 1%; 
2005 EWCS: ESO 1.3%, PS 2.4%;  
ESO: AI, PrivL 12 cases 9-37% ESO, 1 
case majority, up to 15% discount; 
SO/ESO private firms mostly foreign 
(26 registered, 35 applications); 2007 
survey evidence: 3-4% of publicly 
traded companies;  
IntE: N.A.; 
PS: AI, retained profits from dividends 
widespread; CS 38 out of 50 listed 
firms; 2007 survey evidence: 20% of 
publicly traded companies. 
Norway [A] TU traditionally 
opposed; 
[B] Controversial po-
litical issue, few atten-
tion by government; 
1984 tax exemption 
for discounted stocks 
introduced. 
ESO: difference between market 
value and subscription price is 
subject to PIT and SSC; if 
broad-based, benefit is tax-
exempt up to NOK 1,500 per 
annum; financing by company 
possible;  
SO: difference between market 
value and subscription price is 
subject to PIT and SSC on exer-
cise; if broad-based, benefit is 
tax-exempt up to NOK 1,500 per 
annum; 
PS: none. 
2010 EWCS: ESO 2.7% PS 9%; 
2005 Cranet: ESO 2.3%, PS 7.4%; 
. 
USA [A] After legalization 
of unions in 1935, 
collective bargaining 
for fair wages by un-
ion and non-union 
companies increased 
the acceptance for 
CPS/ GS.  
[B] Long-standing 
government efforts 
(Republicans and 
Democrats alike) 
since Internal Reve-
nue Act 1921 to pro-
vide greater financial 
participation and re-
tirement benefits for 
citizens, ESOP author-
ised by Employee Re-
tirement Income Se-
curity Act (ERISA) in 
1974, enabling legis-
ESO: Qualified Stock Bonus 
Plans – since 1921 Internal Rev-
enue Act, tax-exempt trust, de-
ductible company contributions 
limited to 25% of eligible pay-
roll, proportionate allocations up 
to USD 260,000, earnings of 
trust are tax-exempt; 
Direct stock purchases – CGT, 
after 1 year; 
Employee stock purchase plans 
(ESPPs) – not taxable at grant / 
exercise; taxation as long-term 
gains subject to holding period 
and conditions; 
ESOP: exempt from prohibition 
of direct or indirect lending of 
money to a qualified plan; since 
1974, any sale of stock to an 
ESOP taxed at CGT if the pur-
chase leveraged - interest and 
principal is tax-deductible; since 
ESOPs: 2011 NCEO estimate is 6,941 
ESOPs and 1,985 ESOP-like plans  for 
a total of 8,926 plans; 14.7m partici-
pants in ESOPs; held USD 995.3bn in 
assets; 
2010 General Survey (GSS): ESOPs, 
401(k) plans, SO and similar grants as 
well as employee stock purchase plans 
(ESPPs): ESO: 18.7m employees, i.e., 
17.4% owned company stock; SO: 
9.3m employees = 8.7%. Considering 
the companies, which have stock, 36% 
of employees, i.e., 28m employees 
own company stock through different 
benefit plans; 
2011 Annual Survey of PS and 401(k) 
Plans conducted by the Plan Sponsor 
Council of America: 686 IRS qualified 
PS plan, cover 10.3m participants, 
held USD 769bn in plan assets. 
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Country General attitude 
[A] Social partners 
[B] Government 
Legislation and  
fiscal or other incentives 
Schemes and their incidence 
CRANET: Offer in firms > 200 Empl. 
EWCS: Take-up rate of employees  
lation for 401(k) plans 
in 1978, further ESOP 
incentives passed in 
1984 and 2001.  
 
 
1984, “tax-free rollover” tax-
deferral for seller, when min. 
30% of stock and reinvested in 
“qualified replacement securi-
ties” within 1 year; dividends 
paid to ESOP participants or to 
service loan deductible; since 
2001, ESOPs qualify as share-
holders of S corporations, ex-
empted from unrelated business 
income tax; S corporation 100% 
owned by ESOP tax-exempt; 
SO: Incentive Stock Option 
Plans – CGT subject to condi-
tions; Nonqualified Stock Op-
tions – taxed at exercise; at 
sale, CGT after holding period;  
PS: since 1921 Internal Revenue 
Act, tax-exempt trust, tax-
deductible contributions to plan 
up to 25% of payroll, trust earn-
ings are tax-exempt; invest-
ments must be diversified;  
Qualified Profit Sharing 
Plans - exemptions from diversi-
fication requirement.   
401(k) plans - since 1978 Reve-
nue Act, deductible salary con-
tributions to plan (for 2014, max 
USD 17,500); since 2006 com-
pany matching contributions 
after 3 years of service; 
DPS – deferred taxation of cash 
bonuses and cash PS amounts;  
 
Source: PEPPER I-IV and: CNMV 2003; CRANET 2010/2005 (firms with more than 200 employees); ECS 2013; 
EU Stock Options Report 2003; EWCS 2005 (take-up rate); FONDACT 2004; GSS 2010; Heissmann 2003; 
HWERS 2010 (Hungarian Workplace Employment Relation Survey); IAB 2005; IBEC 2002; ifsProShare 2006; 
NCEO 2014; Nutall Report 2012; WKÖ/BAK 2005; WSI 2003; please note that the country data of the different 
surveys is incoherent due to inconsistencies in methodology and definitions. Excluded from studies: Manage-
ment Buyout, General Savings Plans, Consumer and Housing Cooperatives; 
Abbreviations: AI = anecdotal information; bn = billion; CGT = capital gains tax; CIT = corporate income 
tax; CivC = Civil Code; CPS = cash-based profit sharing; CS = case studies; DPS = deferred profit sharing; EA 
= employer associations; EBO = employee buyout; EmpC = employer company; ES = employee shares; ESO 
= employee share ownership; ESOP = Employee Share Ownership Plan; EFP = employee financial participa-
tion; FMV = fair market value; GS = gain sharing; IEnt = intermediary entity; JSC = joint-stock companies; m 
= million; MEBO = management-employee buyout; NCL = national company law; NLL = national labour legis-
lation; NSL = national social benefit legislation; NTL = national tax legislation; PIT = personal income tax; 
PrivL = privatisation legislation; PS = profit sharing; SAYE = save-as-you-earn schemes; SO = stock options; 
SPS = share-based profit sharing; SSC = Social Security Contributions; TU = trade unions. 
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ANNEX 2 – A brief review of literature on employee 
financial participation  
1. Main benefits of EFP for employers and employees  
The main argument in favour of introducing EFP schemes is that they provide a solu-
tion to the agency problem (McNabb and Whitfield 1998). Companies seek to create 
mechanisms, which ensure that the interest of workers as agents is aligned with that 
of companies as principals (Robinson and Wilson 2006). There is a rich body of aca-
demic literature on employee participation in ownership and enterprise results going 
back as far as the 1950s and 1960s, although the bulk of theoretical and empirical re-
search has been conducted in the last 30 years. It is important to point out that much 
of the empirical investigations in a variety of countries and different forms of employ-
ee participation have concluded that EFP has a positive influence on the performance 
of companies. This Annex provides a brief summary of the literature highlighting the 
benefits of EFP scheme under several main headings, followed by a discussion of the 
main problems associated with employee ownership and participation. 
a) Improved efficiency, labour productivity and competitiveness 
In the theoretical literature, the most often cited reason for improved efficiency, la-
bour productivity and competitiveness is that employee financial participation creates 
incentives for workers to be more involved in their firms, identify with and have 
stronger commitment to them. Giving workers a stake in the success of the firm will 
motivate higher levels of effort, generate more positive attitudes and more co-
operative behaviour, and also help realign employee interests with those of the firm 
(Poutsma and Huijgen 1999). All of these contribute to higher labour productivity and 
improved overall enterprise efficiency, which make the company more competitive 
(Ben-Ner and Jones 1995; Bryson and Freeman 2007; Oxera 2007a, 2007b; Jones, 
Kalmi and Kato 2010; Kruse, Blasi and Freeman 2010; Poutsma and Bramm 2011 
among others).  
Kruse (2002), summarising 31 studies on employee attitudes and behaviour under 
employee ownership, found that most of these studies showed a higher commitment 
to and identification with the company, with others showing mixed results ranging 
from favourable to neutral with regard to job satisfaction, motivation and other behav-
ioural measures. More recently, Guedri and Hollandts (2008) investigated listed French 
firms and found that the positive impact of employee ownership on company perfor-
mance is related to positive changes in attitudinal behaviour of employees, e.g., an 
increase in motivation, involvement and job satisfaction, and a reduction in turnover 
and absenteeism rates. 
A meta analysis of 48 early studies of the impact of different forms of EFP by Doucou-
liagos (1995) found that EFP was positively associated with productivity. Another sur-
vey of 70 empirical studies on the effects of employee stock ownership, broad-based 
stock options, profit sharing, and employee participation by Blasi, Kruse and Bernstein 
(2003) found that the adoption of any of these scheme had led to an average rise in 
productivity of 4 per cent, return on equity (ROE) of 14 per cent, return on assets 
(ROA) of 12 per cent and profit margins of 11 per cent. Later on, Kaarsemaker 
(2006), also reviewing some 70 papers found that 48 of the 70 studies had shown that 
EFP had a positive effect on firm performance, while only 6 studies had found negative 
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effects. Another survey of the literature on employee-owned firms by Freeman (2007) 
supports the earlier survey results that firms with EFP schemes were more productive 
and profitable, survive longer, and result in better shareholder returns.   
b) Recruitment and retention, absenteeism and labour turnover 
Financial participation can also help recruit and retain qualified employees, especially 
in SMEs (IAFP 2010). SMEs typically lack the well developed and extensive internal 
labour force found in many large firms, thus opportunities for promotion can be limited 
or non-existent. The challenge for SMEs is to attract and retain experienced managers 
and other personnel (Postlethwaite 2004). If the company is listed on the stock mar-
ket, a successful firm may offer shares to its employees as an incentive to retain exist-
ing employees and attract new ones. This is especially true of firms where the em-
ployees’ know-how is important, e.g., small and medium-sized high technology firms. 
In this case, employee share ownership can bridge the gap between the need for 
greater employee effort and commitment on the one hand, and potential labour turno-
ver on the other. EFP can help retain the most valuable employees by “locking” them 
into the firm through deferred reward schemes (Sen Gupta, Whitfield and McNabb 
2007; Marsden 1999; Morris, Bakan and Wood 2006) or by linking the reward to the 
business cycle (share values tend to be highest when alternative employment oppor-
tunities are greatest) (Oyer 2004).  
Another benefit arising from EFP is reduced absenteeism and labour turnover (Robin-
son and Zhang 2005). Wilson and Peel (1991) find that firms with financial participa-
tion schemes had significantly lower average absenteeism and quit rates than firms 
without such schemes. A lower turnover rate, of course, reduces recruitment and 
training costs and improves firm competitiveness. The change from a fixed-wage sys-
tem, where rewards are independent of efforts expended, to a system that provides 
an income more directly linked to enterprise performance anticipates greater employ-
ee commitment, lower absenteeism and labour turnover, greater investments in com-
pany-specific human capital and reduced conflict within the company (Festing et al. 
1999).  
c) Source of income after retirement  
One of the most important benefits of EFP schemes (particularly ESO) for employees is 
savings for future. It is well known that the European population is aging and that 
governments are finding it increasingly more difficult to maintain pensions at current 
levels. EFP schemes can be a source of additional income, which could be put aside in 
a savings scheme, to increase the income available for retirement. EFP schemes may 
be embedded in retirement plans or investment funds in which not only employee 
shares but also other contributions from profit-sharing schemes can be invested. De-
ferred profit-sharing schemes can be allocated to savings accounts with certain reten-
tion periods or can be invested in assets, including shares in the employer company. 
In the U.S., for example, 401(k) plans110 are the most popular type of defined contri-
bution retirement plans (IAFP 2010).  
                                           
110  A 401(k) plan is a qualified profit-sharing plan allowing employees to contribute salary deferral (salary 
reduction) contributions on a post-tax and/or pre-tax basis often involving employer’s matching contri-
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d) Wage flexibility and stability of employment 
In addition to productivity enhancement, firms may adopt EFP schemes to introduce 
greater wage flexibility in the employees’ remuneration package and to help stabilise 
employment (Weitzman 1984; Harbaugh 2005). The importance of remuneration flex-
ibility becomes clear in times of recession (e.g., the recent financial crisis). When con-
fronted with unanticipated aggregate demand or aggregate supply shocks, compensa-
tion would respond more quickly under profit sharing than under a fixed wage system 
set by long-term contracts. A firm utilising profit sharing would exhibit less employ-
ment variability than a firm with fixed wages (Weitzman 1984). In a survey of over 
40,000 employees in 14 firms and 323 worksites, conducted as part of NBER’s 
“Shared Capitalism” project in the U.S., Kruse, Blasi and Freeman (2010) found that 
EFP schemes are associated with higher job security.111  
Empirical studies on the relationship between EFP and employment have generally ar-
rived at positive results. Kruse (1991), using a sample of 3,000 firms, found that the 
decline in employment in profit-sharing firms during business downturns was lower 
than in other firms. Similarly, Kruse (1998) reviewed 19 studies, which examined 
Weitzman’s predictions that profit sharing would stabilise company employment levels. 
The majority of these found that when making employment decisions, firms view profit 
sharing differently from fixed wages. Of the 12 studies directed to employment stabil-
ity, six found greater employment stability under profit sharing, four showed greater 
stability in some but not all the firms in the sample, and two showed little or no differ-
ence. Blair, Kruse and Blasi (2000) found higher job stability in U.S. companies with 
broad-based employee ownership plans as compared to firms with no employee own-
ership plan in the same industries. Similar results have been reported for UK employ-
ee owned firms by Lampel, Bhalla, and Pushkar (2010). 
e) Economic resilience 
According to Lampel, Bhalla, and Pushkar (2010), employee-owned firms not only 
demonstrate greater employment stability but also greater resilience compared to in-
vestor owned firms. The authors maintain that employee owned firms focus on long 
term operations, avoiding excessive risk taking and excessive risk aversion in different 
phases of the business cycle which is typical of the short term focus of non-employee- 
owned firms. Using sales growth, they show that for a sample of UK companies, em-
ployee-owned firms had a more stable and less fluctuating sales growth in comparison 
with their non-employee owned competitors. They experienced a slightly slower aver-
age annual growth rate during the expansion phase (10.04 per cent vs 12.10 per cent) 
and a relatively similar but much larger rate of growth during the slow-down phase 
(11.08 per cent vs 0.61 per cent). The authors' view about the long-term focus of em-
ployee-owned firms was corroborated by the submissions of these firms to the Nuttall 
Review of employee ownership set up by the UK Government (Nuttall, 2012, para-
graph 2.15, p.25). Earlier, in a study involving 27 employee-owned firms (with em-
                                                                                                                                 
butions; the allocated sums are generally invested over a specific period of time until they can be with-
drawn. 
111 For details of this Study, see Kruse, Blasi and Freeman (2010). The companies had a variety of EFP 
schemes. About 90 per cent of the workers surveyed are in five Fortune 500 multinational firms where 
employee ownership accounts for a minority stake of the firm’s equity, workers do not elect board repre-
sentatives, and employee ownership is combined with cash profit sharing or broad-based stock options. 
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ployees owning more than 20 per cent of shares) and 45 investor-owned firms, Blair, 
Kruse, and Blasi (2000) had shown that employee-owned firms were less likely to be 
taken over. In another study of U.S. firms with share option plans for employees, 
Kramer (2008) had found that the chances of survival of employee-owned firms are 
higher than those of non-employee owned firms. 
f) Business succession 
As the Commission Communication (2006)112 emphasises, with the ageing of Europe’s 
population, “one-third of EU entrepreneurs, mainly those managing family enterprises, 
will withdraw within the next ten years”. This portends an enormous increase in busi-
ness transfer activity, which in 2002 was estimated to potentially affect up to 690,000 
SMEs and 2.8 million jobs every year.113 More recent figures from 2011 anticipate that 
each year some 450,000 firms in the EU look for successors, affecting up to 2 million 
employees. Every year, there is a risk of losing approximately 150,000 companies and 
600,000 jobs due to inefficient business transfers.114 It is anticipated that as a conse-
quence of the new forms of business finance now coming into use, transfers within the 
family will decrease, while sales to outside buyers (such as private equity funds115) will 
rise. This process is likely to threaten the successful regional structure of European 
(family-owned) businesses (Deutsche Bank Research 2007 p. 1) and thus will pro-
foundly affect the European Union itself. The Commission, the European Parliament 
and the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) have highlighted employee 
buyouts as one possible solution to the business succession problem of European 
SMEs. Appropriately designed long-term EFP models could also contribute to the re-
tention of these small firms and strengthening regional economies and employment 
throughout the EU.  
The EESC emphasises the potential usefulness of Employee Stock Ownership Plans 
(ESOP models), which have already demonstrated their effectiveness (see best prac-
tice cases in Annex 3). An important characteristic of the ESOP model is that it is es-
pecially tailored to the needs of unquoted companies. It encourages business owners 
to sell their enterprise to their own employees instead of a third party and facilitates 
the gradual acquisition of up to 100 per cent of company stock by employees. Em-
ployees do not have to invest their savings, since the employee stock purchase gener-
ally is financed by a profit share paid in addition to salary. Thus, employees do not in-
cur personal debt or additional risk.  
The ESOP creates a market for the shares of retiring shareholders at a price accepta-
ble to the owner—a market, which otherwise might not exist. At the same time, when 
                                           
112  Implementing the Lisbon Community Programme for Growth and Jobs, on the Transfer of Businesses – 
Continuity through a new beginning, from 14 March 2006 COM(2006)117 final.  
113  Calculated by extrapolations from the final report of the BEST project on the transfer of small and medi-
um-sized enterprises, 2002, which estimated that the annual transfer potential for the EU-15 was 
610,000 businesses. E.g., the transfer volume of enterprises was estimated for Germany around 
354,000 over the next five years (Institut für Mittelstandsforschung Bonn (IfM) 2005), for France around 
600,000 for the next decade (Vilain, 2004). 
114  See European Commission 2011, Business Dynamics: Start-ups, Business Transfers and Bankruptcy, 
final report for DG Enterprise, p. 95, 96 and 100. 
115  The volume of private equity transactions in Europe has been rising over the last years with EUR 126 
billion in 2005 and a new peak of EUR 178 billion in 2007 (Incisive Financial Publishing, 2007).  
  ANNEX 2 – A brief review of literature on employee financial participation 
 
October 2014  |  121  
 
a change of control is appropriate, ownership can be transferred to motivated employ-
ees who have a vital interest in the firm’s long-term success. 
2. Potential drawbacks of EFP schemes  
Empirical studies, showing the positive effects of various forms of EFP on firm perfor-
mance discussed above, also suggest that EFP may be associated with problems for 
both firms and workers. These issues are investigated in the literature, which is sum-
marised below. 
a) Free riding 
The most often cited criticism of employee participation in the literature is the free-
rider problem, which is likely to be present in any group-incentive system. In EFP 
schemes, workers receive only a small fraction of any additional income resulting from 
their own increased efforts, but gain benefits from the collective effort. This may then 
result in a temptation for free riding, shirking and on-the-job leisure (Kruse 1996). But 
EFP and other forms of employee involvement can help foster greater trust, co-
operation, and identification with the firm, which reduce the incidence of free riding. 
Employees in firms with EFP schemes also have an incentive to monitor their col-
leagues—as well as managers—thus further minimising the free-rider problem (Park, 
Kruse and Sesil 2004). When individual pay is computed on the basis of the aggregate 
performance of a group, everyone has an incentive to monitor co-workers to avoid de-
creases in output (Bryson et al. 2011). 
Empirical studies previously mentioned, showing the positive effects of various forms 
of EFP on firm performance, suggest that firms and workers have developed mecha-
nisms to reduce free riding which enable EFP schemes to succeed. Among such mech-
anisms are mutual monitoring, peer pressure and social norms (Falk and Ichino 2006; 
Mas and Moretti 2009). Pendleton et al. (2001) found no evidence of any free-rider 
effect in companies with 250 or more employees. It is expected that free riding is less 
common in smaller companies, due to more effective peer monitoring. Furthermore, 
the free-rider problem is one reason why the literature emphasises the importance of 
participation in decision-making and complementary human resource management 
practices to accompany EFP in order for employees to develop co-operation and an 
ownership culture (Kaarsmaker, Pendleton and Poutsma 2009).  
b) Interference with management 
Other authors have argued that the financial participation of employees, particularly 
employee ownership, can adversely affect the performance of enterprises because 
managers might find it harder to exercise their authority when people they manage 
are also partial owners of the firm. Jensen and Meckling (1979) have emphasised the 
impact of the involvement of ill-informed employees on decision-making and their in-
terference with the work of the management. Hansmann (1990 and 1993) has drawn 
attention to the cost of “collective governance” and the impact of conflict between 
heterogeneous groups of employees (young and old, skilled and unskilled, etc.) with 
different interests and objectives on company performance. However, in practice, the 
potential conflict with the management autonomy might be less problematic if em-
ployees consider that their company has to compete with other firms in the market 
and that any interference in the work of management may affect the company per-
formance, and its position in the market, adversely, resulting in losses to themselves.  
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Some of these problems can also be avoided if employee share ownership is organised 
through an intermediary institution—such as an ESOP—without direct employee in-
volvement in the decision-making process.  
c) Risk for employees 
From the employees’ standpoint, one of the oldest commonly cited drawbacks to em-
ployee ownership is that holding shares of their own company is a poor portfolio deci-
sion, involving the “double risk” of becoming unemployed and losing their savings—
which are invested in the company—if the company experiences financial difficulties. 
On the other hand, employees and their representatives are likely to know the firm 
they work for well, which enables them to assess the investment opportunity better 
than would otherwise be the case, e.g., on the stock markets. Nevertheless, as em-
ployees may not be able to sell their shares at once116, the problem of risk remains. In 
reality, however, shares of the company form only a small part of an employee’s sav-
ings, and EFP schemes do not prevent employees from having other forms of saving 
(such as home ownership).   
The already mentioned NBER study of employees’ attitudes towards EFP, shows that 
this issue—and more broadly speaking the issue of risk aversion—is not a barrier to 
EFP (Kruse, Blasi and Park 2008). Using the same dataset, Kruse, Blasi and Freeman 
(2010) found that employees’ attitudes to EFP schemes and preferences for variable 
pay depend on how secure they feel about the future.117 The more secure employees 
feel, the more willing they are to participate in EFP schemes. Furthermore, employees 
feel secure when there is a greater sense of empowerment and involvement in the 
company’s activities. 
 
                                           
116  This is also an obvious disadvantage of deferred profit-sharing plans with sometimes onerous restriction 
on withdrawals. Most schemes impose retention periods before benefits become available to employees. 
117 They developed an “index of economic insecurity”, which consists of three components: the size of each 
worker’s fixed annual pay, the ratio of each worker’s wealth (minus debt) to his/her fixed annual pay, 
and the extent to which each worker perceives that he/she is competitively paid by his/her firm.  
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ANNEX 3 – Examples of best-practice models for ESO  
1. ESO in micro-enterprises – Spanish Sociedades Laborales  
The Spanish concept of Sociedades Laborales (Workers’ Companies) is the only 
ESO plan across the EU implemented at large scale in small and smallest companies, 
which makes it of particular interest for policy making.  
a) Legal framework 
A Sociedad Laboral (SL) is a specific form of corporation in Spain, with no exact paral-
lel in other countries. It is an inexpensive form of incorporation, majority-owned by its 
permanent employees: Permanent workers must own more than 50 per cent of com-
pany shares while no single owner may own more than one third (33 per cent) of the 
company's stock (except for public organisations, which may own up to 49 per cent). 
Unlike co-operatives, it is based on share ownership and is permitted to utilise non-
employee capital. Providing stable employment for their worker-owners, who control 
the company’s directive bodies, they may be founded as SLs, or conventional compa-
nies may convert to this form.  
Sociedades Laborales are governed by the Law on Workers’ Companies of 1986, sub-
stantially amended in 1997 (Law 4/1997, of 24 March).118 They can be founded as a 
Worker-owned Company or a conventional firm can qualify as a Worker-owned Com-
pany when fulfilling certain prerequisites. There are two forms: Sociedad Anónima La-
boral (SAL) with minimum equity capital of EUR 60,000 and Sociedad Limitada Laboral 
(SLL) with minimum equity capital of EUR 3,000. Permanent workers must own more 
than 50 per cent of company shares while the minimum number of working partners is 
two and individual shareholders may not hold more than one-third of the capital (ex-
cept in SLs partially owned by the State, Autonomous Communities or Local Authori-
ties, in which case public ownership may reach up to 50 per cent). The number of 
hours worked by permanent workers who are not simultaneously owners of the com-
pany cannot exceed 15 per cent of the total hours worked by worker-owners (25 per 
cent when the SL has less than 25 worker-owners). 
The articles of association must contain regulations on transfer of shares when an em-
ployee shareholder leaves the company with an established order of preference to sell 
his or her shares. Firstly, these shares must be offered to permanent workers who are 
not worker-owners (to promote maintaining broad worker ownership). Secondly, 
shares must be offered to existing worker-owners. Thirdly, shares must be offered to 
owners who do not work in the organization. Finally, the company itself can acquire 
shares.  
Each Workers’ Company must establish a special fund for the compensation of losses 
amounting to 20 per cent of its profits (the compulsory 10 per cent for normal compa-
nies plus an additional 10 per cent for Workers’ Companies). The remaining 80 per 
cent of the profits can be distributed between the members of the workers’ company 
                                           
118  Legislation applicable to SL in Spain can be found, among others, in the web page of The Observatorio 
Español de la Economia Social http://www.observatorioeconomiasocial.es/area-juridica-sociedades-
laborales.php?PHPSESSID=f1163852650a6c4a09a960b8d1ae99e6.  
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or attributed to a voluntary reserve to increase the company’s own capital and thus 
the value of its shares. If the compensation fund amounts to 25 per cent of annual 
profits the company benefits from a 99 per cent tax exemption from capital transfer 
tax (this affects primarily acquisitions of real estate by the workers’ company).  Un-
employed persons that wish to join a Workers’ Company have the possibility to receive 
their public unemployment benefits as a single lump-sum payment (instead of as 
monthly payments for the duration of unemployment) conditional on contributing the 
sums to the capital of the Workers’ Company.  
Furthermore, Workers’ Companies are exempted from: (1) taxes in connection with 
company formation and transformation of SLL to SAL or vice versa as well as capital 
increases (additional to a tax credit of 99 per cent of taxes connected with transfer of 
shares to employees); (2) notarial deeds on transfers to the company as well as no-
tarial deeds on bond debts, and debenture bonds (including a 99 per cent tax reduc-
tion when the Workers’ Company acquires goods or rights from the company where 
the majority of its workers were previously employed). These incentives only apply to 
the setting up of the Workers’ Company (i.e., they do not affect personal income tax 
liability, etc.). Furthermore, pursuant to Art. 11.2. a) Corporate Tax Law tangible fixed 
assets, intangible assets and property investments affected by Sociedades Laborales 
in conducting their activities, and acquired during the first five years from the date of 
qualification, may be depreciated freely. 
b) Incidence 
In 2013, there were a total of 11,557 Workers’ Companies providing 63,931 jobs. In 
the first trimester of 2014 employment in SL has increased by 1,4 per cent, which fi-
nally reversed the negative tendency since 2009.119 Andalusia, Madrid and the Basque 
Country have been the regions where this increase has been highest. In the last tri-
mester, of 2013 the rhythm of SL creation has doubled as compared to 2012.120 Fur-
thermore, 78 per cent of the employment is permanent and the decrease of employ-
ment has been 8.5 per cent less compared to that in other entities.121 In 2012 (last 
year available), 79,61 per cent of the total SL members (i.e., workers or investors) 
were workers members. 
Clearly, the preferred legal form is the Sociedad Limitada Laboral or SLL (Limited Lia-
bility Worker-Owned Company), employing an average of 4.6 workers. Between 1999 
and 2011, the number of workers in SLLs increased by 161 per cent. The general 
trend followed by SLs mimics that of mercantile companies since they are basically 
economic equals. They face the same problems as other SMEs, mainly to become suf-
                                           
119  In general, compared to conventional firms, SLs have grown in greater numbers (see CONFESAL “Report 
regarding changes to the Law governing Sociedades Laborales” from October 2006, p. 6), yet recently 
their number has decreased (as compared to approx. 20,000 firms, employing 125,000 workers in 2007) 
though as has the number of their conventional competitors due to the general economic situation.  
120 http://www.confesal.com/home/index.php/component/jnews/mailing/view/listid-0/mailingid-
111/listype-1/Itemid-191.html. Other sources for statistical data: Instituto Nacional de Estadistica: 
www.ine.es; Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social: 
http://www.empleo.gob.es/es/sec_trabajo/autonomos/economia-
soc/EconomiaSocial/estadisticas/index.htm; Observatorio de Economía Social en España: 
http://www.observatorioeconomiasocial.es/; Confederación Empresarial Española de la Economía Social: 
http://www.cepes.es/). 
121  http://www.confesal.com/home/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=389:2014-05-22-18-
32-20&catid=36:noticias-economia-social&Itemid=196. 
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ficiently competitive. Compared to conventional companies, SLs have grown in greater 
numbers, yet the net increase is negative. However, in many cases, they have con-
verted to conventional companies (either by choice or by disqualification) often be-
coming “victims of their success“: They continue to exist with substantial employee 
ownership but do no longer qualify as SL, e.g., because the employee-ownership rate 
drops below 50 per cent. Between 1 January 2010 and 31 December 2012 in the 
Basque Registrar of SLs, of 110 disqualifications 51 became conventional companies, 
i.e., 46.36 per cent of which only 8 have closed down. 
Despite the lack of sound fiscal incentives, SLs have flourished over the past 15 years 
and have demonstrated their ability to generate stable employment and endure over 
time. The survival rates are slightly higher than those of conventional companies: 
More than 50 per cent of SLs survive the first five years. The reason for their success 
is that since 1985, unemployed persons can capitalise their unemployment benefits as 
a lump sum instead of monthly payments in order to start a new Workers’ Company or 
to recapitalise an existing one. However, the number of start-ups subsequently de-
clined when this benefit was extended to self-employed workers. Organisations such 
as ASLE (Agrupación empresarial de sociedades laborales de Euskadi) and CONFESAL 
(Confederación Empresarial de Sociedades Laborales de España) have played a key 
role in the support and promotion of Workers’ Companies in Spain.  
2. Re-launching a share economy – UK 
Successive United Kingdom Governments have committed themselves to supporting 
employee financial participation plans and promoting widespread individual share 
ownership for reasons both ideological and pragmatic. These include making enter-
prise more democratic, developing financial markets and fostering social welfare. 2011 
the Office of Tax Simplification (OTS) started reviews into the complexities of ESPs, 
both tax advantaged and non-tax advantaged. This work of the OTS has enabled the 
Government to undertake the most significant package of reform to the tax rules for 
ESPs for many years. These reforms have simplified the tax rules and made it easier 
for private companies to introduce tax advantaged ESPs. 
In 2012, the Government commissioned the Nuttall Review of Employee Ownership 
that provided a comprehensive appraisal of the situation of employee share ownership 
in the country and proposed a wide range of initiatives to promote, in particular, the 
employee ownership business model in the British economy (Nuttall Review 2012). 
The Nuttall Review defined “employee ownership” as “a significant and meaningful 
stake in a business for all its employees” and explained that “What is ‘meaningful’ 
goes beyond financial participation. The employees’ stake must underpin organisation-
al structures that ensure employee engagement”. This report resulted in a number of 
significant Government initiatives and legal reforms122. Amongst other initiatives, in 
October 2012 the Government adopted an Action Plan on Employee Ownership and 
included into the Budget 2013 the provision of GBP 50m annually from 2014-15 to fur-
ther incentivise growth of the employee ownership sector. In terms of legislative re-
forms, in 2013 the British Government reformed the Companies Act 2006 in favour of 
ESPs and in 2014 introduced tax exemptions for “indirect” ownership of shares on be-
half of employees, through EOTs. This is a significant change in emphasis from only 
                                           
122 Nuttall Review of Employee Ownership – a guide to source materials http://tinyurl.com/FieldfisherEO18. 
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supporting the ownership of shares directly by employees and means there are now 
tax advantaged arrangements for all the main forms of employee share ownership in 
operation in the United Kingdom.123 
a) Legal framework 
All employee financial participation plans fall into one of two categories: tax advan-
taged and other, non-tax advantaged, plans. At one time all tax advantaged plans had 
to be approved by HM Revenue & Customs. In 2014, this approval process was re-
placed by self-certification. Some non-tax advantaged plans may still be referred to as 
“Unapproved Plans”.  
Tax advantaged share and share option plans enjoy substantial tax and national insur-
ance contributions (NICs) exemptions, as set out primarily in the Income Tax (Earn-
ings and Pensions) Act 2003, especially for employees. Non-tax advantaged plans may 
be introduced at the employer’s discretion, but receive no special tax incentives. Tax 
advantaged plans must conform to tax law; non-tax advantaged plans are more flexi-
ble. Non-tax advantaged plans may be used for granting shares, options or cash 
equivalents without conforming to the requirements imposed on tax advantaged plans 
and may be operated alongside tax advantaged plans. In recent years, all tax advan-
taged employee financial participation plans have been ESPs. This changed in 2014, as 
a result of the findings of the Nuttall Review, with the introduction of an income tax 
exemption for certain qualifying cash bonuses paid by companies owned by EOTs. 
Recent Governments, including the Coalition Government formed in 2010, have pro-
moted the concept of what is now called a public service mutual. This is an organisa-
tion that delivers public services (such as community health care) but has “spun-out” 
of the public (state) sector and has employee control embedded within its organisa-
tion. This can be employee control through employee share ownership. The Mutuals 
Information Service managed by the Cabinet Office’s mutuals team, encourages and 
supports the establishment of public service mutual.124 By July 2014 there were 100 
public service mutual.125 
b) Reform of the legal framework for ESO 2012-14 – focus tax incentives 
Share plans may be tax advantaged or non-tax advantaged. Under current legislation 
there are four main tax advantaged plans, one share plan with several variations (SIP) 
and three share option plans (SRSO, CSOP and EMI). SIP and SRSO are broad-based 
“all-employee” plans, while CSOP and EMI may be restricted to selected employees. 
Some forms of non-tax advantaged plans are quite widespread: Long-Term Incentive 
Plans (LTIPs), Restricted Shares Plans and Unapproved (i.e., non-tax advantaged) Op-
tion Plans. LTIP and Restricted Shares Plans are predominantly confined to executives. 
                                           
123  The United Kingdom introduced an additional tax advantaged arrangement in 2013. “Employee Share-
holder” is an employment status with different employment rights to employees. In exchange for giving 
up certain employment law rights an individual must be awarded at least GBP 2,000 of shares in their 
employer or parent company. There is a capital gains tax exemption when these Employee Shareholder 
shares are sold. Only a very small number of the responses to the Government consultation on imple-
menting this proposal welcomed the scheme and this “shares for rights” scheme has been widely criti-
cised. 
124  Mutuals Information Service https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/mutuals-information-service.  
125  Cabinet Office Press Release (23 July 2014) https://www.gov.uk/government/news/cabinet-office-
mutuals-reach-century-success. 
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Unapproved Option Plans may be used to “top-up” awards under a tax advantaged 
plan. The following section will cover only rules concerning these tax advantaged 
plans. In addition, there is the Employee Shareholder status tax advantaged arrange-
ment.  
The past two years have seen some crucial legislative reform in the field of employee 
share ownership in the United Kingdom. A consultation on improving the operation of 
internal share markets was launched in 2012 following the publication of the Nuttall 
Review. This consultation resulted in “The Companies Act 2006 (Amendment of Part 
18) Regulations 2013” that came into force on 30 April 2013.  
This legislation allows for shareholder approval of off-market share buy backs by a 
simple majority, and where the share buy backs are connected to an employees’ share 
scheme (a term defined in the United Kingdom Companies Act) allows for this approv-
al to be granted in advance. Further, it gives private limited companies greater free-
dom to finance the share buy backs by allowing for such companies to pay for shares 
they buy back (in connection with an employees’ share scheme) in instalments (if the 
seller agrees) and by introducing a simplified regime for buying back shares out of 
capital (in connection with an employees’ share scheme), and involving small amounts 
of cash. In addition, the legislation allows all companies to hold shares bought back in 
treasury. The legislation retains the need for shareholder approval where necessary to 
protect the interests of shareholders and creditors. These provisions are deregulatory 
and voluntary and largely limited to buy backs linked to employees' share schemes. 
(The Nuttall Review 2013)  
Further, the Government has introduced a capital gains tax exemption and income tax 
exemption to promote employee ownership in the UK. Both these exemptions help 
simplify indirect employee ownership and, in particular, the capital gains tax exemp-
tion encourages its use as a solution to the growing challenge of finding a business 
succession in SMEs. The capital gains tax exemption is granted when a controlling in-
terest in a company is transferred to an EOT. The capital gains tax exemption applies 
from 6 April 2014 (Finance (No. 2) Bill 2013/14 Sch 33 Pt 1) and is unlimited in 
amount. Instead of a trade sale or other conventional forms of exit, owners may now 
opt for an EOT buyout as their succession solution. There is also from 1 October 2014 
(Finance (No. 2) Bill 2013/14 Sch 33 Pt 2), an exemption from income tax (but not 
NICs) of GBP 3,600 per employee per tax year for certain bonus payments made to all 
employees of a company where an EOT has a controlling interest. This provides a cash 
alternative to operating a SIP.  
The EOT is a more restrictive form of the employee trust more commonly used in the 
United Kingdom (the so-called “section 86 trust” because it meets the requirements in 
section 86 Inheritance Tax Act 1984). The initial indications are that the differences 
between an EOT and a section 86 trust are acceptable in the context of a trust that is 
designed to acquire and hold shares indefinitely on behalf of the employees. One addi-
tional restriction is that the EOT must not include a power for the trustee to make 
loans to beneficiaries. A key difference relates to who must benefit from any distribu-
tion from the EOT. A section 86 trust usually defines its beneficiaries by reference to 
employment with a particular body, but can limit the class of beneficiaries to ‘all or 
most’ of the persons employed by the body concerned and only selected employees 
may, in fact, benefit. In contrast, in an EOT, essentially, every employee of the rele-
vant company or group must be an eligible employee, except for certain excluded par-
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ticipators. A same terms requirement permits differing amounts to be paid to eligible 
employees, but every such employee must receive something if there is a distribution. 
The Government considered a change in English trust law to allow employee trusts to 
last forever instead of limiting their life to 125 years but has currently deferred action 
on this idea.126 
c) Existing ESO plans in detail  
Apart from this legislation several tax-advantaged ESPs operate in the United Kingdom 
to promote direct employee ownership: 
Tax-advantaged Share Plan – Share Incentive Plan (SIP) – The SIP was introduced 
in the Finance Act 2000 to replace the 1978 Approved Profit Sharing Scheme on which 
it is partially modelled. Several possible modifications made it more flexible. The em-
ployer company sets up a trust to serve as an intermediary in allocating shares to em-
ployees. The shares may be allocated without cost (“free shares”), at a discount, or at 
full price (“partnership shares”); also the employer may match the employee’s part-
nership shares (“matching shares”). Dividends paid on all shares may be reinvested in 
additional shares (“dividend shares”). Each plan is subject to specific requirements 
which, if met, confer substantial tax advantages on both employees and the employer 
company. These generally take the form of exemption from both personal income tax 
and NICs. The plan must include all employees, with the possible exclusion of those 
employed less than 18 months, and the same general provisions must apply to all par-
ticipants. Tax exemptions are valid for all versions of the plan after the shares have 
been held for five years, or earlier if the employee terminates his employment on ac-
count of injury, disability, redundancy, retirement or death; also if transferred under 
the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations, or on the em-
ployer company ceasing to be an associated company. Shares sold immediately after 
withdrawal are exempt from capital gains tax. Regulations specific to each type of 
award are as follows: 
Free shares cannot be withdrawn from the trust during a holding period of three to 
five years. However, if the employee withdraws the shares or his or her employment 
ceases between the third and fifth year for reasons other than above, personal income 
tax and NICs are payable on the lesser of market value on the award date and the 
market value on the withdrawal/cessation date. If the employment ceases for other 
than the stated reasons before the end of the three-year holding period, full personal 
income tax and NICs are imposed. An employee’s award of free shares in the plan is 
limited to GBP 3,600 per tax year (from the 2014/15 tax year).  
Partnership shares are purchased by the trust from a part of the employee’s pre-tax 
remuneration according to the employee’s agreement with the employer company. 
The shares are purchased either within 30 days of pay deduction or at the end of a 
specified accumulation period of up to 12 months.  An employee is limited to GBP 
1,800 per tax year (or 10 per cent of an employee’s annual gross salary)(from the 
2014/15 tax year). After the five-year holding period or termination of employment for 
the given reasons, the employee is exempted from personal income tax, and the em-
                                           
126  http://www.fieldfisher.com/publications/2014/06/the-employee-ownership-business-
model#sthash.vXBk0AlB.dpbs. 
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ployer exempt from NICs. If the employee withdraws the shares or his employment 
ends for a reason other than those stated between the third and fifth year, personal 
income tax and NICs are paid on the lesser of the amount of the employee contribu-
tions for purchase and the market value of shares on the date of withdrawal/cessation.  
Matching shares can be offered by the employer company up to two matching shares 
for each partnership share. These are allocated to the employee on the same day as 
partnership shares are acquired. The holding period is the same for matching shares 
as for free shares.  
Up to GBP 1,500 of dividends per annum may be used to purchase dividend shares. 
The general holding period for dividend shares is three years. If these shares are 
withdrawn or employment ends for other than stated reasons within five years of their 
acquisition, the employee is liable for personal income tax on the dividends used to 
purchase the shares. However, there is no liability for NICs. 
Tax-advantaged Share Option Plans – Savings-Related Share Option Scheme 
(SRSO) or Sharesave or SAYE Scheme, introduced by the Finance Act 1980, is cur-
rently the most popular plan judged by the number of participants. It must apply to all 
employees, except possibly those with relatively short service. The basic structure of 
the plan is as follows: the employee enters into a Save-as-you-earn (SAYE) contract 
with a designated bank or building society, agreeing to save a specified monthly 
amount (GBP 5 to 500) by deduction from after-tax remuneration for 3 or 5 years (a 
7-year contract was withdrawn in 2013) and the employer company grants him share 
options for the maximum number of shares he will be able to purchase at the exercise 
price with his SAYE savings. The SAYE contract always includes a tax-free bonus add-
ed to savings on completion, the amount depending on the term of the contract and 
the rates are set by HM Treasury. The share exercise price can be up to 20 per cent 
under the market value of the underlying shares at the time of the grant. At maturity 
of the SAYE contract, the employee is entitled to choose whether to exercise the op-
tion and retain or sell the shares or take the savings and bonus in cash. These re-
quirements fulfilled, the employee is not liable for personal income tax at grant or ex-
ercise. However, he must pay capital gains tax on the sale of shares. 
Company Share Ownership Plan (CSOP) was introduced in 1984 as a Discretionary 
Share Option Plan and re-launched in 1996 under the current name with amended re-
quirements. It is a discretionary plan which is often limited to executives but can also 
be broad-based. It is often connected to performance results, i.e., a certain goal must 
be reached before the option can be exercised. The following requirements also apply: 
the value127 of outstanding options per employee must not exceed GBP 30,000 at 
grant; the exercise price may not be less than market value at grant; the exercise pe-
riod may not be shorter than three nor longer than ten years after grant.128 These re-
quirements fulfilled, the employee is not liable for personal income tax at grant or ex-
ercise. 
Enterprise Management Incentives (EMI) was introduced by the Finance Act 2000 in 
order to help small, higher risk companies to recruit and retain highly qualified em-
                                           
127  The value is equal to the number of shares multiplied by the exercise price. 
128  Before 2003, an additional requirement had to be fulfilled: the exercise period had to be not less than 3 
years after any previous tax-free exercise. This requirement was abolished. 
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ployees. It applies to companies with gross assets of less than GBP 30 million.129 The 
plan can be selective. Approval of the HM Revenue & Customs is not required, but it 
must be notified of each stock option grant under EMI within 92 days. Options granted 
must not exceed a total market value of GBP 250,000 per employee (including any 
amount granted under a CSOP) or GBP 3 million for the company. If various require-
ments are fulfilled, neither employees nor the employer company are subject to per-
sonal income tax or NICs at grant or exercise. However, they must pay capital gains 
tax at the sale of shares. 
d) Incidence  
Profit-sharing plans first appeared in the UK at the end of the 19th century, while em-
ployee share plans (ESPs) were introduced in the 1950s. These plans, however, re-
mained small in number until the introduction of tax incentives in 1978. By 2012/2013 
10,160 companies maintained HM Revenue & Customs tax advantaged employee fi-
nancial participation plans.130 Following the abolition, from 2000, of a tax-advantaged 
cash profit sharing plan (Profit-Related Pay Scheme), the remaining tax advantaged 
plans were all share-based until the introduction of an income tax exemption for cer-
tain qualifying bonuses paid by companies owned by employee-ownership trusts 
(EOTs) in 2014.  
Four tax-advantaged ESPs operated in the 2012/2013 tax year and their breakdown is 
as follows: Share Incentive Plans (SIPs) were operated by 820 companies; Savings-
Related Share Option Schemes (SRSOs) (also known as Sharesave or SAYE Schemes) 
by 460 companies; Company Share Option Plans (CSOPs) by 1,110 companies, and 
Enterprise Management Incentives (EMI) share option arrangements by 8,590 compa-
nies. A substantial decline in the number of SAYE Schemes (from 1,110 to 460) and 
CSOPs (from 4,270 to 1,110) can be seen since 2001, but the number of EMI ar-
rangements has risen rapidly (from 870 to 8,590) while the number of SIPs has re-
mained stable over recent years.131 
Many companies combine one or more tax advantaged plans with non-tax advantaged 
plans (no statistics are available). Since tax advantaged plans involve events which 
are not all reported to HM Revenue and Customs, it is impossible to determine the ex-
act number of employees participating in plans at a given moment.  
According to the European Company Survey, a survey of more than 27,000 human 
resource executives across Europe conducted in 2013, 8.3 per cent of companies in 
the United Kingdom offer their employees stock-ownership schemes and 26.5 per cent 
offer some form of profit sharing. The European Working Conditions Survey, a regular 
household survey which in 2010 covered 43,816 randomly selected individuals in 34 
countries, shows that 5.16 per cent of British employees were taking part in employee 
share ownership schemes while 12.78 per cent of them were participating in profit-
sharing. 
                                           
129  Originally, the volume of assets was GBP 15 million (until 2003), but it was considered necessary to sub-
stantially increase it. 
130  Employee Share Schemes Statistics for 2012/13, HM Revenue & Customs, United Kingdom, Released 26 
June 2014, p. 7. 
131  Employee Share Schemes Statistics for 2012/13, HM Revenue & Customs, United Kingdom, Released 26 
June 2014, p. 8. 
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3. Focus: ESO via intermediary entities and trusteed plans  
There is a European trend towards using intermediary entities as a vehicle for share 
transfer in employee share ownership plans (ESOP schemes) because they limit risk of 
investment for employee shareholders, allow to implement leveraged investment and 
to pool voting rights after the shares are acquired. On the macroeconomic level, 
ESOPs support productivity and growth as well as strategic stabilisation of ownership 
contributing to the aims of the Europe 2020 strategy. 
a) Employee Stock Ownership Plans as a vehicle for business succession  
A full or partial Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP) buyout provides an ideal vehi-
cle to facilitate transitions in ownership and management of closely held companies. 
An ESOP usually involves a loan to an employee benefit trust, which acquires company 
stock and allocates it through periodic contributions to each employee's ESOP account. 
The loan is serviced by payments from the company out of company profits and out of 
dividends paid on the stock held by the ESOP. This field of action has been highlighted 
as one of the main objectives of the Council Recommendation of 7 December 1994 
and recently by the Commission, explicitly stressing the importance of ownership 
transfers to employees as a specific measure for facilitating business succession in 
SMEs. 
Creating a market for retiring shareholders’ shares 
ESOPs may easily buyout one or more shareholders while permitting other sharehold-
ers to retain their equity position. Furthermore, there is no dilution in equity per share 
of current stockholders since no new shares are issued and all shares are bought at 
fair market value. In this way the ESOP creates a market for retiring shareholders’ 
shares at a price acceptable to the owner—a market which otherwise might not exist. 
At the same time, when a change of control is appropriate, ownership is transferred to 
motivated employees who have a vital interest in the company’s long-term success. 
Thus, the ESOP may be an attractive alternative to selling the business to outsiders, 
especially when there is a desire to keep control of the business within a family or a 
key-employee group. As a trusteed plan, the ESOP is designed to pool employee’s 
voting rights.  The trustee exercises the voting rights while the employees are the fi-
nancial beneficiaries of the trust.  Of course, most ESOPs make some arrangement for 
the presence of employee representatives on the plan committee.  
While share ownership generally involves additional risk for employees, the ESOP 
avoids this consequence. Although employees, as in other share ownership schemes, 
are encouraged to allot part of their wealth into the shares of their own companies ra-
ther than those of other companies, resulting in concentrated rather than diversified 
risk, there is this fundamental difference: ESOP debt is funded by appropriately timed 
contributions from the company to an employee trust (ESOT). Thus the scheme pro-
vides an additional benefit to basic wages. The employee’s salary remains unaffected. 
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Figure 18. ESOP as a vehicle for business succession 
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Source: Lowitzsch et al. 2008. 
Furthermore, ESOPs make employees more motivated and productive while at the 
same time making enterprises more competitive.132 Finally, there is an additional ad-
vantage to the company: shares are not sold to outsiders; thus there is no risk of loss 
of control and the company remains local. As such ESOPs could strengthen bonds 
between enterprise and community, while keeping jobs local and more wage in-
come spent at home. 
Facilitating SME lending to finance business successions in SMEs can increase ESO. A 
public bank such as the European Investment Bank (EIB) could step in focussing its 
efforts more on providing senior and/or mezzanine capital for the transmission (buy-
out) of established mature companies. Providing loans to established mature compa-
nies is by definition less risky than for example providing loans for start-ups and new-
er SMEs. Further, providing loans for the transmission of established mature compa-
nies would enable the EIB to invest larger sums of money. As the experience from the 
U.S.—where this type of lending has become part of the texture of corporate Ameri-
ca—shows, loans made for ESOP buyouts have a much lower default rate than is the 
case with other types of loans. A related SME loan facility could be embedded, for ex-
ample in the EIB’s JEREMY programme. 
                                           
,!*  For a recent, comprehensive overview of the positive economic evidence (esp. for ESOPs) see Blasi, 
Kruse and Bernstein (2003); they find an average increase of productivity level by about 4 per cent, of 
total shareholder returns by about 2 per cent and of profit levels by about 14 per cent compared to firms 
without PEPPER schemes. 
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Incidence of ESOPs in the U.S. 
A recently completed study by the National Center for Employee Ownership found that 
as of the end of 2011, the number of ESOP and ESOP-like plans in the U.S. was 8,926. 
These plans covered 14.5 million participants and held USD 994.8 billion in assets: 
Table 28. Number of U.S. ESOPs and ESOP-like plans in 2011  
Type of Plan No of 
Plans 
No of 
Participants 
Employer 
Securities* 
Total for 
plans* 
Literal ESOPs 6,941         13.5m 214.4bn     942.5bn 
Large public-company ESOPs133 68 6.7m 90.3bn 548.9bn 
All other large ESOPs  
(>100 participants) 
2,832 6.7m 114.9 bn 382.0bn 
Small ESOPs  
(<100 participants) 
4,041 165,000          9.2 bn 11.6 bn 
ESOP-like plans  1,985          1.2m 18.6bn 52.8bn 
Total                                                8,926        14.7m 233bn 995.3bn 
Source: National Center for Employee Ownership 2011; * columns 4 and 5 in USD. 
Other EFP plans are less widely diffused. According to the Annual Survey of Profit 
Sharing and 401(k) Plans conducted by the Plan Sponsor Council of America in 2011, 
there are 686 IRS qualified profit sharing plan in existence. These plans cover 10.3 
million participants and hold USD 769 billion in plan assets.  
Furthermore, it seems that EFP plans are becoming more and more important with 
regards to retirement. According to the U.S. Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation, 
as of January 23, 2013, the number of defined benefit pension plans covered by the 
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation’s single-employer insurance program fell to an 
all-time low of 22,700, which is about 50 per cent of what it was in 1977. In addition, 
there were approximately 1,400 multi-employer plans in existence as of January 12, 
2013.  
b) Employee buyout mutual funds in France – the “FCPE de reprise” 
In 2006, the so-called “FCPE de reprise” (employee buyout mutual fund) was intro-
duced into the French system of EFP in order to allow employees to take over their 
employer company under preferential conditions.  
In France, employee share ownership is mostly acquired by means of profit-sharing 
plans as part of the overall system of EFP composed of the following major plans: “in-
téressement” profit sharing, “participation” profit sharing, short-term savings plans 
                                           
133  Large public company plans are defined as ESOP plans with more than USD 3.1 billion in total assets and 
not privately held.  This definition is based on the DOL definition of “mega plans,” as adjusted for infla-
tion. 
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(Plan d’epargne d’enterprise—PEE) and long-term savings plans (Plan d'epargne-
retraite collectif—PERCO). Within this system, invested employee earnings and match-
ing amounts of the employer company must be, and employee profit shares can be, 
transferred to mutual funds (Fonds commun de placement d’entreprise—FCPE), usual-
ly managed by assets management firms, i.e., branches of banks or insurance compa-
nies, which invest the assets on the capital markets, in shares or bonds of the em-
ployer company or of several different companies. If the employer company is not 
listed, the FCPE is obliged to invest one-third of assets in marketable shares or bonds. 
There are, however, two exceptions: (i) “FCPE simplifié”—a mechanism guarantying 
the liquidity (e.g., by the enterprise) is installed or the company buys back ten per 
cent of its own shares, or (ii) since 2006, the “FCPE de reprise”—all assets belong to 
employees planning to participate in a leveraged buyout. 
The new business succession vehicle is a specific form of FCPE to facilitate business 
succession in non-quoted SMEs: The “FCPE de reprise” is invested in unlisted se-
curities with the aim to acquire shares of the employer company or of a holding com-
pany set up in view of its acquisition reserved to the employees. It can be invested up 
to 95 per cent in shares of the purchased company vs 67 per cent in the case of the 
regular non-diversified FCPE. Thus, the liquidity reserve is limited to five per cent. The 
blocking period of sums allocated to the fund is until the completion of the takeover of 
the company but not less than five years. There are three cases of early release, i.e., 
disability, death and retirement, to ensure longevity and stability, in order to 
strengthen it as a business succession device and to reassure partners of this under-
taking. A holding company is created to carry the debt needed to buy out the compa-
ny. At least 15 employees—or one-third of employees in firms with fewer than 50 em-
ployees—must hold shares in the acquisition vehicle (holding) created. These employ-
ees may own unequal shares of the capital, and it is not required that the operation is 
offered to all employees.  
In essence, the “FCPE de reprise” as the new French vehicle—both, with regards to 
legal structure as well as financing mechanism—is very similar to its Anglo-American 
cousin, the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP). Both are share ownership 
schemes where the acquisition of shares via a trusteed fund (as intermediary entity) is 
financed by a profit share paid in addition to wages. Both may use borrowed funds on 
a leveraged basis, and both have the capacity to create substantial employee owner-
ship and can be used to finance ownership succession plans. Just as the ESOP, which 
is primarily popular as a business succession vehicle for SMEs134, the French “FCPE de 
reprise” creates a market for retiring shareholders’ shares, which is of major im-
portance to unlisted SMEs having no other ready source of liquidity.  
However, in 2012 only a couple of “FCPE de reprise” were reported. Given the de-
scribed advantages and the long tradition of EFP in France, the scarce incidence of is 
surprising. Large asset management companies are more interested in private equity 
transactions and the management of diversified employee savings plans, which is 
probably one of the main reasons why this device has not been often implemented 
yet. However, this essentially appears to be a problem of the limited knowledge of its 
existence among professionals in the concerned financial sector.  
                                           
134  As of 2010, there were approximately 11,500 ESOPs in the U.S., covering approximately ten million em-
ployees, most of them originating in a business succession transaction; for details see 3.2.2. above. 
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c) Employee ownership emerging from privatisation – Hungarian ESOPs 
In the course of transition, instruments for broad individual and collective participation 
of employees have been introduced. During the first stage of privatisation, the support 
of social partners and political parties, on the one hand, and the actual development of 
employee ownership, on the other, seemed to be promising. However, on the long 
run, the attempt of policy makers to turn a considerable proportion of Hungarians into 
owners, i.e., into small capitalists, and to establish an economic balance did not bring 
the desired outcome. Since then only about 300 ESOPs were established in total and 
less than one quarter is still functioning today. 
The legal framework for the Hungarian ESOPs, which already existed in practice, was 
laid down in Law XLIV of 1992 on the Employee Share Ownership Programme. Deriv-
ing from the U.S. ESOP model, the Hungarian ESOP structure simulates the Anglo-
American trust. It served a dual purpose: It transformed employees into owners of 
state-owned companies while accelerating the privatisation process. The legal frame-
work of the ESOP today largely retains its original form, though it has been amended 
several times, most recently in 2003. The ESOP Act enabled employees to acquire 
state property under preferential conditions, which were significantly limited by Law 
XXXIX of 1995 on Realisation of Entrepreneurial Property in State Ownership providing 
(i) credit facilities of up to 50 per cent of the value of the respective property to be 
purchased, with a ceiling of HUF 50 million; (ii) a discount corresponding to 150 per 
cent of an annual minimum wage. The total equity purchased by an ESOP was not to 
exceed 15 per cent of the nominal value of the company. The legal incentives are 
based on a governmental decree of 1991 on “Egzisztencia” credit and the amend-
ments of the ESOP Act of 1992 still in force. The fact that no ESOP loans have been 
granted since 1998, although the decree is still in force, shows that these conditions 
need revision, in particular abolishing the link of preferential credit conditions to the 
nearly terminated privatisation process. 
After 1996, one year after the amendment of the ESOP Act, the absolute number of 
ESOP organisations declined continuously. Following 1998, no more ESOPs have been 
established, and from 1996 on the number of ESOPs shrunk until 2010 to approxi-
mately one-fourth, which is also the lowest point. 
The primary cause for the decrease of Hungarian ESOPs was the lack of commitment 
to this idea and the lack of sufficient far-sightedness of political institutions. This is 
even more regretful, as companies in majority ownership of employees did not per-
form worse than other private economic entities. The Hungarian ESOP was a prema-
ture model, because policy makers did not change the provisions early enough and 
thus permitted the abuse of the original concept behind it. For these reasons, ESOP 
schemes were not as successful as they could have been in the long run, as they 
lacked the necessary sustainable provisions in the post-privatisation era. Furthermore, 
the time window of three to four years, when SMEs were privatised, was a period too 
short to be able to measure the real outcomes of ESOPs and to make policy amend-
ments to foster employee ownership. 
d) Strategic shareholding – employee shareholder’s foundations in Austria 
By the end of the 1990s, the Austrian government had become more supportive of 
employee financial participation. Behind this change in attitude were such factors as 
increasing competition with Eastern European economies, promotion of employee par-
ticipation by the EU, and impending privatization of several large state-owned compa-
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nies (e.g., voestalpine AG, Vienna Airport, Saline AG, AMAG, AUA, OMV). Both the 
trade unions and employers’ associations strongly support employee financial partici-
pation and co-operate with each other in this area.  
A government declaration from autumn 2013 announced that in the context of an im-
pending tax reform the doubling of the existing tax exemptions for share ownership 
scheme and the introduction of additional incentives for profit sharing are considered. 
The former proposal was supported by the social democrats and led to a motion by 
the liberals for a parliament resolution of September 2014135 while the latter is a pro-
ject associated with the Christian Democratic faction. 
Legal framework for leveraged share ownership plans 
The Law on Capital Market Offensive of 5 January 2001 amended the Austrian Income 
Tax Law (ITL) in relation to the taxation of private foundations. In view of prospective 
privatization of large state companies, a model for “strategic ownership” of employees 
had to be developed. An already existing business form, the private foundation, was 
chosen to serve as the vehicle of the leveraged employee share ownership plans. 
Whereas many large privatised enterprises use a private foundation under the Law on 
Private Foundations as an intermediary company (e.g., voestalpine AG, Saline AG, 
AMAG), some utilise a new form “employee participation foundation” (Belegschafts-
beteiligungsstiftung) defined in § 4, para. 11, no. 1(c), ITL (e.g., Vienna Airport).136  
The “employee participation foundation” holds and purchases the shares, exercises 
voting rights, and transfers returns to the employees.137 In contrast to direct employ-
ee share ownership plans, the beneficiaries of leveraged plans enjoying tax conces-
sions can also be retired employees and family members (spouses, children) of em-
ployees. A foundation can only be used for shares of domestic companies; the defini-
tion of affiliated companies in connection with the foundation was not extended in 
2005. The employer company can deduct the value of its own shares or money for 
purchasing shares transferred to the foundation as well as the costs of establishing 
and operating the foundation from the tax base of the corporate income tax.  
The foundation distributes the amount of contribution by the employer company over 
nine financial years, and EUR 1,460 per employee per annum is tax-free (§ 13, para. 
1, last sentence CTL). Dividends on shares held by the foundation are also tax exempt 
(§ 10, para. 1 CTL). However, the capital gains tax is imposed on contributions used 
for administration. The employee pays a capital gains tax on returns transferred by 
the foundation of up to EUR 1,460 and full personal income tax, but no social security 
contributions on the amount in excess thereof. 
The example of voestalpine Mitarbeiterbeteiligung Privatstiftung 
Voestalpine AG, headquartered in Linz, is principally engaged in the production and 
treatment of steel. As successful international corporate group with some 500 produc-
                                           
135 626/A(E)XXV.GP, Entschließungsantrag. 
136 In the literature it is objected that law restricts the economic activities of “employee participation foun-
dation” so that it cannot create reserves and make investments. In addition, this form cannot be utilised 
by small companies due to administrative complexity and prohibitive costs, therefore they use business 
forms as associations (Vereine), trusts (Treuhandschaften) and partnerships under civil law (GbR) in-
stead. 
137 In some companies, the shares are possessed by employees, whereas the “employee participation foun-
dation”only accumulates and exercises the voting rights. In such cases, the taxation is different. 
  ANNEX 3 – Examples of best-practice cases for ESO 
 
October 2014  |  137  
 
tion and sales companies in more than 50 countries, it has nearly 48,000 employees 
(fewer than half in Austria). In conjunction with discussions about full privatisation of 
the corporate group undertaken at the beginning of 2000, the group’s Management 
Board, in co-operation with employee representatives, developed and later imple-
mented an employee participation scheme, which was unprecedented in Austria. The 
result is that as of 2014 a large percentage of the group’s workforce, together with a 
small group of former employees currently holds a 13.8 per cent ownership stake, i.e., 
approximately 23.9 million shares (22.1 million from the scheme for the active and 
1.8 million from former employees) held by 23,500 employees which are administrat-
ed by a private foundation. This foundation, voestalpine Mitarbeiterbeteiligung 
Privatstiftung, representing the employee shareholders, has been the most stable 
core shareholder for years. Today, it is the second largest shareholder after the Raif-
feisenlandesbank Oberösterreich Invest GmbH & Co. (nearly 15 per cent). The chair-
man of the foundation’s governing body represents 13.8 per cent of the voting rights 
within the General Meeting of Shareholders. In addition, the foundation has had the 
power to nominate a representative to the Supervisory Board, a power it has had 
since 2004. 
The foundation not only administers the acquired stock, but also exercises all individu-
al voting rights due to a transfer of the ownership’s civil claim, governed by integrated 
trust agreements. This ensures the workforce an important vote within the General 
Meeting of Shareholders. Individual employees, however, retain their right to receive 
dividends. Fully utilising tax incentives and savings on social security contributions, 
shares were allocated to employees up to a maximum limit of EUR 1,460 per year. 
Employees’ shares remain within the foundation for the entire period of employment. 
The two principal bodies of the foundation are the Management Board and the Adviso-
ry Board. The group’s Management Board and Works Councils appoint an equal num-
ber of representatives. A representative for the employees chairs both bodies and 
casts the deciding vote in the event of a tie. The Advisory Board makes all decisions 
concerning employee participation schemes (e.g., their further development, admin-
istration of the assets, etc.) and is responsible for appointing the foundation’s Man-
agement Board. 
The workforce’s capital investment has proved its financial value. Each year since 
2000, the Voestalpine AG has declared a dividend. In the period from 2000 to 2014, it 
distributed a total of net EUR 76 million in dividends (after 25 per cent deduction CTL) 
to participating employees. Demonstrating confidence in their capital investment, 15 
per cent of them (3,450 individuals) have elected to re-invest their dividends. 3,600 
individuals already separated from the voestalpine AG, exercise their option to keep 
their “private shares” (around 1.8 million shares).   
4. Employee-owned SMEs – Polish spó!ki pracownicze 
The most significant form of EFP in Poland today is employee ownership. Poland’s pri-
vatisation programme was characterised by significant incentives for employee partici-
pation, especially in firms privatised by leasing and transformed into so-called Em-
ployee Companies (spó!ki pracownicze). Contrary to expectations, ownership 
structures in these companies have, on the whole, been relatively stable, with non-
managerial employees retaining, on average, a significant portion of enterprise shares. 
Although all current forms of financial participation may also be used in employee 
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compensation schemes outside of privatisation, there are no tax incentives to encour-
age this.  
Legal framework 
Polish employee companies emerged from Leverage-Lease-Buy-Out (LLBO) privatisa-
tion. This is one form of so-called liquidation privatisation introduced in 1990 which 
according to Art. 39 of the Law on Commercialisation and Privatisation (PrivL138) since 
1997 requires: relatively good financial and market conditions; no requirement for 
substantial investment to modernise, replace, develop equipment, etc; a yearly turno-
ver of max. EUR 6 million; a maximum of EUR 2 million of equity consisting of two en-
terprise funds; willingness of management and employees to assume the financial risk 
involved in undertaking a common investment (including third parties). A newly estab-
lished private company concludes an agreement with the State Treasury to lease the 
assets of the state enterprise for a maximum period of 15 years.139 The interest pay-
ment was set at 30 per cent (75 of 40 per cent) if the central bank refinance rate ex-
ceeded 40 per cent; in 1993 this was lowered to 50 per cent of the refinance rate.140 
Moreover, a leased company can apply to its founding organ for a reduction of interest 
payments owed as a result of postponements during the first two years of the leasing 
period if its investment expenditures out of profits amount to at least 50 per cent of its 
net profit. Finally, the corporate income tax law allows firms to include the interest 
portion of their lease payments as costs, thus reducing their tax liability.  
The new privatisation law in 1996 additionally leveraged the financial lease contracts 
in order to enhance the credit-worthiness of employee-leased firms applying for bank 
loans. Art. 52 PrivL makes it possible for full ownership to be acquired before the end 
of the contract if one-third of total leasing rates have been paid, provided that the 
balance sheet for the second business year of the company has been approved. If 
more than half of the total leasing rates have been paid, the blocking period is cut in 
half. Because of conditions on the Polish credit market, this regulation has become 
very important in practice.141 
Incidence 
By 2002, the most common way to manage a privatised enterprise was to lease it to 
an “Employee Company”. From 1990 until 2010, 62.4 per cent of enterprises undergo-
ing “direct privatisation” were transferred into private hand through this concept re-
sulting in a total of 1,563 Employee Companies with a population of 852 in the end of 
2010 employing a total of 131.5 thousand workers and an average size of 150 em-
ployees. (Lowitzsch and Wojtkowski 2014) Between 2000 and 2007 out of 185 leasing 
                                           
138  Of 30 August 1996, Dz. U. No. 118, Pos. 561, republished in Dz. U. 2002 No. 171, Pos. 1397, No. 240, 
Pos. 2055, with subsequent amendments. 
139  Until 2002 Art. 52 para. 1 PrivL foresaw a maximum of 10 years; the legal regulations for LLBOs are to 
be found in Art. 39 para. 1 No. 3 and 50 to 54 PrivL; it is reserved exclusively for Polish nationals and as 
an exception also legal persons (Art. 51, para. 1 No. 2 PrivL).  
140  Ordinance of the Minister of Finance of 13 May 1993, M. P. 1993 No. 26, Pos. 274, altering that of 7 May 
1991, M. P. 1991 No. 18, Pos. 123. 
141  Furthermore Art. 54 PrivL foresees the possibility to regulate the specific conditions of such leverage by 
Ordinance of the Council of Ministers including the possibility to reduce the threshold of paying 20 per 
cent of the net value of the object of the lease stated in Art. 51 para. 1 No. 3 PrivL to 15 per cent. In 
this context Art. 64 PrivL granted existing Employees Companies the right to renegotiate their contracts 
within 3 months of the Ordinance coming into power. 
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agreements with a total value of PLN 658 million only 14 were prematurely terminated 
due to late payments; by the end of 2009 around 68 firms were earmarked to be po-
tentially privatised by this method.142  
Until the end of 2010, their population decreased to 852 employing a total of 131.5 
thousand workers with an average size of 150 employees. It is difficult to obtain in-
formation on the reasons for the decline of employee ownership as Employee Compa-
nies are not a specific legal form of enterprise but registered together with all other 
corporations. It was certainly not economic distress: In 2010, Employee Companies 
have achieved a positive gross profit of PLN 2,322 million (as compared to 2,106.7 
million in 2009) with an average gross turnover profitability rate close to five per cent.  
Reacting to this decline, in the end of 2009, the Polish Government launched the cur-
rent programme to support Employee Companies entitled Supporting Privatisation 
Through Granting Sureties and Guarantees to Employee Companies and Civic Activity 
Companies. Beyond a system of guarantees for Employee Companies, the programme 
defines the Company of Civic Activity, a joint-stock company or limited liability com-
pany where 33 per cent shares belong to at least 30 per cent of the active employees 
of a privatised enterprise. 
Ownership structures in these employee companies have, on the whole, been relative-
ly stable, with non-managerial employees retaining, on average, a significant portion 
of enterprise shares. Research conducted in the late 1990s from a sample of 110 em-
ployee-leased companies privatised between 1990 and 1996 showed that on average 
the share of non-managerial employees in ownership decreased from 58.7 per cent 
immediately after privatisation to 31.5 per cent in 1999. Approximately 32 per cent of 
leasing-privatised firms were still majority-owned by non-managerial employees by 
mid-1999. Over time, more and more shares were also found in the hands of outsid-
ers, while the presence of strategic outside investors (including foreign investors) had 
begun to be felt in a minority of firms by the end of the last decade (see Lowitzsch 
2006, p. 237: Table 3). 
 
                                           
142  “Guide to employee privatisation” (PL), Ministry of the Economy 2009, p. 6, 37 i 42; their financial re-
sults were assessed positively by a Report of the Highest Control Chamber of March 2009.  
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ANNEX 4 – Technical description of the econometric 
models used in Chapter III  
1. Econometric modelling: The impact of EFP on company performance  
The econometric investigation of the relationship between EFP and performance is 
complicated because of the potential endogeneity between the two variables. Much of 
the previous studies estimated the impact of various EFP schemes on the performance 
of firms but overlooked the fact that the performance of firms may also affect the de-
cision of firms to offer EFP schemes or change the level of EFP for their employees. 
Furthermore, many of the factors that influence one variable also affect the other var-
iable. For both reasons, it is likely that the relationship between the two is endoge-
nous. Hence, direct estimation of this relationship without considering the endogeneity 
issue might lead to biased estimation of this relationship. In trying to overcome this 
problem, particularly given the dichotomous nature of the two main variables, this 
Study uses the ‘seemingly unrelated probit models’ which are a class of simultaneous 
equation models (Maddala 1983; Greene 2007). They draw upon an equation for the 
potentially endogenous dichotomous variable (EFP schemes in this case) and a struc-
tural form equation for the performance measures of interest (improvement in produc-
tivity and increase in employment). The basic overview of such models is as follows: 
!!! ! !!!!!! ! !!! 
!!! ! !!!!!! ! !!!!!! ! !!! !!
Where !!" represents the probability that a firm offers an EFP scheme and !!" represents 
company performance structural equation. !!" and !!" represent independed exoge-
nous variables, and !!", !!", !!" are estimated parameters. The error terms of the two 
models are dependent and distributed as a bivariate normal so that !!!!"! ! !!!!"! ! !, 
!"#!!!"! ! !"#!!!"! ! !, and ! ! !"#!!!"! !!"!. Various tests provide the evidence for the 
correlation between the unobserved explanatory variables of both equations so that if 
! ! !, then !!" is exogenous for the second equation. Within this parametric framework 
the hypothesis of exogeneity of the dummy can be defined as the absence of correla-
tion between the two equation’s error terms, and submitted to statistical tests.  
The EFP model, the probability of a firm offering an EFP scheme is as follows: 
!"# !
!!
!!!!
!
!! ! !!!"#$%& ! !!!"#$% ! !!!"#$!!"#!$"%&! ! !!!"#$%& ! !!!"#$%& ! !!!"#$%& ! !!!"" !
!!!"#$%&'(%)"# ! !!!"#$%&'$'%( ! !!"!"#$#%"$&!!"#$%& ! !!!!!!"#$%"#!!"#!!"#$% !
!!"!"#$!!"#$#!!!"#!!"#$%&'"! ! !!"!"!!"!!"#$%&"! ! !!"!"#!!!"#$$%&! "#$%#& !
!!"!"#$%&''!!"#!"$"%&'&()% ! !!"!"#$%&'( ! !! !! …     (q1 equation) 
The performance model of this Study is as follows: 
!"#$%&'"'()*!!"!!"#$%&!!"#$%&'()('*!!"!!"#$%&"'() !
!!
!!!!
! !! ! !!!"# ! !!!"#$%& !
!!!"#$% ! !!!"" ! !!!"#$!!"#!$ ! !!!"#$%& ! !!!"#$%& ! !!!"#$%& ! !!!"#$!"#$!%&' !
!!"!"#$%&'$'%( ! !!!!"#$#%"$&!!"#$%& ! !!"!!!"#$%"#!!"#!!"#$% ! !!"!"#$!!"#$#!!!"#!!"#$%&'"! !
!!"!"!!"!!"#$%&"! ! !!"!"#$! ! !! !!  …       (q2 equation) 
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In the q2 equation, the dependent variable is the probability of a company exhibiting 
improvement in performance indicators (growth in productivity or employment). Inde-
pendent variables include a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if company offers an 
EFP scheme (the EFP variable) and 0 otherwise; as well as other dummy variables 
controlling for size, region and sector of activity.  
In the q1 equation, the depended variable is the probability of a company offering EFP 
schemes (employee share ownership or profit sharing). The independent variables in-
clude control variables as in q2 as well as three additional instrumental variables as 
exclusion restriction. These variables control for employee characteristics (proportion 
of high skilled workers) as well as HR practices (the existence of employee representa-
tion and the organization of work in teams). The dependence of EFP on these variables 
have already been demonstrated using the 2009 ECS data (Hashi and Hashani 2013). 
The description of variables in the two equations is provided in Table A1. For this exer-
cise, the data from ECS 2009 and 2013 were pooled together. 
Table A1. Description of variables  
Name of the variable Description 
Dependent variables  
Labour productivity improvement 
Value of 1 if the company reported improvements in labour 
productivity in the last three years, 0 otherwise 
Increase in employment 
Value of 1 if the company reported an increase in the number of 
employees in the last three years, 0 otherwise 
Independent variables  
Employee share ownership schemes  Value of 1 if the employer offers share ownership, 0 otherwise 
Profit-sharing schemes Value of 1 if the employer offers profit-sharing, 0 otherwise 
Proportion of high skilled workers*  Proportion of high skilled workers in total workforce (in percentage) 
Small (Base category) 1 if the company has less than 50 employees, 0 otherwise  
Medium  1 if the company has between 50-249 employees, 0 otherwise 
Large 1 if the company has more than 250 employees, 0 otherwise 
Sector 
1. Manufacturing (Base category) 
2. Electricity 
3. Financial sector 
4. Wholesale and trade 
5. Construction 
6. Real estate and transport 
7. Other services 
1 if the company operates in the particular sector, 0 otherwise  
Region 
1. Western Europe (base category)  
1 if a company is from Western Europe, 0 otherwise  
(Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Ireland, UK) 
2. Iberia region 
1 if a company is from Iberian region and 0 otherwise 
(Spain and Portugal) 
3. Nordic region 
1 if a company is from Nordic region and 0 otherwise 
(Finland, Sweden, Denmark) 
4. Central and Eastern Europe 
1 if a company is from Central and Eastern Europe and 0 otherwise 
(Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, 
Bulgaria) 
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5. Southern Europe 
1 if a company is from Southern Europe, 0 otherwise 
(Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta) 
6. Baltic region 
1 if a company is from Baltic region, 0 otherwise 
(Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) 
 2013 1 if an observation is from the year 2013 and 0 if an observation is 
from the year 2009 
Teamwork 1 if a company organises its work in teams, 0 otherwise 
Employee representation 1 if a company has some form of employee representation, 0 oth-erwise 
* Continuous variables. Source: ECS 2009 and 2013. 
The results are presented in Table A2 and A3. Table A2 and Table A3 are divided into 
two panels each (panel 1 and panel 2) with two sets of results (Specification 1 and 
Specification 2, representing two different specifications of the model). The first panel 
represents q2 equation, i.e., the structural equation for the performance measures 
(improvement in labour productivity in Specification 1 and increase in employment in 
Specification 2). The second panel represents the results of q1 equation, i.e., the 
equation for the potentially endogenous dichotomous variable (employee share owner-
ship in Table A2 and profit sharing in Table A3). 
The coefficients in all specifications are mostly significant, and their magnitude and the 
direction of the effects are as expected. Results (Table A2 and A3) show that inde-
pendent variables are jointly significant, as the Wald chi2 statistic is statistically signif-
icant in all specifications respectively with the p value of absolute zero. Likelihood ra-
tion test of the covariance (rho coefficient) is statistically significant in all cases indi-
cating that if the endogeneity has not been addressed, the results would have been 
biased and inconsistent. As a robustness check, the regressions were also run sepa-
rately for ECS 2009 and 2013. The results were consistent and similarly highly signifi-
cant. For the seemingly unrelated probit model, the estimated coefficients do not have 
a direct economic interpretation. Therefore, the results are interpreted in terms of 
predicted probabilities. The predicted probability allows one to simulate changes in 
firm characteristics and note respective difference. The predicted probabilities that a 
company will have improvements in either labour productivity or employment levels 
when controlling for presence of employee share ownership and/or profit sharing are 
presented in Chapter III in the form of a number of scenarios. Predicted probabilities 
are calculated using the ‘margins’ command in STATA 13.  All predicted probabilities 
are statistically significant. Additional technical details are available from the authors. 
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Table A2. Results from seemingly unrelated probit model (controlling for presence of 
ESO schemes) 
PANEL 1  
(q2 equation: the structural form equation for the performance measures of interest; productivity and 
employment), controlling for the presence of ESO schemes 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 
 Improvement in labour productivity Improvement in employment 
Variable Coefficient p- values Coefficient p- values 
Employee share ownership 0.902*** 0.000 0.804*** 0.000 
Medium 0.163*** 0.000 0.202*** 0.000 
Large 0.229*** 0.000 0.248*** 0.000 
Southern EU -0.048** 0.054 -0.184*** 0.000 
Baltic 0.126*** 0.000 -0.139*** 0.000 
Iberia -0.263*** 0.000 -0.291*** 0.000 
Nordic 0.281*** 0.000 -0.008 0.747 
CEE 0.135*** 0.000 -0.224*** 0.000 
Construction -0.255*** 0.000 0.045* 0.080 
Electricity -0.019 0.751 -0.025 0.681 
Financial sector  0.081* 0.082 0.245*** 0.000 
Wholesale  -0.034* 0.064 0.085*** 0.000 
Real estate and transport -0.012 0.581 0.268*** 0.000 
Other services 0.018 0.457 0.266*** 0.000 
_2013 -0.221*** 0.000 -0.113*** 0.000 
Constant term 0.019 0.292 -0.522*** 0.000 
PANEL 2 
(q1 equation: equation for the potentially endogenous dichotomous variable; ESO in this case). 
Employee share ownership  Improvement in labour productivity Improvement in employment 
Medium 0.188*** 0.000 0.199*** 0.000 
Large 0.413*** 0.000 0.428*** 0.000 
Southern EU -0.243*** 0.000 -0.259*** 0.000 
Baltic -0.156*** 0.002 -0.175*** 0.000 
Iberia 0.151*** 0.000 0.147*** 0.000 
Nordic 0.250*** 0.000 0.245*** 0.000 
CEE -0.136*** 0.000 -0.163*** 0.000 
Construction 0.011 0.783 0.027 0.480 
Electricity 0.191* 0.019 0.203** 0.011 
Financial sector  0.213*** 0.000 0.201*** 0.000 
Wholesale  0.008 0.792 -0.003 0.929 
Real estate and transport 0.094** 0.005 0.079* 0.015 
Other services -0.328*** 0.000 -0.361*** 0.000 
Proportion of high-skilled workers 0.007*** 0.000 0.007*** 0.000 
Teamwork 0.298*** 0.000 0.276*** 0.000 
Employee representation  0.137*** 0.000 0.100*** 0.000 
Constant term -2.098*** 0.000 -2.063*** 0.000 
 
rho 
- 0.419*** 
chi2(1) =  
39.58 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.000 
-0. 395*** 
chi2(1) =  
33.09 
Prob > chi2 = 
0.000 
Number of observations 32,825 33,929 
Wald Chi 2 2869*** 0.000 2625*** 0.000 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Source: ECS 2009 and 2013. 
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Table A3. Results from seemingly unrelated probit model (controlling for presence of 
PS schemes) 
PANEL 1  
(q2 equation: the structural form equation for the performance measures of interest; productivity and 
employment), controlling for the presence of PS schemes 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 
 Improvement in labour productivity Improvement in employment 
Variable Coefficient p- values Coefficient p- values 
Profit sharing 0.953*** 0.000 0.520*** 0.000 
Medium 0.062*** 0.001 0.162*** 0.000 
Large 0.089*** 0.001 0.205*** 0.000 
Southern EU 0.024 0.342 -0.154*** 0.000 
Baltic 0.093*** 0.002 -0.151*** 0.000 
Iberia -0.194*** 0.000 -0.247*** 0.000 
Nordic 0.221*** 0.000 -0.017 0.489 
CEE 0.107*** 0.000 -0.238*** 0.000 
Construction -0.198*** 0.000 0.069** 0.007 
Electricity -0.053 0.377 -0.032 0.611 
Financial sector  0.059 0.193 0.255*** 0.000 
Wholesale  -0.037** 0.039 0.082*** 0.000 
Real estate and transport 0.013 0.557 0.294*** 0.000 
Other services 0.096*** 0.000 0.299*** 0.000 
_2013 -0.240*** 0.000 -0.136*** 0.000 
Constant term -0.138*** 0.000 -0.592*** 0.000 
PANEL 2 
(q1 equation: reduced form equation for the potentially endogenous dichotomous variable; PS in this 
case). 
Profit sharing  Improvement in labour productivity Improvement in employment 
Medium 0.295*** 0.000 0.296*** 0.000 
Large 0.452*** 0.000 0.457*** 0.000 
Southern EU -0.292*** 0.000 -0.300*** 0.000 
Baltic 0.031 0.351 0.045 0.164 
Iberia -0.153*** 0.000 -0.150*** 0.000 
Nordic 0.216*** 0.000 0.218*** 0.000 
CEE 0.051** 0.013 0.034* 0.095 
Construction -0.169*** 0.000 -0.153*** 0.000 
Electricity 0.159** 0.011 0.139*** 0.023 
Financial sector  0.080*** 0.085 0.078* 0.088 
Wholesale  0.038* 0.054 0.037* 0.057 
Real estate and transport -0.114*** 0.000 -0.122*** 0.000 
Other services -0.436*** 0.000 -0.445*** 0.000 
Proportion of high-skilled workers 0.007*** 0.000 0.007*** 0.000 
Teamwork 0.236*** 0.000 0.191*** 0.000 
Employee representation  0.221*** 0.000 0.231*** 0.000 
Constant term -1.167*** 0.000 -1.144*** 0.000 
 
rho 
- 0.508*** 
chi2(1) =  
94.52 
Prob > chi2 
= 0.000 
-0.254*** 
chi2(1) =  
17.74 
Prob > chi2 = 
0.000 
Number of observations 32,928 34,050 
Wald Chi 2 5499*** 0.000 3995*** 0.000 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Source: ECS 2009 and 2013. 
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2. Propensity score matching: Estimating the potential for EFP 
Although only a small proportion of firms in the ECS sample offer EFP schemes to their 
employees, there are many other firms with similar characteristics which, under other 
conditions, may also be willing to initiate such schemes. Perhaps, they do not have 
sufficient knowledge of, and information about, these schemes and their impact; or  
perhaps the environment is not conducive to the initiation of such schemes. Given that 
it is possible to identify factors which influence the adoption of EFP schemes, it is also 
possible to apply this knowledge to firms which currently do not offer any scheme and 
identify those that, under different circumstances, may be able to offer. In order to 
estimate the likely number of companies that may offer any EFP schemes, a matching 
technique may be used. Matching can be applied in almost any context as long as 
there is a group of companies engaging in an action and a group of companies not en-
gaged in that action; the former group can serve as a suitable benchmark. It relies on 
observed characteristics to construct a comparison group, assuming there are no un-
observed differences among the two groups.   
In order to find a matching group, it is necessary to find companies with similar char-
acteristics in the two groups, or approximate the characteristics of firms from the two 
groups as closely as possible. If the number of characteristics is small, it would be 
easy to find companies in the two groups with very similar characteristics. But as the 
number of characteristics increases, the chances of finding companies with similar 
characteristics (matching companies) decrease.143 This problem can be resolved by 
using the propensity score matching (PSM) technique developed by Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983). PSM does not try to match all characteristics of firms but, instead, it 
estimates a single propensity score for each firm (from both groups) that represents 
the likelihood of a firm offering an EFP scheme. It is then relatively easy to identify 
firms that have similar scores. In effect, PSM reduces the dimensionality problem into 
one single score which is then used for matching.  
The observable characteristics used to estimate the propensity score were already 
identified in Hashi and Hashani (2013), in a model similar to equation 1 in section 1 of 
this Annex, i.e., estimating the probability of a firm offering an EFP scheme. The pro-
pensity scores of the group of companies offering PS and ESO were estimated sepa-
rately using Stata user written programme (psmatch2). Using observable characteris-
tics this programme implements propensity score matching methods to match compa-
nies that offer PS and ESO schemes against those that do not. The procedure is based 
on estimating a probit model described as in the q3 equation below. .     
!"#$%&'()*!!"#$%!!"# ! !! ! !!!"#$%& ! !!!"#$% ! !!!"#$!!"#!$"%&! ! !!!"#$%& ! !!!"#$%& !
!!!"#$%& ! !!!"" ! !!!"#$%&'(%)"# ! !!!"#$%&'$'%( ! !!"!"#$#%"$&!!"#$%& !
!!!!!!"#$%"#!!"#!!"#$% ! !!"!"#$!!"#$#!!!"#!!"#$%&'"! ! !!"!"!!"!!"#$%&!" !
!!"!"#$%&''!!"#!"$"%&'&()% ! !!"!"#$%&'( ! !! !      (q3 equation) 
The depended variable is the propensity score (i.e. likelihood of a firm offering an EFP 
scheme). The Propensity Scoring Algorithm was run using the following independent 
variables: size of the company; region where the company is located; sector of activi-
                                           
143 This is known as the ‘curse of dimensionality’ and it increases exponentially with the increase in the 
number of characteristics against which one wants to match firms from the two groups. 
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ty; presence of an employee representation arrangement; and whether work organ-
ised in teams. The precise definition of these variables is provided in Table A1, earlier 
in this Annex. 
In all specifications, the diagnostic tests are valid showing that the group of companies 
offering EFP schemes do have comparison observations ‘nearby’ in the propensity 
score distribution. Also, the characteristic used for matching is found to be statistically 
significant determinants of likelihood of companies offering EFP schemes. Additional 
technical details are available from the authors. 
In reality the firms offering EFP may also have other characteristics, which are either 
not specified in the data set or they are not observable at all. To the extent that there 
are other variables affecting the probability of a firm offering a scheme, the procedure 
overestimates the number of matching firms with similar propensity scores. For this 
reason, in Chapter 3, we have allowed a 50 per cent margin of error to account for 
such unobservable characteristics. 
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